The European project currently faces not only an economic crisis, but a moral one as well. The economic growth model of social justice combined with market-oriented policies, also referred to as the European social model has lost much of its meaning after ten years of austerity and financial calamities. In 2012 ECB President Draghi says in the Wall Street Journal that the European social model is “gone”, a thing of the past. While only a couple of years later the European Pillar of Social Rights is put in place. What is happening with ‘Social Europe’? And how do trade unions, as a historical motor of social policy in the member states, relate to the European social model, especially since the financial crisis. This article deals with the position of trade unions vis-à-vis European social policy and the European institutions. The European social model, economic governance and the collective bargaining system are discussed as examples of post-crisis European social policy. It will be argued that although the European Commission gives institutional space to social policy and to a role for trade unions, it has always been subordinate to economic integration. And moreover that the recent economic crisis is used at the European level to obtain almost complete control over social policy in the member states.

Using survey data from 1,300 welfare recipients in the Netherlands, this paper explores the effects of different enforcement styles in the field of social security law. Although most policy debates focus on punitive and persuasive enforcement, our findings suggest that both styles only play a limited role in explaining regulatory compliance. Our study also shows that the level of compliance among welfare recipients is related to their ‘motivational postures’ (Braithwaite 2003; 2009; 2011). While some of these ‘postures’ are shaped by elements of procedural justice, others are related to the perceived legitimacy of laws or to instrumental motives. Given these findings, we suggest that compliance with social security laws may not only depend on punitive or persuasive enforcement, but also on the degree in which regulatory enforcement is attuned to the individual characteristics of welfare recipients. Finally, these ideas are translated into several practical suggestions for the ‘smart enforcement’ of social security law.

Decades of neoliberalism have placed emphasis on individualism, self-responsibility, and self-interest. As a result solidarity, and charity are losing ground and inter-subjective suspicion enters society. With a dominant focus on the economic life, happiness can be found in working and consuming, which has led to a morbid focus on performance. As a consequence self-exploitation, stress, fear of failure and auto-aggression undermines self-love. Competing individuals, with whom man cannot identify himself, see the other as someone who also has to take care of himself; empathy for the stranger is far to seek. Problematic because in the participatory society people need to care for themselves, and others, which calls for public love. Economic actions of man should be perceived as a social activity that presupposes love. A supplier must show empathy towards its customer before a decent product can be created. A prerequisite for empathy and cooperation is equality. However with scarcity as the engine of hyper-capitalism market thinking inequality between people increases. It seems that men should embrace the ‘difference’ of others. The acceptance of ‘the strange’ could start with a heterogeneous student population during education, and a variety of inhabitants in neighbourhoods. Furthermore a more relaxed working climate with the focus on cooperation instead of competition could contribute to the return of empathy and self-love.

Much has been written about the decline of trust in societies: trust in governments and political systems is a popular field of research. Trust of governments in citizens however, is a relatively unknown field. This article presents a research into the trust the Dutch government has in its citizens. By conducting a discourse analysis on policy documents regarding the participation society, the degree of trust was examined. The results show that the government has trust in the capabilities of citizens, but does not trust the intentions of citizens. This results in many control measures, high transaction costs, a fragile base for public cooperation and a disturbed relationship between the government and citizens. In order to gain more trust in citizens the government has to change the way it uses language regarding citizens.

In this feature authors discuss recent research findings that are of interest to readers of Beleid en Maatschappij.
According to many commentators, the system of science is in a crisis: it is characterized by perverse incentives, it is contested and misused, and it has lost its authority. In this essay, I suggest that the answer to this crisis lies in a broadening of the notion of scientific integritiy from the conduct of individual researchers to the wider context of the science-policy-society interface. Specifically, I argue for the need to foster what I call here ‘relations of integrity’. In these relations, science reflects on the role it plays and takes into account the context in which knowledge is produced and used. It has to maintain independence, while fully recognizing that value free knowledge does not exist and that multiple forms of independence are possible, and it needs to be accountable for the decisions it makes and for the consequences of those decisions.

In this feature authors review recently published books on subjects of interest to readers of Beleid en Maatschappij.

The discussion on how to resolve mass disputes stemming from faulty financial products among banks, insurance companies and other stakeholders in the Netherlands ended in deadlock. While diligent action is considered imperative, parties shy away from discussing options for settling damages suffered by consumers for fear of triggering mass claims themselves. To contribute to a new framework for resolving mass disputes, a responsive evaluation was conducted between 2011 and 2015. In such evaluation, the way stakeholders make sense of the situation serves as an organizing principle in knowledge production. This article discusses the methodical challenges implied in adapting the methodological guidelines for such inquiry to fit the ill-structured, controversial and complex legal issue and its highly politicized context. Because of a careful handling of confidentiality in the inquiry and a focused selection of participants on the basis of their proximity to the issue, the evaluation resulted in insight in options for resolving mass disputes that are supported by various parties. Furthermore, the evaluation itself served, it is argued, as a vehicle to overcome the deadlock by sensitizing stakeholders to the fact that they all aspire similar practical objectives and all acknowledge the need for cooperation on the issue.

Regulatory supervision and inspection have become key features of public governance, some authors even talk about the ‘audit society’ or the age of ‘regulatory capitalism’. Despite international research showing the importance of trust in supervisory relations, there is still a fierce debate about the role of trust in Dutch supervisory relations. Several inspectorates have incorporated trust as a central theme in their supervisory policy. This article describes the role of trust within the policy of the Dutch Healthcare Inspectorate (IGZ). This research addresses four themes in dealing with the concept of trust in supervisory relations: from transparency to accountability, from output performance to performance and risk management, from trust or control to trust and control, and, finally, a special regime for reliable inspectees. The empirical analysis in this paper contributes to the knowledge about the role of trust in supervision (policy) and to the debate about the role of trust in regulatory supervision policy.

The key question of this study is whether policies adopted elsewhere in Europe might be useful in helping to increase the labour force participation of women and of older workers in the Netherlands, and thus improve the financial basis for social security arrangements. We examined the effectiveness of national policy measures over and above that of the individual-level determinants that are traditionally examined in economic and sociological studies. The data on labour force participation are from the European Social Survey, and information on public policy arrangements comes from the MULTILINKS database. Regarding the labour force participation of women, findings show the importance of distinguishing financial measures and care services. Women generally work fewer hours per week in countries with generous financial support for families (tax benefits, child support), and more hours in countries with generous parental leaves. Regarding the participation of older workers, findings show the importance of distinguishing the minimum pension level (negative association with the likelihood of having a job) and pension as a proportion of earned wage (no association with having a job). A novelty of the present study is its ability to demonstrate the impact of national arrangements at the level of individual participation behaviour.

The factor time is an often neglected issue in the literature on network governance. In this article we analyze the differences in perceptions on time between actors involved in water governance and describe the managerial interventions aimed at synchronizing time horizons, managing the available amount of time and the tempo of the governance process. Two case studies of governance processes in the district of Water Board Delfland are included to provide insight in the question how the factor time influences the governance processes and how aspects of time are managed. The case studies show that different perceptions of time may cause tensions in collaborative relationships, and even cause the end of collaborations. This underscores the importance of time-sensitive governance.

The credit crisis that began in the summer of 2007 has fundamentally challenged much financial regulation and the political institutions that produced it. Measured against the criticisms that have been brought forth against previous financial governance, the extent of governments’ overall reform ambitions has been disappointing. Starting from this observation, this article asks: what explains governments’ reform choices, and thus also their limited ambitions? To explore this question, this article focuses on the positions that four governments central to global financial regulation (the USA, the UK, Germany and France) have taken in advance of the G20 meetings in 2009 across four key issue areas: accounting standards, derivatives trading, credit ratings agencies and banking rules. It evaluates both the overlap between positions across domains and governments as well as the differences between them. Such variation, we argue, provides key clues to the overall drivers behind reforms – as well as their limits. The overall picture that emerges can be summarized as follows: governments have been staunch defenders of their national firms’ competitive interests in regulatory reforms. That has not necessarily meant that they followed industry preferences across the board. It has been the relative impact, compared to foreign competitors, that counted in reform positions, not the absolute impact. These differences of opinion have played out within the context and the limits of the overall debates about thinkable policy alternatives. In spite of fundamental criticisms of pre-crisis regulatory orthodoxy, convincing and coherent alternatives have been forthcoming slowly at best. This has made reform proposals less radical than criticisms, seen on their own, might suggest.

In this feature authors discuss recent research findings that are of interest to readers of Beleid en Maatschappij.

Currently the Dutch government funds dozens of social interventions designed to tackle polarization and radicalization issues. It is still unknown whether the assumptions underlying these interventions are valid. This article puts the theories of change of such interventions to the test. Underlying causal assumptions of four dominant Dutch social policies were confronted with scientific evidence: (1) the system-based approach, (2) peer mediation, (3) intergroup contact and (4) self-esteem enhancement. System-based approaches – comparable to multi-systemic therapy (MST) – seem effective in reducing extremist behaviour in radical youth, but do not necessarily lead to an ideological change. In peer mediation, the causal link between the deployment of young people and the positive outcomes of such methods remains unclear. Peer mediation is also more likely to contribute in conflicts that have not yet escalated. Intergroup contact reduces prejudices about other groups, but has a limited effect. There is also no evidence for a long term effect and positive outcomes of intergroup contact do not automatically apply to adolescents. Finally, it is questionable that enhancing the self-esteem of (moslim) youth makes them more resilient against radical tendencies. In the same vein, the scientific evidence is ambiguous about whether increasing self-esteem results in social desirable behaviour or improved social relations.

In managing new cleavages between conflicting values (such as materialism and post-materialism), we cannot simply fall back on a classical approach to cleavage management. The segments surrounding the new cleavage are clearly more fluid than those surrounding the religious or socio-economic cleavages from consociationalism and neo-corporatism, such as is rightly emphasised in the network approach. In the conflict between the materialist and post-materialist value pattern, representation logic is not a given certainty. Not only the facts, but also the negotiating players and the decision-making arenas are the subject of negotiation and strategic action. This is reflected in the new forms of consultation politics. Similarly, consensus formation cannot make do with the (party) political integration of the segments because, given the conditions of post-materialism, this integration can only be partial. It seems important in the new cleavage management to devote attention to the existence of several arenas in which political interests are weighed up. For the players involved in a particular policy issue, this means the lure of strategic forum shopping and thus complication of the conflict-resolving ability of each of the forums.

Behind many notions of ‘governance’, there lies the image of a ‘modest’ or ‘retreating’ state. The assumption is that local and national authorities can only perform effectively if in cooperation with other public and private actors. Generally, it is said, governments increasingly lack the legitimacy for top-down interventions and hence the need of including participative citizen involvement in policy making and implementation. In recent years this democratic image has been disputed in scientific debates because of its lack of attention for new forms of interventionism by the state in societal processes, e.g. crime, youth care, immigration and integration. In this article, we aim to contribute to this other understanding of modern governance by analysing Dutch political discourse between 2001 and 2010 on (implicit) notions of the role and responsibility of the state. We show how the idea of ‘responsibilisation’ of citizens is turned into an argument for more instead of less state involvement in societal processes and citizens’ lives. By emphasizing ‘shared responsibilities’ between government and society, a tricky picture of parity is sketched of this relation. Dutch government presents itself as ‘an ally’ of citizens in fighting pressing social problems, but in the meantime an ideal of ‘responsible behaviour’ is constructed, namely, citizen behaviour in concordance with government’s policy ambitions. Within this political discourse, the socio-liberal idea of ‘responsibility’ turns into ‘responsibilisation on government’s terms’ and ‘irresponsible’ behaviour becomes a legitimate focal point for deep state interventions through techniques of governance.

In the past decades, employment and incomes were on the rise, social spending remained high while passive welfare states were progressively transformed into so-called ‘investment states’. Despite these favourable conditions, however, contemporary welfare states did not succeed in reducing poverty and inequality. What lies beneath the disquieting poverty standstill and how did welfare states miss this ‘window of opportunity’? In this article, we aim to shed more light on this question. We identify three structural trends behind the poverty standstill: rising employment has benefited workless households only partially; income protection for the working-age population out of work has become less adequate; social policies and, more generally, social redistribution have become less pro-poor. In other words, the reorientation of social expenditures to the employed occurred at the expense of those at risk in the labour market. The success of future poverty-reducing strategies will depend on the way policies aimed at labour market inclusion will be implemented and the emphasis on redistributive policies.