Traditionally, technological transitions in infrastructure bound sectors are matters for the private sector. History teaches us that as soon as technological transitions proved successful, government sooner or later got involved with the distribution. Most of this involvement, both in history and now, has taken the form of public regulation with the help of various formal legal instruments.

This article aims to answer three questions, namely (1) what ideational and materials drives can be distinguished in the government's involvement in these technological transitions, (2) through what legal instruments are these objectives expressed and how , and (3) what are the incentives of these formal legal instruments on innovative private entrepreneurs for their further technological pursuits. How were their behavioural options affected by the use of statutory acts, concessions, permits and/or licences? Incentives to private innovators are qualified as positive, neutral or negative. The research method chosen has been inspired by insights from legal sociology, public choice theory and strategic actor behaviour in qualitative simulation-games, but follows distinct methodological steps. Throughout the article a case study on the transition from telegraphy to telephony in The Netherlands will be used to illustrate the discussion.

In the Netherlands, an ambitious policy goal of 1,000 MW of wind power capacity by the year 2000 had already been formulated in 1985 and remained the official basis for wind energy policy until 2000. The pace of realisation of wind turbines however did not keep up with this policy objective. An important reason is that it proves difficult to provide enough locations for wind turbines in spatial plans. Over the last 15 years two covenants have been concluded between the Dutch central government and provinces in order to overcome this problem: the 1991-Governmental Agreement on Planning Problems Wind Energy (BPW), and the 2001-Governmental Agreement on the National Development Wind Energy (BLOW). In the BLOW provinces have agreed to work towards the realisation of wind turbines with a total capacity of 1,500 MW in 2010. For this purpose provinces need the co-operation of municipalities, wind power project developers and local communities. Municipalities have a crucial role because of their discretion of detailed allocation of land use in local spatial plans. They are no partners to the covenant however. Provinces can use several governance strategies for mobilising co-operation: from top-down governance in which provinces specify locations to bottom-up approaches in which the initiatives are left to municipalities and project developers. This paper compares both covenants and assesses the effectiveness of different governance strategies employed by three distinct provinces.

Cities are in stage of transformation under the combined effect of enlargement of scale and the enlargement of scope of urban activities. The enlargement of scale is visible in the regionalization of urban development. Housing markets, labor markets and mobility patterns crystallize at regional level. However, the scaling up of urban life is not just an extension of the city as is experienced over more than a century. The simultaneous enlargement of scope makes the transformation more complex and dependant on external connections, both in the private and the public sector. The essay explores concepts that try to explain the nature of this new complexity. What is the meaning of 'urban space' and 'urban place' under the conditions of globalization? And what are the consequences for the guidance of collective action in the context of multi actor and multi level governance? The nature of urban change is illustrated in the case of the Randstad Holland, in particular the region of Amsterdam.

In February 2004, a highly debated research report with the title 'A Burdened Relation. 25 Years Development Aid between the Netherlands and Surinam' was sent to parliament. The study was conducted by a Netherlands scientist and a Surinam senior official (Kruijt and Maks, 2004). Their central aim was to execute a 'quick scan lessons learned evaluation' in order to arrive at a research agenda for a more detailed and profound study of the bilateral development aid relations of the two countries. In spite of this, the Netherlands minister for Development Aid decided in June 2005 to terminate the research project. Main argument she put forward to underpin the decision was that further research would add just about nothing to what already was known, or could be thought relevant for policymaking. The author of this article questions the validity of the argument of the minister. She scrutinizes the threefold research task, the research process and the results of the joint exercise. This demonstrates that the review holds a future scientific research agenda that is both innovative and provocative. Furthermore, she points out that the political ups and downs that accompanied the publication contain some additional practical insights.