Since 1994, the concept of citizenship is a central concept in Dutch Integration policy for immigrants and their descendants. Gradually, the concept has become a moral category of good and active citizenship, associated with all kinds of obligations. Since the turn of the century it is even used to urge on – especially – Muslims to assimilate to mainstream culture and fundamental norms and values. This contrasts sharply with the Dutch multicultural policy of the 1980s. How is it possible for political and policy discourse to change in such a radical way within a few decades? And what role played the concept of citizenship in these changes? This article seeks to answer these questions by investigating how the concept of citizenship has been interpreted and applied differently over time in Dutch discourse on integration policy, focussing on issues of unity versus ethno-cultural diversity. With this purpose, first, the concept of citizenship is defined and differentiated in four dimensions and various perspectives. Next, Dutch political and policy discourse of the last 25 years is examined in broad lines. Subsequently, the Dutch discourse is analysed in more detail in debates of the last decades on dual nationality and on civic integration policy.

According to many observers, multicultural integration policies have strongly eroded in the Netherlands since the early 1990s and particularly following the rise of Pim Fortuyn in 2002. In this view, the Netherlands now follow harsh, assimilationist policies that threaten the foundations of democracy. Policy studies on the local level have however found strong continuities. This article investigates changes and continuities in Dutch integration policies on the national level. The cross-national policy data compiled in the Migration Policy Index show that the Netherlands are in 2007 still among the European countries that offer immigrants and their descendants the largest degree of legal equality. Comparative data on accommodation policies regarding immigrant cultures and religions show that Dutch policies are still culturally pluralist compared to most other European countries, e.g., by recognizing immigrants' ethnic and religious identities and practices, subsidizing and incorporating their associations, and providing preferential access to public sector jobs. Quantitative comparative policy data are supplemented by qualitative examples of pluralist policies in the media, the police force, and nature conservation and recreation. The article concludes that in spite of rhetoric to the contrary, there is strong path dependence in Dutch integration policies, also on the national level.

This article traces the redefinition of citizenship that Dutch governments have tried to accomplish through legislation and various policy initiatives. The classical liberal notion of citizenship is said to provide insufficient social cohesion. More emphasis on integration into the typically Dutch culture is offered as a remedy. Newcomers are only accepted as full citizens after they have been introduced and trained in the essential elements of this culture. Criticisms of this policy are presented. Lately the government itself seems to have second thoughts on the definition of citizenship.

The historical transformations of Dutch citizenship are assessed in this article in light of two aspects. One concerns the dimensions and layers of citizenship; the other pertains to the relative stress laid on either formal or moral citizenship. We illustrate how citizenship was broadened from civic to political, social and cultural rights. Then we discuss the recent moralization of citizenship in the context of Dutch debates on immigrant integration. We illustrate how the relative stress on moral citizenship therein pertains to a virtual disenfranchisement of non-native Dutch citizens.

After a summary of several contributions in this volume, we focus on certain problems and omissions in the debate about citizenship and the position of migrants in Dutch society. First, nearly all the contributions are related to the level of theoretical concepts or policy proposals, neglecting the level of social behaviour and important changes of social reality. Second, all authors acknowledge the fact that the moral dimensions of citizenship have become more important, yet nobody seems to be interested in a scientific explanation of this remarkable fact. In response to these omissions we try to understand why the Netherlands has changed from an open society into a community struck by xenophobia. One explanation might be that the intensity of social interaction has increased considerably. Another explanation is related to the fact the level of education has grown, creating a higher expectations of 'normal' behaviour. Together these tendencies undermine the ('typical Dutch') tradition of tolerance or deviant behaviour generally and for 'strange' behaviour of migrants specifically.

In public debate on immigrants' political ties with their country of origin, two assumptions prevail. The first assumption is that many immigrants engage in transnational political activities. The second is that forms of transnational citizenship are an impediment for the development of local citizenship. However, so far little research has been done on the importance of, and the relationship between, local and transnational citizenship. In this article, we focus on local and transnational forms of active citizenship, here understood as the total of political practices and processes of identification. Our study, conducted among middle-class immigrants in Rotterdam, indicates that the importance of active transnational citizenship should not be overstated. Among these middle-class immigrants, political practices are primarily focused on the local level; political practices directed to the home country appear to be quite rare. If we look at processes of identification, we see that a majority of the middle-class immigrants have a strong urban identity. Many of them combine this local identification with feelings of belonging with people in their home country. These local and transnational identifications seem to reinforce, rather than impede, each other.

Municipalities expect that outsourcing, autonomization and privatization will reduce costs or even create revenues. Such decisions also have costs. An analysis of 38 reports by local audit offices shows that municipalities are not aware or unable to calculate these costs. Based on thirteen cases of autonomization and privatization in a large Dutch municipality, this article shows for example that personnel costs can be very high. Municipalities should therefore make better informed decisions, based on managerial considerations, rather than political reasons.

This article sketches four more or less excluding future scenarios with regard to immigration and social security. Its objective is to find an answer to the question how the Dutch welfare state and more in particular the system of social security can contribute positively to both labour market participation and social integration of non-western immigrants. The four scenarios, constructed on the basis of two dichotomies open versus closed country borders and privatised versus collective social security, can be perceived as ideal types. Although none of the four scenarios will contribute unequivocally to solving the problem of labour market participation and social integration of immigration, it turns out that two scenarios will be more realistic, given in particular the long-term development of the social security system towards further privatisation. These are the scenarios that combine privatised social security with open or closed borders. The first scenario will be more beneficial from an economic viewpoint. By contrast, the second scenario will be more attractive for those people who primarily want to restrict immigration.

This article examines conflicts in public space in terms of the underlying 'symbolic order'. Using the case of the wild fires on New Year's eve in the city of The Hague it explores the role of the local government in managing the latest manifestation of this 'tradition' of fires in the neighbourhoods. The analysis illuminates a framing in terms of 'old' and 'new' fires in which the earlier fires were well understood as relating to a neighbourhood culture and the new fires, attributed to young migrant youths, are not. It is pointed out that there is a wide variety of attributions that now inform the response of local government. As an alternative it is suggested to invest in understanding the symbolics of fire setting and appreciate the fact that the 'parochial' sphere that was characteristic for neighbourhoods some decades ago, can no longer be assumed. It is suggested that the fact that different actors hold distinct frames is crucial for understanding the conflict.

Over recent years, we have seen a steady increase in the number of security officers and city supervisors in Dutch urban areas. However, despite the mounting presence and visibility of these auxiliary patrols, little is known about how citizens perceive and value them. A questionnaire held among a sample of 761 residents of Amsterdam shows that citizens have mixed opinions. Many people are accepting or neutral about the occurrence of security officers and city supervisors in urban space, but at the same time lack a clear idea of their quality and professionalism. This somewhat ignorant and laconic attitude raises the question whether people underestimate the potential consequences of omnipresent quasi-police. It is argued that more repressive approaches may generate substantial conflicts with the general public. Furthermore, safety and security may become 'consumer goods' in the sense that people are quite happy to leave their responsibilities to paid policing professionals – a position which promotes the rise of a 'culture of control'.

To live in a safe neighbourhood is to live in a neighbourhood where one knows what to expect and can navigate the public space. This article argues that issues of public safety in urban disadvantaged neighbourhoods are often understood as depending on crime and social control; but it may well be that whether or not people feel safe depends just as much on the degree of public familiarity of the context in which they live – and consequently on their abilities to know who to trust and distrust – as it depends on the usual suspects of crime rates, social cohesion, broken windows and collective efficacy. Using empirical data from four neighbourhoods in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, the article shows that data may substantiate this claim, formulates some policy recommendations and proposes an agenda for further research.