Samenvatting

In the Netherlands, new horizontal forms of accountability have in recent years been introduced for executive agencies. These forms of accountability address other stakeholders besides the hierarchical principal. It includes for example demonstrating responsiveness to clients, independent overseers or professional standards. In this article, two related questions are answered. At first the question is posed whether horizontal accountability can be regarded as a substitute for democratic accountability or as complementary to it. The second question is how their introduction fits with traditional (vertical) forms of accountability. The article is based on a qualitative research that was carried out in 2005 and 2006 on nine large Dutch executive agencies. It focuses on two types of horizontal accountability: accountability of agencies to boards and to an independent evaluation committee ('visitation'). The article concludes that horizontal accountability is best regarded as complementary to democratic accountability. Horizontal accountability has added value because it invokes learning processes. In addition, the introduction of horizontal forms of accountability creates a redundant accountability regime for executive agencies in which they account for the same actions to different accountees. Redundancy has the advantages that it mitigates information asymmetry and incorporates the different expectations for agencies.