Beleid en Maatschappij

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Aflevering 4, 2012 Alle samenvattingen uitklappen

Van de redactie

Auteurs Ewald Engelen

Ewald Engelen
Ewald Engelen is voorzitter van de redactie van Beleid en Maatschappij.

Handelingsperspectieven in het politiek-financieel complex

Trefwoorden financial crisis, action logics, decision-making theories, regulatory bodies, financial institutions
Auteurs Dr. Kutsal Yesilkagit

    The world-wide meltdown of financial markets is one of the largest human-made crises in modern times. The question that trembles on the lips of many researcher is why the main actors, all considered as rational, have displayed such self-destructing behaviour. Answers have been sought and partially found in theories as varied as ‘regulatory capture’, ‘failed regulation’, and inadequate crisis management. In this special issue, an alternative view is suggested. The financial sector, like any other complex sector, is made up of loosely coupled actors and actor settings (i.e. financial institutions, regulatory bodies, political actors), each driven by different action logics. The studies in this special issue each deeply examine the action logic of one actor group. The purpose of this issue is hence to parcel out the various action logics and suggest directions for further research to combine better the various actors and their differing action logics.

Dr. Kutsal Yesilkagit
Kutsal Yesilkagit is universitair hoofddocent bestuurskunde aan de Universiteit Utrecht. Correspondentiegegevens:

Morele verantwoordelijkheid te midden van meervoudigheid

De toegevoegde waarde van het kritische individu in complexe omgevingen met meervoudige belangen

Trefwoorden financial markets, financial regulation, lobbying, financial crisis, policy paradigms
Auteurs Dr. Liesbeth Noordegraaf-Eelens en Lotte van Vliet MA

    The lessons learned from the financial crisis are not necessarily limited to the financial sector. Both the financial sector and the public sector have to deal with perverse effects. The effects can be related to a reduction of complexity and plurality through introducing (oversimplified and one dimensional) models and financial incentives. However, in doing this, complexity and plurality are often lost: the neglect of multiple interests, goal replacement and too much focus on short term results. As a consequence perverse effects arise.
    Public sectors and organizations face internal and external pressure to act as they do. At the level of organizations or groups this may involve groupthink; at institutional level uniformity is promoted by the dynamics of isomorphism. This article is a critique on simplification and a plea for the (re)introduction of plurality. More specifically, we stress the importance of individual moral responsibility as a resource for and a way to preserve plurality. Not because that is the only option, but because it is an option that we believe deserves more attention. Other options such as changing regulations and changing the structure of supervision are already broadly discussed. We want to draw attention to the individual as parts of multiple organizations and systems. Individuals are therefore a natural carrier of multiplicity and plurality. Taking moral responsibility serious is not an easy task, but a meaningful step towards awareness of perverse effects due to reduction of complexity and plurality.

Dr. Liesbeth Noordegraaf-Eelens
Liesbeth Noordegraaf-Eelens is als universitair docent verbonden aan de Erasmus School of Economics. Eerder verschenen van haar De overspelige bankier (2004) en Op naar de volgende crisis (2009). In 2010 promoveerde zij op het proefschrift Contested Communication. A Critical Analysis of Central Bank Speech. Liesbeth Noordegraaf-Eelens is een van de auteurs van het RMO-advies Tegenkracht organiseren. Lessen uit de kredietcrisis. Correspondentiegegevens: Dr. Liesbeth Noordegraaf-Eelens, Erasmus School of Economics, Burgemeester Oudlaan 50, 3000 DR Rotterdam,

Lotte van Vliet MA
Lotte van Vliet MA werkt als senior adviseur bij de Raad voor Maatschappelijke Ontwikkeling (RMO). Zij is een van de auteurs van het RMO-advies Tegenkracht organiseren. Lessen uit de kredietcrisis. Correspondentiegegevens:

Ontbrekende alternatieven en gevestigde belangen

Een studie naar de posities van overheden in hervormingsdebatten tijdens de financiële crisis

Auteurs Daniel Mügge PhD en Bart Stellinga MA MSc

    The credit crisis that began in the summer of 2007 has fundamentally challenged much financial regulation and the political institutions that produced it. Measured against the criticisms that have been brought forth against previous financial governance, the extent of governments’ overall reform ambitions has been disappointing. Starting from this observation, this article asks: what explains governments’ reform choices, and thus also their limited ambitions? To explore this question, this article focuses on the positions that four governments central to global financial regulation (the USA, the UK, Germany and France) have taken in advance of the G20 meetings in 2009 across four key issue areas: accounting standards, derivatives trading, credit ratings agencies and banking rules. It evaluates both the overlap between positions across domains and governments as well as the differences between them. Such variation, we argue, provides key clues to the overall drivers behind reforms – as well as their limits. The overall picture that emerges can be summarized as follows: governments have been staunch defenders of their national firms’ competitive interests in regulatory reforms. That has not necessarily meant that they followed industry preferences across the board. It has been the relative impact, compared to foreign competitors, that counted in reform positions, not the absolute impact. These differences of opinion have played out within the context and the limits of the overall debates about thinkable policy alternatives. In spite of fundamental criticisms of pre-crisis regulatory orthodoxy, convincing and coherent alternatives have been forthcoming slowly at best. This has made reform proposals less radical than criticisms, seen on their own, might suggest.

Daniel Mügge PhD
Daniel Mügge is universitair docent politicologie aan de Universiteit van Amsterdam. Correspondentiegegevens: D. Mügge, PhD, afdeling Politicologie, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Oudezijds Achterburgwal 237, 1012 DL Amsterdam,

Bart Stellinga MA MSc
Bart Stellinga is medior wetenschappelijk medewerker bij de Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid. Correspondentiegegevens: B. Stellinga, MA MSc, Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid, Lange Vijverberg 4-5, 2500 EA Den Haag,

Laveren tussen belanghebbenden

Reële autonomie en financieel toezicht

Trefwoorden regulatory governance, de facto autonomy, financial supervision, bureaucracy, institutional reform
Auteurs Dr. Caelesta Braun

    De facto autonomy, the actual potential of regulatory agencies to go about their daily work, is often conceived to be more important to explain regulatory capacity than its formal autonomy and responsibilities. In this article we investigate whether external context factors, such as the financial and economic crisis have an impact on de facto autonomy. More specifically, we investigate whether the de facto autonomy varies after the crisis and distinctively so for specific subsets of employees within regulatory agencies. According to literature, mid-level managers of agencies are key to de facto autonomy and building a secure reputation for the agency in question. We test these external and internal effects on de facto autonomy with a survey among employees of the Dutch Financial Market Authority (N = 248). The findings show that the perceived influence of stakeholders is relatively constant, but that it is more dynamic for European stakeholders. Both middle managers and employees working at strategic and policy departments of the agency conceive the impact of European stakeholders as increasing in nature. The findings have important implications for our studies of de facto autonomy of regulatory agencies as well as reform potential after major institutional crises.

Dr. Caelesta Braun
Caelesta Braun is universitair docent aan het Department of Governance Studies, Vu University en als gastonderzoeker verbonden aan Antwerp Centre for Institutions and Multilevel Politics (ACIM), University of Antwerp. Correspondentiegegevens: Dr. Caelesta Braun, afdeling Bestuurswetenschappen, faculteit Sociale Wetenschappen, De Boelelaan 1081, 1081 HV Amsterdam,

    Reflection and Debate initiates academically inspired discussions on issues that are on the current policy agenda.

Monique Kremer
Monique Kremer is redactielid van Beleid en Maatschappij.

    Reflection and Debate initiates academically inspired discussions on issues that are on the current policy agenda.

Nico Wilterdink
Nico Wilterdink is professor cultuursociologie aan de Universiteit van Amsterdam. Correspondentiegegevens: Prof. dr. N.A. Wilterdink, afdeling Sociologie en Antropologie, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Oudezijds Achterburgwal 185, 1012 DK Amsterdam,

    Reflection and Debate initiates academically inspired discussions on issues that are on the current policy agenda.

Pieter Pekelharing
Pieter Pekelharing is docent sociale en politieke filosofie aan de Universiteit van Amsterdam. Correspondentiegegevens: Drs. Pieter Pekelharing, Universiteit van Amsterdam, afdeling Wijsbegeerte, Oude Turfmarkt 141-147, 1012 GC Amsterdam,

Markten zijn overal

Auteurs Dr. Rutger Claassen

Dr. Rutger Claassen
Rutger Claassen is universitair docent politieke filosofie aan de Universiteit Leiden. Correspondentiegegevens: Dr. Rutger Claassen, Instituut Politieke Wetenschappen, Universiteit Leiden, Wassenaarseweg 52, 2333 AK Leiden,

Transparantie doorgelicht. Of: de logica van vaagheid

Auteurs Jurre van den Berg MSc

Jurre van den Berg MSc
J. van den Berg MSc, afdeling Bestuurswetenschappen, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, De Boelelaan 1081, 1081 HV Amsterdam,

    In a column a journal editor or an author expresses his or her opinion on a particular subject.

Dr. Rodrigo Fernandez
Rodrigo Fernandez is postdoc onderzoeker aan het Amsterdam Institute for Social Science Research van de Universiteit van Amsterdam en werkzaam voor de Stichting Onderzoek Multinationale Ondernemingen (SOMO). Correspondentiegegevens: Dr. R. Fernandez, University of Amsterdam, Faculty of Social & Behavioral Sciences, Amsterdam Institute for Social Science Research (AISSR), Plantage Muidergracht 14, 1018 VZ Amsterdam,