The EU is one example of how national states try to manage transnational problems. Countless national civil servants meet in EU working groups and committees with representatives of (non-governmental) organisations to exchange information, harmonise policies and regulations, and decide on implementation. To what extent and in which way do Dutch civil servants participate in these networks? How are their activities steered by politicians? One of the main conclusions of this study is that public policymaking within highly Europeanised departments is highly embedded within these transnational government networks, whereas policymaking within weakly Europeanised departments is to a substantial degree shielded from these government networks for reasons of, among others, the protection of national sovereignty of the Member State in their field.

In this article the question of bureaucratic autonomy of Europeanised civil servants is addressed. As a test bed we examine the political and administrative steering and control of Dutch national civil servants who are seconded to the European Commission (SNEs). The empirical analysis benefits from survey data (N = 90) and interview data (N = 28), acquired from both present and former Dutch SNEs. Based on this material we argue that despite the formal impossibility of steering and control from the member state, in practice SNEs do fulfill a bridging function between the two levels of governance. This may happen by means of frontloading (either consciously, after instructions from the national administration; or unconsciously, as a result of their national-cultural perspective) and signaling (transmitting strategic information and positions from one level of governance to the other). Although the SNEs' contacts within the Commission are generally preserved after the expiration of the secondment, the intensity of the contacts with other types of actors within the policy network mostly decrease rapidly.

In local government, traditions and styles of working are under pressure. Local administrators try to find new methods to address urban matters in a business-like manner, to direct networks and to activate stakeholders. In that way, they strive for better performance, and for 'new' politics. In order to succeed, not only new methods are introduced, but cultures are changed as well and new traditions of governance are established. Existing styles of working and regular procedures are seen as outdated and considered to be barriers that have to be eliminated. This 'violence of renewal', as we call it, is based on several assumptions. First, new methods are seen as crucial for modernizing local governance. Second, the effects of new methods depend on the manner in which modernization takes place. Third, effective introductions of new methods do not happen straightforwardly; cultural change is required. In this article we will argue that these assumptions have to be put into perspective and, especially, that the idea of 'making' of cultures in order to effectively implement new methods is illusory. We show, based on research in four municipalities, that interventions in local governance as such are culturally biased, and that local traditions, styles and customs influence how modernization takes place.

It is often claimed, that there is a clear relationship between the Dutch experience with the 'pillarization' of national minorities in the nineteenth and twentieth century, and the 'integration' of ethnic minorities in Dutch society by government policies since the 1970s. This claim has never been substantiated though. In this article, the relationship is examined systematically on the basis of an analytical distinction between the 'organizational principles' and the 'rules of the game' of pillarization. It is concluded that traces of the organizational principles and the rules of the game of pillarization can, indeed, clearly be found in the minority policies of the 1970s and 1980s, but that since the early 1990s a process of 'de-pillarization' of government policies has set in. The article shows that in the early twenty-first century the experience with pillarization can hardly be traced in the minority policies.

This article examines the differences and similarities in public policy of the Dutch and Belgian government in the policy field of socially responsible investing (SRI). In particular the authors discuss both the content and the consequences of the Dutch arrangement 'Groen beleggen' and the Belgian 'Kringloopfonds'. Our empirical evidence states that, although both public policies are very similar (a tax incentive for investors investing financial means in socially responsible funds), they had a different influence on the socially responsible investment market. The Dutch arrangement 'Groen beleggen' lead to more assets under management, more green private funds, more financed projects and a bigger influence on the market of socially responsible investment products. This is mainly caused by the nature of the funding: the choice for private funds in the Netherlands, instead of a public fund like in Belgium.

Decision-making in the Netherlands is generally characterised as (neo) corporatist. Whether stakeholders enjoy a similar level of access to, and influence on the formulation of the national position, which the Dutch government advocates in Brussels, remains however unclear. This article aims at providing a first tentative answer to this question by studying the formulation of the Dutch position on EU resolution 882/2004 concerning the official controls on compliance with feed and food law, animal health and animal welfare.

In-depth analysis of this case reveals that the development process of the Dutch stance on 882/2004 was largely devoid of stakeholder-input. As such, this process may be characterised as essentially etatist rather than corporatist. Moreover, it was established – as expected – that specialised lobby groups – those that could offer additional information and expertise to the dossier team responsible for 882/2004 – were able to exert more influence than general advocacy groups. Finally, the hypothesis that openness leads to more stakeholder-influence was not confirmed in this case. To the contrary, only during private bilateral discussion did a selection of business organizations manage to convince the dossier team of the benefits of limited border controls.

Over the last decades, the number of European Union member states has significantly increased, resulting into a reduction of the relative formal power of the Dutch government. Improving Dutch influence in Brussels is therefore an important topic on the agenda of public administration scholars and advisory boards. Using experts at the various stages of the EU policymaking process is one option to increase the influence in the EU. This article evaluates the effectiveness of this strategy concerning one of the most complex and most controversial public policy issues in the history of the European Union: the revision of the EU's chemical policy (REACH). The article demonstrates that the 'expert strategy' has been successful in this case. However, the effectiveness of this strategy comes under pressure if the trend towards core departments will continue.

Governing the Netherlands seems to have become a form of governing by commission. Between 1995 and 2005 Dutch central government installed at least 364 commissions that we were able to identify. Cuts in this phenomenon are often called for by its opponents since commissions are often believed to be a strategic instrument for policymaker to cut democratic corners or slow down policy making processes. Dutch Parliament by motion has even asked government to keep from forming (so many) commissions. Still trends have not changed and new commissions are being formed almost every other week. Apparently there are compelling reasons for forming commissions. In this article we discuss how societal and public context lead to the installation of commissions. Furthermore we argue that installation of a commission can be clearly understood from the motives officials have with its formation. Hiring expertise (60%), independence of members (30%) and creating legitimacy (20%) are important factors regarding these motivations. Timing of commissions within election cycles is strategic: installation shortly after the new administration is effective, as is reporting back before the next elections. As long as politics remains politics calling for less commissions has mostly symbolic value.

Uncertainties about climate change are a major incentive for the Dutch government to communicate frequently about risks related to water safety. In September 2008, the 'New Delta Committee' even presented several coping strategies to safeguard the low-lying Delta of The Netherlands far into the next century. The government assumes that increased high water risk awareness and behaviour in society, based on a risk-based approach, is an important factor for sustainable future living with water and thus made this into the spearhead of policy. However, the main part of Dutch society still lives in a flush of victory. The Delta Works symbolize the victory over the water; The Netherlands is safe. The government doesn't succeed satisfactorily to realize high water risk awareness and behaviour in its society, notwithstanding years of campaigning. Cultural sociologists Heems and Kothuis demonstrate by means of a discourse analysis of public campaigns that government communication on high water safety is not only entangled but also creates confusion. Reason of the entanglement in communication is a breakthrough of the taboo on publicly speaking of a flood disaster as a realistic scenario. The confusion obstructs the Dutch government to bridge the gap in perception between itself and society and to achieve its policy objectives.

This article analyzes the attention to democratic performance and the functioning of public administration by governments in the Netherlands. The views of national governments on these matters have not been mapped systematically. Through a content analysis of all annual Dutch Queen's speeches between 1945 and 2007, which is part of our broader research on the national politics of attention, we analyze the pattern of attention for democracy and public administration. The theoretical perspective used is the model of policy generations. Our findings show that governmental attention for the functioning of public administration emerged in the 1960s and since then went up and down. The time intervals in which agenda changes occurred often were longer than the duration of individual governments, although some governments contributed strongly to a change in attention and tone. Attention not only showed rise and decline, also the emphasis on efficiency, long term planning, and democratization shifted considerably from one period to the next. This empirical pattern matches for the most part the theory of policy generations, which predicts a fixed sequence in policy emphasis. In addition to general cultural driving forces central to this theoretical model, we conclude that political and institutional conditions contribute to a better understanding of the pattern of political attention.