DOI: 10.5553/RP/048647002017059002003

Res PublicaAccess_open


Het morele recht van dieren: een verwerping van asymmetrisch kantianisme

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Boyd T.C. Leupen, "Het morele recht van dieren: een verwerping van asymmetrisch kantianisme", Res Publica, 2, (2017):193-213

    According to asymmetrical Kantianism, humans, but not animals, should be granted certain inviolable moral rights, including the right to be treated as ‘ends-in-themselves’. By limiting the application of Kantian principles to humans, we effectively demote animals to the status of mere means to (non-)human ends and pave the way for the justification of unwarranted practices of animal exploitation. In this article, I will attempt to refute asymmetrical Kantianism by arguing against its underlying idea that the possession of personhood is a necessary requirement for having moral rights. I will do so by showing that the possession of selfhood should be considered a necessary and sufficient requirement for having such rights. I will argue that at least some animals should be seen as possessing selfhood, which makes their treatment as mere means to an end morally untenable.

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