This article shows that the economic left/right dimension does not always suffice to understand the social-economic policy positions of political parties. It focuses on social-economic decision-making in the Netherlands in 2012. The increase of the government pension age, which was championed by parties of the left and the right and opposed by parties of the left and the right, is taken as a prime example of an issue where decision-making did not follow the left-right line of conflict. The article continues to show that party policy positions on a number of more important welfare state reforms do not follow the left/right line of conflict, but rather a reform line of conflict that divides parties from the left and the right into pro-European reformers and Eurosceptic defenders of the existing welfare state.

Advocacy groups can contribute to the public debate in many different ways. In this contribution we compare the presence of Belgian advocacy groups in two crucial arenas: the media arena and the political arena. We analyze the presence of advocacy groups in the 12 strategic advisory councils of the Flemish government (political arena) and the 19 o’clock newscasts of the most important public and commercial television stations in Flanders. We argue that while each arena has its own logic, elements of the political logic are echoed in the media logic. Our results show that access to both arenas is cumulative: the same organizations dominate both arenas. Both arenas are not perfect reflections of each other though. Organizations lacking access to the political arena can rise in the media arena by offering conflict and spectacle. However, this is the exception rather than the rule, as most ‘political outsiders’ gain little attention from journalists. We conclude that mass media tend to follow and reinforce political power, rather than offering challengers a level playing field.

The leader of the parliamentary party in Belgium occupies a very specific position, which differs from that of the political leader and that of the organizational leader of a party. This person acts as a crucial linking pin between ‘the party in central office’ and ‘the party in public office’. Owing to an increase in power of ‘the party in central office’ in modern ‘cartel parties’, we expect repercussions on the profile, selection and functioning of parliamentary party leaders. In this first, exploratory analysis based on a new dataset, we sketch the profile of these leaders in terms of experience and career, and based on these characteristics, we develop a typology. We also investigate whether these variables vary over time and by government status.
Our results show for most of the indicators a weakening of the parliamentary party leader over time, whereas government parties appear to prefer a stronger parliamentary party leader than opposition parties.