It has been claimed by politicians as well as researchers that economic openness poses a threat to the welfare state. This article investigates whether there is such a threat. Based on the literature four different hypotheses are distinguished; economic openness is negatively, positively, curvilinear or not related to the welfare state. The first and the third hypothesis state that economic openness does threaten the welfare state, whereas the other two hypotheses argue that this is not the case. The empirical studies investigating the relationship between economic openness and the welfare state are systematically reviewed in this article. The analysis shows that economic openness does not threaten the welfare state.

The application to animals of biotechnological techniques raises moral dilemmas and requires collective agreements. Under what circumstances, for example, are applications permissible? The technological and ethical complexity of biotechnology makes it difficult to arrive at such agreements. With the recent Animal Biotechnology Act, the Dutch Minister of Agriculture has created an arrangement that should facilitate social learning. Did the arrangement work out as planned? This evaluation study demonstrates that very little substantive learning has taken place: positions have become more rigid and antagonists continue to contest one another in a legal discourse. The legalization has hindered learning processes but presents the opportunity for a polarized debate to be conducted within the same institutional framework.

The degree to which individuals accept to face risks appears to be declining. Therefore, individuals put pressure on the government to take measures to reduce risks. The risk society tends to be associated with an instrumental view on criminal law, i.e. risk reduction is considered the main goal of criminal law. In this article factors that may cause a reduction in risk acceptance are investigated. Moreover, implications in the field of civil and administrative law are discucced.

Horizontal governance arrangements potentially conflict with the very principles of representative democracy and, likewise, with the existing political institutions. This conflict manifests itself in the interaction between representatives and the executive power: although the former have the formal power, the latter participates in horizontal networks and therefore has the resources that are necessary to form good policy. This erodes the power position of representatives. Frame work setting is commonly suggested as an arrangement for representatives to enhance their grip on policy processes in network-settings. The authors of this contribution examine the effects of frame setting as coupling mechanism between horizontal networks and vertical politics in six policy processes in a Dutch Province. Based on both theory and research findings they redefine the concept of framework setting in order to make it more attuned to the complex, interdependent and dynamic nature of policy-making in networks.

The Netherlands has a well-developed, internationally unique system of expert advice founded in law. In addition to being instrumental for problem solving, advisory bodies are assigned tasks in mid- and long-term strategy formulation, putting new issues on the agenda, and organizing countervailing powers and checks and balances in national policy formulation. A decade ago, the number of advisory bodies was drastically reduced. Present cabinet policy pursues a second round of slimming advisory infrastructure. Through political centralization of demand for advice, and a further reduction in the number and diversity of advisory bodies, serviceable and instrumental expert advice for policy is prioritized. In times of new wicked problems for governance, there is a serious threat of erosion of expert policy advice as countervailing power. Does the present cabinet suffer from 'anorexia consulta'?

In the Netherlands, new horizontal forms of accountability have in recent years been introduced for executive agencies. These forms of accountability address other stakeholders besides the hierarchical principal. It includes for example demonstrating responsiveness to clients, independent overseers or professional standards. In this article, two related questions are answered. At first the question is posed whether horizontal accountability can be regarded as a substitute for democratic accountability or as complementary to it. The second question is how their introduction fits with traditional (vertical) forms of accountability. The article is based on a qualitative research that was carried out in 2005 and 2006 on nine large Dutch executive agencies. It focuses on two types of horizontal accountability: accountability of agencies to boards and to an independent evaluation committee ('visitation'). The article concludes that horizontal accountability is best regarded as complementary to democratic accountability. Horizontal accountability has added value because it invokes learning processes. In addition, the introduction of horizontal forms of accountability creates a redundant accountability regime for executive agencies in which they account for the same actions to different accountees. Redundancy has the advantages that it mitigates information asymmetry and incorporates the different expectations for agencies.