The EU is transforming the function and power of the Dutch parliament as an institution, and the way in which its principal actors, the governing and opposition parliamentary party groups, interact with each other and the government. This article seeks to address the question: How does parliamentary scrutiny over EU decision-making function in the Netherlands and how has this new role for parliament changed both parliamentary and executive relations in the country and the interaction of parties in parliament? For the purposes of this research, this paper uses the typology of King. The author has conducted a number of in-depth interviews with Dutch MPs. Overall, this article concludes the process of parliamentary scrutiny over EU matters in the Netherlands is no longer exclusively about finding a national consensus towards the outside world, but increasingly mirrors the rough and tumble of normal, domestic politics.

This article is the introduction to this special issue in which the Europeanisation of Dutch polity, politics and policy forms the central focus of attention. The main question we address in this special issue is to what extent the Netherlands has changed under the influence of processes of Europeanisation. This article first discusses the state-of-the-art Europeanisation literature; then it sets out to discuss four problems with this literature. Based on the insights generated by the contributors to this special issue, the authors conclude that for a better understanding of processes of Europeanisation, the EU should no longer be seen as an actor, but rather as an (cluster of) arena(s) in which a variety of actors (member states, EU institutions, interest groups, et cetera) are trying to achieve their political goals.

The displacement of political decision making from the classic bodies of representative democracy to non democratically legitimised arenas is a major threat to contemporary representative democracy. In this essay, three displacements are discussed: from parliamentary to deliberative processes, from political to professional decision making, and from national to international arenas. Several of the safeguards that have been developed in parliamentary democracy over the past centuries, such as representation, transparency, majority voting, and public accountability, are missing or are underdeveloped in these new arenas. The essay explores how these safeguards could be introduced into these new arenas and concludes that the displacement of politics should be attended by a dissemination of democracy.

In December 2004, the report of the Dutch Parliamentary Investigation Committee on Infrastructural Projects was published. This committee investigated the budgets overruns of two large rail projects currently under construction in the Netherlands: the Betuwe Line and the High Speed Line (HSL)-South. The committee also looked at how mistakes that were made in the earlier projects had been avoided in the construction of the Zuiderzee Line, a project currently under preparation. The report provides a look inside the struggle of the Dutch national government from the beginning of the 1990s in their public-private partnership (PPP) efforts. In this contribution, we provide an analysis of the motives, approach and results of privatisation of these three projects on the bases of the detailed empirical analysis provided by the Committee. We seek explanations of how privatisation with these three projects evolved and what lessons can be drawn. It appears that practices have so far been far from good and instead of committing to the obligation to apply PPP in every large infrastructural project, the government should first find out how PPP in such projects should actually be carried out.

This article poses the question whether the Dutch system of organized interest representation faces a transformation from neo-corporatist mediation to lobbyism similar to Scandinavian countries. Its main claim is that this has so far not been the case, because two essential features of neo-corporatist interest mediation have remained prominent in the Netherlands. First, policies regarding labour conditions continue to be determined within a network of employers' organisations, trade unions, and the government that is essentially closed to outsiders. Second, the system continues to be hierarchical in nature: the government, often below the surface, demonstrates a considerable capacity to steer the participants in its preferred direction. Such a closed network still allows for lobbying the parliament by both network members and outsiders. Lobbying may thus be complementary to closed neo-corporatist networks rather than a substitute. The article offers a research agenda exploring the latter suggestion.

This paper offers an introduction to the research theme of 'lobbyism'. Recent Scandinavian research shows that lobbyism is a modern mirror view of corporatism, which develops through changes in the structure of decision-making and implementation by interest groups and government. Three questions are put forward: (a) what is the empirical evidence for the phenomenon of lobbyism? (b) what potential contribution could the concept of lobbyism make to a better understanding of corporatism in the Netherlands? (c) what are, according to the theory of collective decision-making, the most important differences between influence strategies in corporatist negotiation structures, and those in lobby networks?

This paper offers an introduction to the research theme of 'lobbyism'. Recent Scandinavian research shows that lobbyism is a modern mirror view of corporatism, which develops through changes in the structure of decision-making and implementation by interest groups and government. Three questions are put forward: (a) what is the empirical evidence for the phenomenon of lobbyism? (b) what potential contribution could the concept of lobbyism make to a better understanding of corporatism in the Netherlands? (c) what are, according to the theory of collective decision-making, the most important differences between influence strategies in corporatist negotiation structures, and those in lobby networks?

This article discusses the degree to which Dutch environmental policy exhibits a shift from corporatism to lobbyism. Based on a general analysis of environmental policy making in the Netherlands and two specific cases of environmental decision making, the author draws the conclusion that such a shift has not happened. At the level of policymaking it is rather the opposite: in the 1980s the Ministry of the Environment introduced a certain level of corporatism. This was possible because of a clear framework of environmental policy goals shaped by the National Institute for Public Health and Environment (RIVM), because the environmental movement began to see the Ministry as an ally and because business interests preferred self-regulation (one element of corporatism) to government regulations. In two concrete case of environmental decision-making that are discussed here, environmental goals are being discussed once more. During such discussion, it appears that Dutch ministries have close connection to 'their' target groups. For the coming years, environmental policy will 'Europeanize' further and Dutch economic interest groups, although being remarkably late in responding to this shift, will start to influence the Brussels policymaking game instead of the Dutch implementation game.

Community workers traditionally have a tendency to be very critical towards their own profession. Especially in the 1970s and 1980s, many community workers were afraid that structural conditions would prevent them from fulfilling an emancipatory role or, worse, that they would become part of a system of social control. In the discussion about the profession, the work of philosophers played an important role. In this paper we examine interpretations of two philosophers who were particularly influential among community workers: Foucault and Habermas. We cast doubts about the way in which these philosophers were used to discredit community work and develop an alternative interpretation that does justice to the profession as well as the work of these philosophers.

Recently in The Netherlands, as in other countries, many have called for administrative and democratic reform. The perspectives implicated in the arguments for change differ, however. Some argue for a strengthening of mechanisms of control and accountability. Others opt for more – and more direct – citizen participation in governance. In effect, these perspectives often contradict. In this article we will look into J.S. Mill's effort to combine such different perspectives. It is shown that in his considerations on good government a third principle is active: administrative competence or quality. Mill, thus, makes us aware of a deficiency in many contemporary evaluations of administrative and democratic renewal.