In local government, traditions and styles of working are under pressure. Local administrators try to find new methods to address urban matters in a business-like manner, to direct networks and to activate stakeholders. In that way, they strive for better performance, and for 'new' politics. In order to succeed, not only new methods are introduced, but cultures are changed as well and new traditions of governance are established. Existing styles of working and regular procedures are seen as outdated and considered to be barriers that have to be eliminated. This 'violence of renewal', as we call it, is based on several assumptions. First, new methods are seen as crucial for modernizing local governance. Second, the effects of new methods depend on the manner in which modernization takes place. Third, effective introductions of new methods do not happen straightforwardly; cultural change is required. In this article we will argue that these assumptions have to be put into perspective and, especially, that the idea of 'making' of cultures in order to effectively implement new methods is illusory. We show, based on research in four municipalities, that interventions in local governance as such are culturally biased, and that local traditions, styles and customs influence how modernization takes place.

Governing the Netherlands seems to have become a form of governing by commission. Between 1995 and 2005 Dutch central government installed at least 364 commissions that we were able to identify. Cuts in this phenomenon are often called for by its opponents since commissions are often believed to be a strategic instrument for policymaker to cut democratic corners or slow down policy making processes. Dutch Parliament by motion has even asked government to keep from forming (so many) commissions. Still trends have not changed and new commissions are being formed almost every other week. Apparently there are compelling reasons for forming commissions. In this article we discuss how societal and public context lead to the installation of commissions. Furthermore we argue that installation of a commission can be clearly understood from the motives officials have with its formation. Hiring expertise (60%), independence of members (30%) and creating legitimacy (20%) are important factors regarding these motivations. Timing of commissions within election cycles is strategic: installation shortly after the new administration is effective, as is reporting back before the next elections. As long as politics remains politics calling for less commissions has mostly symbolic value.

It is often claimed, that there is a clear relationship between the Dutch experience with the 'pillarization' of national minorities in the nineteenth and twentieth century, and the 'integration' of ethnic minorities in Dutch society by government policies since the 1970s. This claim has never been substantiated though. In this article, the relationship is examined systematically on the basis of an analytical distinction between the 'organizational principles' and the 'rules of the game' of pillarization. It is concluded that traces of the organizational principles and the rules of the game of pillarization can, indeed, clearly be found in the minority policies of the 1970s and 1980s, but that since the early 1990s a process of 'de-pillarization' of government policies has set in. The article shows that in the early twenty-first century the experience with pillarization can hardly be traced in the minority policies.

This article examines the differences and similarities in public policy of the Dutch and Belgian government in the policy field of socially responsible investing (SRI). In particular the authors discuss both the content and the consequences of the Dutch arrangement 'Groen beleggen' and the Belgian 'Kringloopfonds'. Our empirical evidence states that, although both public policies are very similar (a tax incentive for investors investing financial means in socially responsible funds), they had a different influence on the socially responsible investment market. The Dutch arrangement 'Groen beleggen' lead to more assets under management, more green private funds, more financed projects and a bigger influence on the market of socially responsible investment products. This is mainly caused by the nature of the funding: the choice for private funds in the Netherlands, instead of a public fund like in Belgium.