Zoekresultaat: 3 artikelen

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Jaar 2005 x

    The displacement of political decision making from the classic bodies of representative democracy to non democratically legitimised arenas is a major threat to contemporary representative democracy. In this essay, three displacements are discussed: from parliamentary to deliberative processes, from political to professional decision making, and from national to international arenas. Several of the safeguards that have been developed in parliamentary democracy over the past centuries, such as representation, transparency, majority voting, and public accountability, are missing or are underdeveloped in these new arenas. The essay explores how these safeguards could be introduced into these new arenas and concludes that the displacement of politics should be attended by a dissemination of democracy.


Mark Bovens
Prof. dr Mark Bovens is als hoogleraar bestuurskunde verbonden aan de Utrechtse School voor Bestuurs- en Organisatiewetenschap van de Universiteit Utrecht. Zijn meest recente boek is: De digitale republiek: Democratie en rechtsstaat in de informatiemaatschappij (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press 2003). Dit essay markeert zijn afscheid als redactievoorzitter van B en M. Adres: Bijlhouwerstraat 6, 3511 ZC Utrecht, e-mail: m.bovens@usg.uu.nl

    This article distinguished between three fundamental processes of collective decision-making as collective production in social systems: (1) persuasion; (2) exchange and (3) coercion. The conditions under which these processes are dominant are described, as well as the type of network that is central to each of the processes. Corporatism and lobbyism appear to be two polarities of collective decision-making. In corporatism interest groups are directly involved in final decision making through formal and informal institutions whereas in lobbyism final decision making is delegated to independent persons. In corporatist decision-making, mutual interests dominate conflicting interests. Thus, a failure of reaching consensus becomes unattractive and consensus is guaranteed through the formal norm of majority decision-making and the informal norm of unanimity. When mutual interests dominate over conflicting interests, lobbyism is reflected by the interactions between lobby activists and civil servants and politicians who share the same position. Ad hoc lobbyism will arise when conflicts of interests dominate and a non-cooperative game exists in which (temporal) coalitions must be built.


Frans N. Stokman
Frans Stokman is als hoogleraar verbonden aan de capaciteitsgroep Sociologie van de Rijksuniversiteit Groningen en het Interuniversitair Centrum voor Sociaal-wetenschappelijke theorievorming en Methodenontwikkeling (ICS). Daarnaast is hij directeur van DECIDE B.V. Recente publicaties van zijn hand zijn: co-editor van The European Union Decides. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (met Robert Thomson, Christopher Achen en Thomas König, te verschijnen in 2006), co-editor van Winners and Losers in the European Union, Special issue van European Union Politics Vol 5(1) (2004) en 'Frame Dependent Modeling of Influence Processes', in: Andreas Diekmann en Thomas Voss (Red.), Rational-Choice-Theorie in den Sozialwissenschaften. Anwendungen und Probleme. Festschrift für Rolf Ziegler, München: Oldenbourg (pp.113-127). Adres: Grote Rozenstraat 31, 9712 TG Groningen.
Article

Populisme en de ambivalentie van het egalitarisme

Hoe rijmen sociaal zwakkeren een rechtse partijvoorkeur met hun sociaal-economische attitudes?

Tijdschrift Res Publica, Aflevering 4 2005
Auteurs Anton Derks
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie

    The decline of traditional class voting is at the centre of the Class Politics debate. From the framework of traditional class analysis a labourer’s right wing vote appears ‘unnatural’. A right wing vote is thought to damage the interests of the economically precarious groups. This paper attempts to understand the phenomenon of so-called unnatural voting behaviour starting from the populism concept. From a theoretical literature study we analyse the relationship between populism and attitudes regarding the economic left-right cleavage. We argue that right-wing populism appeals to a cry for equality, yet at the same time mobilises this sentiment against the institutions of the welfare state. In that way populist right parties succeed in attuning their economic discourse to the socio-economic attitudes of broad layers of the population, including economically precarious categories. The empirical relevance of this hypothesis is tested on the case of Flanders.


Anton Derks
Postdoctoraal Onderzoeker FWO-Vlaanderen aan de Vrije Universiteit Brussel.
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