In local government, traditions and styles of working are under pressure. Local administrators try to find new methods to address urban matters in a business-like manner, to direct networks and to activate stakeholders. In that way, they strive for better performance, and for 'new' politics. In order to succeed, not only new methods are introduced, but cultures are changed as well and new traditions of governance are established. Existing styles of working and regular procedures are seen as outdated and considered to be barriers that have to be eliminated. This 'violence of renewal', as we call it, is based on several assumptions. First, new methods are seen as crucial for modernizing local governance. Second, the effects of new methods depend on the manner in which modernization takes place. Third, effective introductions of new methods do not happen straightforwardly; cultural change is required. In this article we will argue that these assumptions have to be put into perspective and, especially, that the idea of 'making' of cultures in order to effectively implement new methods is illusory. We show, based on research in four municipalities, that interventions in local governance as such are culturally biased, and that local traditions, styles and customs influence how modernization takes place.

Decision-making in the Netherlands is generally characterised as (neo) corporatist. Whether stakeholders enjoy a similar level of access to, and influence on the formulation of the national position, which the Dutch government advocates in Brussels, remains however unclear. This article aims at providing a first tentative answer to this question by studying the formulation of the Dutch position on EU resolution 882/2004 concerning the official controls on compliance with feed and food law, animal health and animal welfare.

In-depth analysis of this case reveals that the development process of the Dutch stance on 882/2004 was largely devoid of stakeholder-input. As such, this process may be characterised as essentially etatist rather than corporatist. Moreover, it was established – as expected – that specialised lobby groups – those that could offer additional information and expertise to the dossier team responsible for 882/2004 – were able to exert more influence than general advocacy groups. Finally, the hypothesis that openness leads to more stakeholder-influence was not confirmed in this case. To the contrary, only during private bilateral discussion did a selection of business organizations manage to convince the dossier team of the benefits of limited border controls.