This paper offers an introduction to the research theme of 'lobbyism'. Recent Scandinavian research shows that lobbyism is a modern mirror view of corporatism, which develops through changes in the structure of decision-making and implementation by interest groups and government. Three questions are put forward: (a) what is the empirical evidence for the phenomenon of lobbyism? (b) what potential contribution could the concept of lobbyism make to a better understanding of corporatism in the Netherlands? (c) what are, according to the theory of collective decision-making, the most important differences between influence strategies in corporatist negotiation structures, and those in lobby networks?

This paper provides an overview of the results of Scandinavian research into the lobbying activities of interest organisations. The paper is based on the reports of Danish and Norwegian scholars. These studies suppose that an association exists between the downfall of corporatist decision-making and policy implementation (among others observed in the decreasing number of boards, councils, and commissions), the increasing influence of parliament, and the increase in lobbying by interest organisations. The most important empirical evidence for this association is presented and discussed.

This article poses the question whether the Dutch system of organized interest representation faces a transformation from neo-corporatist mediation to lobbyism similar to Scandinavian countries. Its main claim is that this has so far not been the case, because two essential features of neo-corporatist interest mediation have remained prominent in the Netherlands. First, policies regarding labour conditions continue to be determined within a network of employers' organisations, trade unions, and the government that is essentially closed to outsiders. Second, the system continues to be hierarchical in nature: the government, often below the surface, demonstrates a considerable capacity to steer the participants in its preferred direction. Such a closed network still allows for lobbying the parliament by both network members and outsiders. Lobbying may thus be complementary to closed neo-corporatist networks rather than a substitute. The article offers a research agenda exploring the latter suggestion.

This article discusses the degree to which Dutch environmental policy exhibits a shift from corporatism to lobbyism. Based on a general analysis of environmental policy making in the Netherlands and two specific cases of environmental decision making, the author draws the conclusion that such a shift has not happened. At the level of policymaking it is rather the opposite: in the 1980s the Ministry of the Environment introduced a certain level of corporatism. This was possible because of a clear framework of environmental policy goals shaped by the National Institute for Public Health and Environment (RIVM), because the environmental movement began to see the Ministry as an ally and because business interests preferred self-regulation (one element of corporatism) to government regulations. In two concrete case of environmental decision-making that are discussed here, environmental goals are being discussed once more. During such discussion, it appears that Dutch ministries have close connection to 'their' target groups. For the coming years, environmental policy will 'Europeanize' further and Dutch economic interest groups, although being remarkably late in responding to this shift, will start to influence the Brussels policymaking game instead of the Dutch implementation game.

This article distinguished between three fundamental processes of collective decision-making as collective production in social systems: (1) persuasion; (2) exchange and (3) coercion. The conditions under which these processes are dominant are described, as well as the type of network that is central to each of the processes. Corporatism and lobbyism appear to be two polarities of collective decision-making. In corporatism interest groups are directly involved in final decision making through formal and informal institutions whereas in lobbyism final decision making is delegated to independent persons. In corporatist decision-making, mutual interests dominate conflicting interests. Thus, a failure of reaching consensus becomes unattractive and consensus is guaranteed through the formal norm of majority decision-making and the informal norm of unanimity. When mutual interests dominate over conflicting interests, lobbyism is reflected by the interactions between lobby activists and civil servants and politicians who share the same position. Ad hoc lobbyism will arise when conflicts of interests dominate and a non-cooperative game exists in which (temporal) coalitions must be built.

This paper offers an introduction to the research theme of 'lobbyism'. Recent Scandinavian research shows that lobbyism is a modern mirror view of corporatism, which develops through changes in the structure of decision-making and implementation by interest groups and government. Three questions are put forward: (a) what is the empirical evidence for the phenomenon of lobbyism? (b) what potential contribution could the concept of lobbyism make to a better understanding of corporatism in the Netherlands? (c) what are, according to the theory of collective decision-making, the most important differences between influence strategies in corporatist negotiation structures, and those in lobby networks?