When the corona virus was reported in the Netherlands in March 2020, it also had a major impact on public administration. At that time it was still completely unclear which consequences would be temporary and which would be permanent, but it was immediately clear that it presented unique study material. There was every reason to quickly start describing, analysing and interpreting the first consequences of the fight against corona for politics, administration and policy, with a focus on local authorities. That is why in April 2020, with the support of the Dutch Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, the ‘Corona papers’ research programme was set up by the Thorbecke Chair (Geerten Boogaard), in which a number of renowned scientists took part. Platform31 (Rogier van der Wal) was also involved. It took care of the accompanying website and newsletters and organised the final conference. Five of these ‘Corona papers’ have been revised and updated for this special issue.

A crisis brings existing vulnerabilities to the surface and clearly shows where the strong qualities of a society and its governance can be found. In the Netherlands, the corona pandemic has also exposed strengths and weaknesses according to that pattern. An important example of this is the region’s strong and complex position in our domestic governance. The author points out three lessons from the long post-war history of failed attempts to adjust the administrative organisation of our country. This leads to three proposals for embedding the region in the existing administrative organisation. The three steps would not be necessary if there were political support for a small adjustment to the administrative structure of the Netherlands, namely a reduction of the provincial scale. A step-by-step, cautious adjustment in the eyes of the author therefore gives more chance of success than a radical administrative reorganisation, which is doomed to fail in this country. For example, the cautious steps could be a prelude to a new and smaller provincial scale.

This article examines the rally round the flag in the Netherlands during the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic in the spring of 2020, i.e. the rise in trust in political authorities in response to the external threat. The authors use unique panel data to do this, the first of which took place in the days before the announcement of the first national lockdown (mid-March 2020), and the second shortly after the announcement of the reopening of schools (late April/early May 2020). This allows them to isolate the rally in time. Their research shows that the government in particular has gained confidence. Confidence in other political institutions rose to a lesser extent; confidence in the police and the judiciary did not increase. We can best understand the rise in confidence as a decline in cynicism: during the first wave, politicians were less often portrayed as incompetent, which proved to be a motivator for increasing confidence. Fear of contamination was an important motivation for increasing confidence. Under the influence of the external threat, people placed their hopes on political authorities. Both mechanisms may explain that confidence rose particularly sharply among voters of radical right parties, although radical right voters remained the least trusting voters.

At the beginning of the corona crisis, there was a real wave of solidarity actions, for example people helping each other in villages and neighbourhoods, and buying food from close by. At the same time, opinion articles appeared about the historical-social context in which the COVID-19 virus could have such a rapid impact on society. These two observations have led to this research into the potential of citizen collectives in times of crisis. First, it was shown that, in combating the pandemic, governments paid little or no attention to the possibilities of citizen collectives to reach citizens in villages, districts and neighbourhoods through direct, personal channels. In contrast, the analysis of 20 opinion articles from the period March-June 2020 shows that the value shifts that most authors consider desirable to address the big issues in society are a good fit with the values that citizen collectives represent. For three domains – care and housing, work and food – this is illustrated with existing practices and new needs. Their conclusion is that the government would do well to make a strong appeal to the organizing capacity of active citizens, their networks and community strength when tackling major social challenges related to climate, energy, care, food and housing.

As soon as uncertainty rears its head, mistrust increases and people seek interpretation and clarity. Both reactions strongly appeal to the ability of public organisations to make contact precisely then, at the critical moments. That’s no mean feat. What makes establishing and perpetuating contact in a unique context such as the corona crisis so complex? That question is central to this contribution. The authors set up their consideration from the philosophy of appreciative communication. The complexity lies in several things, first of all, the necessary customisation. Management is communication and communication is people’s work and that makes it custom work. In a crisis, you cannot simply fall back on protocols, existing policies, etc. The situation requires constant reassessment, coordination and making choices. In addition, you have to make those choices in an ever-changing context that is characterised by factors such as the initial invisibility of the problem, the unprecedented scale, the uncertain course, the indivisibility of the government, and the unease with the government. In combination with a number of faltering communicative levers, various tensions arise that complicate the contact and thus the administrative task. The authors identify seven contact keys from the philosophy of appreciative communication that can be helpful in practice and conclude with a review of these ideas based on the communicative tasks identified by the Dutch Safety Board in its first evaluation. What takes place in a crisis is not an isolated communicative task that can be outsourced, but reveals a quality that is the guiding principle in everyone’s – managerial – actions.

The corona crisis has shaken up the tasks, roles and relationships in the Municipal Executive (B&W) in the Netherlands. The question is what this has meant for the role and for the position of aldermen: the relationship between aldermen themselves, their relationship with the mayor, the municipal council, the civil service and society. A digital survey was used to investigate whether and how the crisis measures have changed the role and the position of aldermen. In addition, questions were asked about policy changes as a result of the corona crisis. The survey was completed by 145 aldermen, bringing the response rate to 10%. The corona crisis had a major impact on the role and position of aldermen. Their contacts with civil servants have become more intensive across the board, their boards have become more collegial and their mayors have taken on a more guiding and coordinating role. Contacts with the municipal councils are less intensive as a result of the corona crisis, which does not apply to their own groups. Relations with companies and institutions have been strengthened; those with citizens have remained unchanged.