In the past decade, large infrastructure projects in the Netherlands have often been implemented through Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs), specifically using Design-Build-Finance-Maintain (DBFM) contracts. While the decision to implement projects through PPPs is based on expected advantages for internal parties – the public and private partners in the PPP –, there is a call for more focus on the advantages and disadvantages of PPPs for external stakeholders. External stakeholder management in DBFM projects is based on a contractual division of risks and responsibilities between the partners. However, it is clear from the literature that the contract does not guarantee successful stakeholder management. Relational aspects are important. Little research has been done, however, into the interplay of contractual and relational aspects in achieving successful stakeholder management. This article addresses this research need. A comparative case study was conducted into the PPP projects A9 Gaasperdammerweg and A16 Rotterdam. The study first shows that sanctions, when combined with a relational approach, have a positive effect on the relationships with stakeholders. Second, external stakeholder management cannot be simply outsourced to the private partner and continuous involvement of the public partner is important for success.

Manic mechanisms in all stages of the development of large, prestigious urban projects can be curbed by internal and external contradiction and control. Someone who has studied this for years is Paul Hofstra, director of the Rotterdam Court of Audit and surrounding municipalities. At the end of his term, he uses research reports to look back with us on the role played by the municipalities in major urban projects over the past twelve years. Recently, the Court of Audit published “Public value in trouble” a meta-analysis of ten years of audit of the Rotterdam municipal administration. In retrospect on the past years, four themes always came back: problems in policy design, implementation problems, internal cooperation and management and cooperation with other parties.

Sometimes dreams become reality, but there are also many examples in which manic ideas for image-defining projects turn into fiascos. How do you find the right balance in the planning and decision-making of image-defining projects between taming manic mechanisms that cause these projects to fail and unleashing manic mechanisms that are necessary to make these projects happen? This article attempts to answer this question by exploring how the taming of mania (through welfare-economic analysis) and the unleashing of vision and ambition (through imagination) can be combined in a better way. We call this a search for an ‘imaginative utilitarianism’ and draw up three preconditions under which this approach can work: (1) more attention to incremental and less grotesque projects, (2) a different appreciation and historiography that places individuals less centrally and also appreciates what has not been built, and (3) a stronger interweaving between the design process and a welfare-economic approach.

Prestigious urban projects demonstrate many insights in the functioning of public administration. Especially, prestigious urban projects can teach us about what we call ‘managerial mania’. Following the perspective of behavioural public administration, this article observes significant characteristics of managerial mania, such as elated behaviour, an exaggerated positive self-image, infectious enthusiasm, selective argumentation, tunnel vision, and an unsubstantiated faith that plans will succeed. As a consequence of managerial mania, prestigious projects are at risk of cost overruns, project fiascos, or underdelivering the expected outcomes promised by politicians or top-level managers. This article explores the phenomenon of managerial mania based on examples of large and controversial urban projects. Furthermore, this article describes and analyses the symptoms of managerial mania, its implications, and its mechanisms. Finally, the authors suggest some means of restraining the most extreme forms of managerial mania.

There is much research available about the development and government participation of new political parties (e.g. Pedersen, 1982; Deschouwer, 2008). Scholars show that survival for new political parties is often difficult, as they in general had little time for party building (Bollyer & Bytzek, 2017). Moreover, the expectation for specific types of new parties, mainly anti-establishment parties, is that they pay a high(er) electoral price when participating in government (Van Spanje, 2011). The Dutch case of the local political party of ‘Leefbaar Rotterdam’ (Livable Rotterdam, LR) is a noteworthy exception to this rule. It won the Rotterdam local election in 2002 with almost 35 percent of the votes, only months after its establishment. Until this day, LR remains an electorally large and relevant political party, participating in Rotterdam government twice (2002-2006 and 2014-2018). The article shows that in comparison to some national new political parties, LR succeeded in building a solid party organization and that from a party institutionalization perspective, it can be considered an institutionalized party. Regarding theory, it provides some additions to party building literature, such as the importance of personal relations and the balance between organizational unity and member autonomy.

Participatory research is increasingly being perceived as a democratic and transformative approach to social situations by both academics and policymakers. The article reflects on what it means to do participatory research, what it contributes to broader knowledge building, and why mess may not only need to be present in participatory research but encouraged. The purposes of participation and mess as nourishment for critical enquiry and more radical learning opportunities are considered and illuminated using case study material from the Family Based Positive Support Project.