In the Netherlands, new horizontal forms of accountability have in recent years been introduced for executive agencies. These forms of accountability address other stakeholders besides the hierarchical principal. It includes for example demonstrating responsiveness to clients, independent overseers or professional standards. In this article, two related questions are answered. At first the question is posed whether horizontal accountability can be regarded as a substitute for democratic accountability or as complementary to it. The second question is how their introduction fits with traditional (vertical) forms of accountability. The article is based on a qualitative research that was carried out in 2005 and 2006 on nine large Dutch executive agencies. It focuses on two types of horizontal accountability: accountability of agencies to boards and to an independent evaluation committee ('visitation'). The article concludes that horizontal accountability is best regarded as complementary to democratic accountability. Horizontal accountability has added value because it invokes learning processes. In addition, the introduction of horizontal forms of accountability creates a redundant accountability regime for executive agencies in which they account for the same actions to different accountees. Redundancy has the advantages that it mitigates information asymmetry and incorporates the different expectations for agencies. |
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Artikel |
Horizontale verantwoording bij zelfstandige uitvoeringsorganisaties: redundant en complementair |
Auteurs | Thomas Schillemans |
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie |
Artikel |
Verticale politiek in horizontale beleidsnetwerken: kaderstelling als koppelingsarrangement |
Auteurs | Joop Koppenjan, Mirjam Kars en Haiko van der Voort |
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie |
Horizontal governance arrangements potentially conflict with the very principles of representative democracy and, likewise, with the existing political institutions. This conflict manifests itself in the interaction between representatives and the executive power: although the former have the formal power, the latter participates in horizontal networks and therefore has the resources that are necessary to form good policy. This erodes the power position of representatives. Frame work setting is commonly suggested as an arrangement for representatives to enhance their grip on policy processes in network-settings. The authors of this contribution examine the effects of frame setting as coupling mechanism between horizontal networks and vertical politics in six policy processes in a Dutch Province. Based on both theory and research findings they redefine the concept of framework setting in order to make it more attuned to the complex, interdependent and dynamic nature of policy-making in networks. |
Artikel |
Naar een Europees corporatisme?Een vergelijking van de sociale en civiele dialoog op Europees niveau |
Auteurs | Inge Bleijenbergh en Taco Brandsen |
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie |
The European Commission has attempted to incorporate non-state actors in European decision-making through the so-called 'social dialogue' and 'civil dialogue'. The actors involved in the two dialogues are, respectively, social partners and civil society organisations. In this article we compare the two dialogues in terms of theories on the development of corporatist governmental arrangements. Our analysis shows that, whereas the social dialogue can now be characterised as corporatist, the civil dialogue remains pluralist in nature. We account for this difference by considering the interests of the actors involved, windows of opportunity and internal responsiveness. |
Artikel |
'Anorexia consulta'?Afslanking adviesinfrastructuur Rijksdienst, deel 2 |
Auteurs | Rob Hoppe |
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie |
The Netherlands has a well-developed, internationally unique system of expert advice founded in law. In addition to being instrumental for problem solving, advisory bodies are assigned tasks in mid- and long-term strategy formulation, putting new issues on the agenda, and organizing countervailing powers and checks and balances in national policy formulation. A decade ago, the number of advisory bodies was drastically reduced. Present cabinet policy pursues a second round of slimming advisory infrastructure. Through political centralization of demand for advice, and a further reduction in the number and diversity of advisory bodies, serviceable and instrumental expert advice for policy is prioritized. In times of new wicked problems for governance, there is a serious threat of erosion of expert policy advice as countervailing power. Does the present cabinet suffer from 'anorexia consulta'? |
Discussie |
Wereldtaal |
Discussie |
A Global, Community Building Language? |
Auteurs | Amitai Etzioni |
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie |
Although long recognized as beneficial, a global language has not come to fruition despite considerable past efforts. A major reason is that many policy makers and citizens fear that such a universal language would undermine the particularistic, constituting primary languages of local and national communities. This dilemma can be greatly diminished by a two tier approach, in which efforts to protect the primary language will be intensified but all the nations involved would agree to use the same second language as the global one. Although theoretically the UN or some other such body could choose such a language, in effect English is increasingly occupying this position. However, policies that are in place slow down the development of a global language, often based on the mistaken assumption that people can readily gain fluency in several languages. |
Boekbespreking |
Godsdienst en politiek: secularisatie of herkersteningOnder redactie van Sanneke Kuipers |
Auteurs | Wim van Noort |
Auteursinformatie |