The revolving door is an ambiguous concept evoking strong opinions, and often is seen to lead to a decline in trust and legitimacy of the policy-making system of the Netherlands. But the different moral objections against the revolving door between functions and jobs in public and private organizations are barely matched with systematic empirical evidence of negative effects on the policy-making system. In this article, a definition of the concept is presented in order to help focusing the discussion on moral objections and practical implications of the revolving door. Two fundamental contradictions emerge from the panoply of arguments and assertions about this phenomenon. With our definition as a basis, we consider the different forms of the revolving door and discuss conditions under which it may be contained without solutions that are disproportionate to the problem. The way out is to develop clearer norms and integrity-enhancing mechanisms with which negative effects may be avoided and positive effects strengthened.

In this article I argue that the commonplace interpretation of neoliberalism in the Netherlands is mistaken. According to this interpretation the term ‘neoliberalism’ refers to a series of policies, including privatisation and deregulation, that were implemented in the Netherlands in the 1980’s in imitation of Thatcher and Reagan. I argue that it is not this series of policies but the justification underpinning them that is of a neoliberal nature. To support this claim I offer a brief genealogical history of neoliberal thought, which developed in the interwar period, by explicitly distinguishing itself from both 19th-century classical liberalism and contemporary modern liberalism. On the basis of this historical account I assert that neoliberalism adopts the foundational principles of classical and modern liberalism, but that it prescribes different formal principles of rational government. I conclude that this diction makes it possible to write a critical history of neoliberalism.

This article compares the study and professional backgrounds of ethnic minority and native Dutch MPs in the Netherlands using self-collected data from 2010-2016. We build on previous studies and further develop and test the compensation and similarity model. We expected that ethnic minorities compensate with regard to the duration of their education and the length of their professional and pre-parliamentarian political careers. Furthermore, in line with the similarity model, we expected greater similarities between ethnic minority and Dutch MPs in terms of their educational and professional backgrounds and political experience. The results show more evidence for the similarity model than for the compensation model. We find that ethnic minority MPs have similar educational levels and types of political experience as Dutch MPs, however, contrary to the expectation they do not have more but less years of professional and pre-parliamentarian political experience.

Studies have shown that multiple office-holding, a practice that denotes the simultaneous exercise of any directly elected municipal mandate and parliamentary seat, is more commonplace in European national parliaments than expected. However, research in Belgium, and especially in the Netherlands, is scarce and extremely fragmented. Therefore, our analysis provides a systematic comparison between the Low Countries with a longitudinal focus. In the first part of the paper, the frequency of the practice is described and its evolution in the last two decades tracked. In the second part, we provide aggregated explanations for the identified discrepancy. Indeed, our results show that after the most recent elections, more than 80% of all Belgian members of parliament held a local mandate, and this percentage increased by 10% during our reference period. In contrast, 9 out of 150 members of the Dutch Second Chamber were combining several offices at the beginning of their national mandate, while the degree of cumulards remained stable. Unexpectedly, the legislative framework and the party regulations are not the source of this deviation, as they are almost identical in both countries. We argue that the difference can be attributed to the role and position of the local government, the political culture and the electoral system.

Even though they are portrayed as culturally and mentally very different, the Dutch and the Flemish share a border, a part of their history, and their language. Little oversight has been provided regarding the similarities and differences in terms of their democratic and political institutions and their mode of operation. This is especially the case for the local level. With upcoming local elections in both the Netherlands and Flanders/Belgium, this article presents an oversight of similarities and differences regarding local government and local elections in both territories. The main conclusion is that there are differences and similarities in both the local institutional setting and government practice. In local government practice however, the differences stand out.

This article compares the mayoralties of the Netherlands and Flanders, with a particular focus on the changes since 2010. The results show that the mayors of these two historically and culturally connected Low Countries form particularly homogeneous groups of people. This has not changed much over the last few years. The role and function of mayors in both Flanders and the Netherlands, however, have gradually changed substantially. In particular, both mayors’ responsibilities in the field of safety and security have increased. At the same time, the two mayoralties show considerable differences. The Flemish mayor has long been and still is a far more political figure than the Dutch mayor is. The Dutch mayoral office, however, is politicising, which has resulted in more debate about its role in local government than in Flanders. The comparison shows how the local political culture can strongly influence how public offices take shape.

This article investigates to what extent national and/or local factors influence the performance of national parties in the most recent Flemish and Dutch municipal elections of, respectively, 2012 and 2014.
Our analyses underscore the impact of local factors on the municipal election results, both in Flanders and in the Netherlands. The number of parties and previous election results have a negative effect on the vote share of national political parties. Contrary to the expectations, participation in local government does not have any influence on the national lists’ elections results.
Although local factors have to be taken into account to get a better estimation of the performance of national lists in municipal elections, national factors have significant effects as well. Parties doing well at the national elections, are less successful at the local level.

This paper analyses ministerial expertise of senior ministers and junior ministers (in Dutch: staatssecretarissen) who held office in the Netherlands between 1967 and 2015. Expertise is differentiated between two independent dimensions: technical knowledge with respect to the subject matter of the portfolio, and political knowledge and skills. Results indicate that both types of ministers have considerable political and technical expertise, but junior ministers have relatively and significantly more often technical expertise and senior ministers more often have political expertise. Furthermore, the complete outsider (lacking both technical and political skills) is a rather rare phenomenon in both types of ministers. Besides, although it follows from the watchdog junior minister theory that political expertise is needed to function effectively as a watchdog, there is not a significantly higher frequency of political expertise in the junior ministers when the junior minister and the senior minister are from different parties than when they are from the same party.

In recent years, there has been a strong diffusion of the concept of the G1000 in the Low countries. Yet, empirical research that concerns the democratic value of these mini-publics is sparse. This raises the question as to how democratic the G1000 initiatives in Belgium and the Netherlands are. To answer this question, we compare the Belgian and the Dutch G1000’s and assess these against a set of deliberative democratic criteria. We conclude that the G1000’s to a large extent meet the process criteria of deliberation. At the same time, the connection with the formal decision-making process appears to be weak. Another lesson to be drawn is that deliberative democratic criteria often seem to conflict with each other, which points to continuing tensions within the ideal of deliberative democracy.

This article looks at indications and counterindications in Dutch democracy for the popular claim that citizens, while still valuing representative democracy, are fed up with representative politics. Using available large-scale surveys, citizen attitudes are analysed at the levels of specific political actors (politicians, officials), central political institutions (political parties, parliament, government) and the general system of representative democratic politics (the way it works in the Netherlands, with multiparty coalitions, etc). While specific legitimacy problems exist, the evidence for a general legitimacy crisis in Dutch democracy is comparatively weak and highly mixed. More specifically, the evidence suggests that Dutch citizens do not so much want less representative politics, but rather representative politics of a somewhat different kind: less exclusively organized via party-political channels; more geared at recognizable and accountable political authority. Dutch citizens want to seriously influence but not supplant selectionistic representative politics, the evidence suggests.

New forms of participatory and deliberative democracy gain popularity alongside traditional representative democracy at the local level in the Netherlands. In this article we look at passive citizens defined as citizens who do not participate in any of the new practices. How do they perceive the shift from traditional to new forms of democracy (defined as stakeholder democracy, deliberative polling and associative or ‘do’ democracy)? We performed a Q-methodological study to find patterns of opinion among passive citizens. We found three patterns. Critical citizens are critical about both traditional representative democracy and new forms of democracy. Loyal citizens support traditional local democracy and do not think the shift to other forms is a change for the better. Distant citizens find that politicians should first and foremost uphold the law and act as referees when citizens disagree. This task has been neglected over the years but this deficiency cannot be remedied by new forms of democracy. All three patterns of opinion are cause for concern for the advocates of more participatory and deliberative democracy. While these new forms may restore faith in politics among active citizens they may simultaneously alienate passive citizens.

National officials play an important role in all phases of the EU policy process and are often assumed to be more euro-enthusiastic than other citizens. Yet, thus far systematic knowledge on their views on EU integration is lacking. This study fills this gap through recently collected survey data among Dutch officials (N = 3509). We find first that at least for officials, hard and soft euroscepticism are no gradations on the same scale, but separate dimensions. Second, both sociological and rational choice institutionalism help explain bureaucratic euroscepticism, where the latter seems to have a somewhat stronger explanatory power. Third, officials are on average indeed more euro-enthusiastic than other citizens. However, (a) relatively fewer officials are strongly euro-enthusiastic compared to the general population; (b) the total share of eurosceptics among officials is practically the same as the general population, and (c) significantly more officials report to be ‘strongly eurosceptic’ than among the wider population.

Issue ownership theory argues that the public considers some parties as more capable to handle certain issues. Issue ownership is important, because parties tend to receive more votes if their owned issues dominate the campaign. Consequently, issue ownership theory expects parties to emphasize issues they own, while ignoring issues owned by their competitors. This study investigates to what extent Dutch parties emphasized issues they own, before and after the seven Dutch national elections held between 1994 and 2012. It uses a detailed content analysis of four Dutch newspapers, that tracked parties’ issue attention. The results show that parties tend to emphasize owned issues more, both compared to other issues and compared to their competitors. A surprising finding is that parties tend to emphasize owned issues more during the formation period compared to the campaign. Moreover, government parties emphasize owned issues less than opposition parties.

This paper analyses the information sources members of the Dutch Lower House base their questions on with regard to EU affairs in the period 1995-2013. Knowledge of the type of information sources to base questions on is vital for determining what the conditions are under which members of national parliaments can scrutinize the decisions taken by the national government at the EU level. The involvement of national parliaments in EU affairs is according to many scholars a necessary condition for closing the democratic deficit of the European Union, especially when the turnout in elections for the European Parliament remains low and for national parliaments remains stable and relatively high. An original dataset is constructed including all sets of written parliamentary questions on EU affairs asked by Dutch MPs in the period 1995-2013, categorized by different types of information sources on which the question is based. These different categories of information sources are regressed with a variable measuring the Treaty changes impacting on the intensity of contact between MPs of different national parliaments and several variables measuring the characteristics of Dutch MPs and their parties. The findings indicate that Dutch MPs base their written questions primarily on coverage on EU affairs by national newspapers. Moreover, MPs are more likely to use sources rooted in a national context for asking questions when they are a member of a party with a negative attitude towards European integration. These findings imply that parliamentary control via written questions over the decisions of the national executive at the EU level can be strengthened by increasing national media coverage on EU affairs, allowing the EU public sphere to develop further in the future.

In this paper we investigate the effect of political sophistication on turnout and whether this effect differs in second-order national elections. Political sophistication is thought to influence turnout because the more sophisticated voters have access to more information about the electoral and the party system. In this paper, we start from the expectation that these effects should be even stronger in the context of secondorder national elections, where information about the stakes of the election is not readily available. We analyse citizens’ willingness to turn out to vote at different levels of government in Belgium and the Netherlands. The results show that a higher degree of political sophistication increases the probability to turn out at the national as well as the European level. Our expectation that this effect would be larger at the European level, however, is not supported by these results.

This article shows that the economic left/right dimension does not always suffice to understand the social-economic policy positions of political parties. It focuses on social-economic decision-making in the Netherlands in 2012. The increase of the government pension age, which was championed by parties of the left and the right and opposed by parties of the left and the right, is taken as a prime example of an issue where decision-making did not follow the left-right line of conflict. The article continues to show that party policy positions on a number of more important welfare state reforms do not follow the left/right line of conflict, but rather a reform line of conflict that divides parties from the left and the right into pro-European reformers and Eurosceptic defenders of the existing welfare state.