The introduction of the euro led to large macroeconomic imbalances between Euro countries. Under pressure from the euro crisis, the European Commission adopted EU regulations 1174/2011 and 1176/2011 in 2011 with the aim of reducing these macroeconomic imbalances. These measures include the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure to identify macroeconomic imbalances and, if necessary, to prompt Member States to take corrective action. This article provides an overview of this recent EU policy for countering imbalances and provides a political-economic analysis of the macroeconomic imbalances in Europe and its consequences. In particular, it focuses on the conflicting interests of the euro-area countries with current account surpluses and deficits. This article also analyses the possibilities offered by the 2019 European election for European policy makers to strengthen this policy. The article concludes that the surplus countries, despite the apparent advantage of trade balance surpluses, do have an interest in reducing imbalances in the EU but fail to translate this into actual policy. The Commission’s role in reducing imbalances is likely to remain limited, even after the 2019 European elections.

The European project currently faces not only an economic crisis, but a moral one as well. The economic growth model of social justice combined with market-oriented policies, also referred to as the European social model has lost much of its meaning after ten years of austerity and financial calamities. In 2012 ECB President Draghi says in the Wall Street Journal that the European social model is “gone”, a thing of the past. While only a couple of years later the European Pillar of Social Rights is put in place. What is happening with ‘Social Europe’? And how do trade unions, as a historical motor of social policy in the member states, relate to the European social model, especially since the financial crisis. This article deals with the position of trade unions vis-à-vis European social policy and the European institutions. The European social model, economic governance and the collective bargaining system are discussed as examples of post-crisis European social policy. It will be argued that although the European Commission gives institutional space to social policy and to a role for trade unions, it has always been subordinate to economic integration. And moreover that the recent economic crisis is used at the European level to obtain almost complete control over social policy in the member states.

According to the outgoing European Commissioner Pierre Moscovici, the European Union (EU) has made more progress in tackling tax avoidance and evasion in the last five years than in the twenty years before that. This article argues that although several targeted measures have indeed been adopted, such as automatic exchange of tax rulings and limitations on interest deductions, this has not led to a structural change in EU corporate tax policies, nor in underlying power relations. The article discusses the politics of a number of recent policy developments related to tax avoidance and evasion by transnational corporations. It argues that the adoption of targeted measures, and the simultaneous stalling of more comprehensive approaches – in terms of tax transparency or a common consolidated corporate tax base – can be explained by recent tax controversies, international politics, and the dynamics within and between EU institutions. Particular attention is paid to the role of the European Parliament that is formally limited, but still houses progressive forces that have continuously pushed for a clampdown on tax avoidance. Finally, the article pleads for more transparent EU decision-making, specifically concerning discussions with and within the Council, in order to improve the democratic legitimacy of EU corporate tax policies and processes.

Ten years ago, now, the Eurozone began to shake on its foundations. This article traces the genesis of the crisis and the present state of affairs. As to the causes of the global financial crisis in 2008, I argue that contrary to common understanding, the financial crisis had its deeper causes in a decades old tendency towards crisis in the real economy, produced by the continuous overaccumulation of capital which can only return profits by undertaking speculative short-term investments (a phenomenon known as ‘financialisation’). I then trace how the global financial crisis morphed into a crisis of public deficits and debt in 2010-2011, particularly in the Eurozone. Three factors are shown to be responsible: financialization, design faults in the European monetary union, and the neo-mercantilist strategy of especially Germany and the Netherlands. The paper next looks at the five main traits of the policy responses in the Eurozone: bailing out governments and banks through creating emergency funds; imposition of austerity and budget discipline for member state governments; attempting to create and complete a Eurozone banking union; subsequently the European Central Bank engaged on an unprecedented scale in ‘quantitative easing’; and finally, institutional reform in an attempt to repair the most pressing design faults of the EMU. The paper concludes that the underlying structural factors leading up to the crisis have only been addressed incompletely: the overaccumulation of capital continues, the completion of the banking union is in an impasse, quantitative easing has mostly just intensified financialization by pushing up asset prizes, and institutional reform has taken the form of a fundamentally undemocratic attempt at monetary and political union by stealth. The broader legitimacy of the European project has been substantially undermined, and Europe is not in a better position than eight years ago in case of a new global crisis.

In this feature authors discuss recent research findings that are of interest to readers of Beleid en Maatschappij.
Mounting concerns exist that small private investors exacerbate the urban housing crisis, by purchasing dwellings to rent out so-called ‘buy-to-let’ purchases. By buying up property, they may drive up house prices and exclude regular house-seekers. In this paper, we show that buy-to-let purchases constitute an increasing share of all purchases on the Dutch housing market, and especially so in larger cities and university cities. We argue these local trends do not emerge out of thin air and are not a ‘natural’ market process but should be considered the product of both global economic developments and national policies supporting these changes. Global developments include the increased mobility and ample availability of capital, exemplified by a prolonged low interest environment and a growing scarcity of high quality collateral and investment opportunities, making housing attractive for storing capital. Dutch housing policies have increasingly restricted access to social rent to low-income groups, while blowing up house prices fuelled with mortgage debts. As a consequence, a growing number of households falls in-between these two tenures: they have to resort to private rent. Private investors respond to and accommodate this demand through buy-to-let investments. Furthermore, the Dutch national government has made steps to relax regulation on the private-rental market and weakened tenant rights. In so doing, it sets the scene for amplifying social and spatial inequalities between the property rich and the property poor.

During the last ten years, the private rental sector in the Netherlands has experienced a rapid growth. In the larger cities, this sector grew with 30 percent, mainly as a result of the large amount of private persons operating as small scale landlords (buy-to-let). This article reflects on the findings of a recent report on the nature of the buy-to-let sector in the Netherlands, carried out by Manuel Aalbers, Jelke Bosma, Rodrigo Fernandez and Cody Hochstenbach. This takes their findings as a starting point, and positions the Dutch private rental sector in an internationally comparative perspective. Furthermore, this article explains the rise of the buy-to-let sector not just from a housing market point of view, but from a welfare state perspective. In different European countries, the private rental sector plays a different role in the housing market, which impacts on the availability and affordability of housing in urban areas. Moreover, rental income for buy-to-let or small-scale private landlords can be seen as part of the provision of welfare. For some it is a pension arrangement, for others a speculative investment. This article reflects on the policy recommendations that Aalbers cum suis propose in their report. To what extent are their proposals able to increase the availability and affordability of housing, without undermining the livelihood of landlords for whom the rental incomes function as social security arrangement?

Over the past three years buy-to-let purchases have become a substantial presence in the Dutch housing market. Private investors buy existing homes in order to rent out. Rental yields have become attractive to a large group of individuals due to low interest rates and high rents. Though buy-to-let helps to increase the stock of rental homes (a broadly recognized need in the Netherlands) there are concerns about negative effects for instance on affordability for regular house seekers. A new group of buyers enters the market and this poses new or potentially aggrevated risks for the Dutch housing market, in particular regarding overall house price stability.

The Socialist Party commissioned this academic study into the scale and impact of the recent rise of buy-to-let transactions in Dutch urban housing markets. The study focusses, however, on the rise of private rental housing. This definition of buy-to-let is challenged in this review, as is the impact of the recent rise of buy-to-let on the Dutch owner occupied housing market.

In the last few years, platform work and the so-called ‘gig economy’ have been growing across countries. While policy makers are debating the gig economy, there is no single agreed definition of this new type of work and systematic academic reviews are missing. This literature review provides main findings of relevant papers on working in the gig economy. The article shows that the growth of the gig economy fits well into the increasing hybridisation of work, which raises some political questions.

In this feature authors discuss recent research findings that are of interest to readers of Beleid en Maatschappij.

In this feature authors discuss recent research findings that are of interest to readers of Beleid en Maatschappij.
We calculate and describe profits obtained by health organizations in The Netherlands in the years 2014 and 2015. We distinguish between profit and not-for-profit organizations. We find that on average net profits amount to about 2 percent on turnover with a peak of more than 3 percent for mental-healthcare organizations. If we take the size of organizations into account, we find that for-profit organizations with a turnover of less than 1 million euro tend to have on average net profit rates of 4 percent to more than 5 percent with peaks amounting to more than 50 percent. We are not yet able to come up with explanations for these excessively high profit rates in parts of the Dutch health care sector. On the other hand, the highest losses can be found in small-sized organizations as well. We delved deeper into the financial accounts of a few for-profit organizations and found indications of misreporting of turnover or number of treatments. On the other hand, bad management and unhealthy cost structures might explain why some organizations incur excessive big losses. The sector does not appear to be well monitored by the government.

In this feature authors discuss recent research findings that are of interest to readers of Beleid en Maatschappij.

In this feature authors discuss recent research findings that are of interest to readers of Beleid en Maatschappij.