Nowadays municipalities in the Netherlands work together more intensively with other municipalities in the region. Also cooperation with companies, institutions and societal organizations is more often looked for at the regional level. In practice this brings along many problems and difficulties. For several reasons it appears not to be easy to combine the implementation strengths of municipalities and societal partners. This article presents a new approach (based on the theory of ‘new regionalism’) to regional implementation strength. This approach is not only about designing regional administrations, but is mainly about the factors that induce administrations as well as companies and institutions to commit themselves jointly for the region. To increase the regional implementation strength more is needed than the formation of a regional administrative structure in which municipalities do not cooperate in a non-committal manner. To induce municipalities and societal partners to commit themselves jointly to handling new tasks or new challenges it is also necessary to have a clear strategic vision on these issues that binds parties and makes them enthusiastic and that regional cooperation is rooted in a societal breeding ground. It also asks for an administrative structure that does justice to the contribution every municipality and societal partner makes to the realization of the strategy and for a democratic involvement of municipal councils and sector-based interest groups.

Within the past two years, hydraulic fracturing for shale gas became a highly contested technology in the Netherlands. Possible negative environmental impacts are at strained terms with possible economic, energy and geo-political benefits. In addition, there are many scientific uncertainties about, for example water contamination, methane emissions, the amounts of gas to extract and the risk of earth quakes. Societal conflict and scientific uncertainties make fracking for shale gas a wicked problem for decision makers. This article demonstrates that the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs has implemented several instruments for deliberation, such as a consultation round with stakeholders and a sound board for an independent research. These failed to lead to the desired support for fracking. In this contribution, I demonstrate that these instruments led to reason giving but not to structuring of the problem. They were used by governmental actors and protest groups as a political platform that was fuel for the political conflict.

Concerns about mobile phone masts are often put down as unfounded fears of health risks. However, our ethnographic study of mast siting controversies shows that citizens mostly want to be democratically involved in the siting decisions. There is no room for such engagement in the national antenna policy, thus, citizens shift their attention to the possibility of health risks. The national government responds to this with more research and risk communication. However, the centrality of science leads to a shift in the discussion towards the credibility of science. Even a Klankbordgroep (Sounding Board) with all stakeholders fails to change the focus. This article shows that local conflicts are not so much the result of individual concerns, which is the subject of many social sciences studies, but are the outcome of a dynamic interaction between governments, citizens and scientists. Governments should not frame a local issue only in terms of a scientific problem.

This special issue focusses on deliberative elements in deciding over wicked problems. We present four case studies in which some form of deliberation was organized: the placement of mobile phone masts, hydraulic fracturing for shale gas, the failed HPV vaccination campaign and climate dialogues organized to enhance deliberative knowledge production over climate change. The case studies demonstrate how each of the deliberative processes has become politicized and that deliberative governance runs the risk of turning into a technocratic policy approach.

In the near future, the Dutch government intends to change the rules relating to smoking bans in the hospitality industry again. After a complete ban, coming into force in July 2008, and introducing an exception for small bars in June 2011, the complete ban will return this year. This article describes the law regarding smoking bans in the Netherlands, and reports along researches of the relevant authority and a commercial research institute the effectiveness of the bans. From these findings it becomes clear that the hospitality industry did a good job in complying with the bans. But there is one exception: small bars. Next we explain, based on the ideas of Kagan and Skolnick and Elias the effectiveness of smoking bans.

The article provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of the Night Time Economy and how the Collective Pub Ban is applied in three Dutch cities: Utrecht, Amersfoort and Den Bosch. The Collective Pub Ban is a measure taken in the Netherlands in an effort to make pubs, bars and clubs co-responsible for maintaining security. Depending on the severity of the conduct, an offender can be denied of entry to these venues for five years. During this period, the offender is not allowed to enter the particular pub or any of the other pubs, bars and clubs that participate in this measure. On the basis of 84 interviews, we show how these venues fill out their new responsibilities with respect to the Collective Pub Ban-measure. Also, we answer the question what this new measure means for the quality of the public space.

Since 1901, Dutch social housing is organized as a hybrid system. Over the years, this system has continually adapted to outside forces and demands. Lately it has come under pressure, especially as the negative side effects of housing associations becoming autonomous have become apparent. This article describes the history of social housing in the Netherlands since 1901, and discusses whether the negative side effects of hybridity should be used as an argument for a major overhaul of the system.

During the 1980s and 1990s, successive Dutch governments reformed public transport by introducing market-type mechanisms. However, these New Public Management-style reforms have only been introduced half-heartedly because governments also tried to avoid the negative effects of NPM. On some fronts, the reforms have undoubtedly led to improved quality (better and newer material) and more choice for governments regarding how to organize public transport because there are several new providers. But on other fronts, these positive effects have been hampered by fragmentation, leading to calls for another overhaul of the system. This article chronicles the developments in public transport and discusses which new steps could be taken.

More than twelve years after the appearance of the report of the Dutch Committee on the Future of Government Communication (‘Commissie Toekomst Overheidscommunicatie’) communication as the responsibility of the government is an important issue of debate and a discipline that is alive and kicking. We may even conclude that communication – in the terminology of this report – has conquered a place in the heart of policy. A lot is still unclear about the communicative function of government. On the normative question ‘why should the government communicate’ diverging answers are possible. However, the question is hardly discussed in practice and in science. For this reason the positioning of government communication as a separate discipline is also unclear. Reflection on the elementary values behind the discipline can reveal themes that have been invisible so far. The article investigates which values and motives are attached in theory and in practice to communication as a governmental function. For this reason a content analysis has been carried out of a number of volumes of five Dutch magazines (practical and scientific). The authors conclude that for professionals communication mainly is an instrument to support policy goals. The possibility to make a purposeful contribution with government communication to democratic values hardly is brought about, not so much in Communication Science as in Public Administration.

Dramatic incidents, such as the 1986 Challenger Disaster, induce the instalment of a Commission to investigate the process that lead to the incident. The Commission attempts to reconstruct the many smaller and larger steps towards the one or several decisions and actions that turned out to be vital – and sometimes fatal. Most Commissions serve a dual purpose; the want to learn lessons and avert similar incidents to occur again, but they are also part of a process to allocate responsibilities and – sometimes – to point the blame. An analysis of Commission-reports reveals two dominant patterns in the narratives Commissions produce. One is relatively simple and identifies the decision or action that caused the incidents; it shows the mistakes that were made, when and by who, The lessons is often to not make the same mistake again. The second pattern is more complicated and produces less ‘crisp’ explanations for the incident. Decisions, actions take place in ambiguous, complex and inherently uncertain contexts. Actors acts amidst such complexity, are subject to all sorts of dynamics and pressures and in the process do things that look awkward or wrong in hindsight. Mistakes happen, not because actors are not smart enough or do the wrong things, but because they are an inherent element of complex decision making. The lesson that follows from that is for organizations that make important decisions under complex conditions to organize checks and balances and look for heterogeneity in their processes. That produces a difficult dilemma, given the ambivalent role of commissions. The second line of reasoning produces much richer lessons for policy, but is very ‘soft’ in casting blame. The first line of reasoning is clearer about responsibility and blame, but oversimplifies the lessons. That draws attention to a crucial – and yet unanswered – question for researchers, practitioners and also the general public; do we see them as platforms for learning or tools for sanctioning?

Our research question is: how do Dutch municipalities practice their local steering role within climate mitigation policy? Policy documents of twelve municipalities have been analysed and corresponding policymakers have been interviewed. Our research illustrates that the Dutch government is struggling with the changing relations with society and the growing dependency on it for reaching policy targets. According to literature, the governmental steering role of process management is expected to be more effective in situations of high dependency. However, the policy strategies of municipalities meet characteristics of project management. Meanwhile, the project targets are not controllably formulated and rely solely on actions of other local parties. The ministry has assigned municipalities to use this project management style, to implement the projects in a top-down manner, and to find partners after the implementation phase. Municipal policymakers indicate that they are facing problems afterwards, because the ‘partners’ have interests that do not correspond with the projects as formulated by the municipalities. It is more effective to negotiate with the other parties. This is necessary in order to formulate collective policy targets that meet the interests of all of the participating parties in accordance with the theory of network governance and process management.

The information revolution, and in particular the convergence of nanotechnology, biotechnology, information technology and cognitive technology, creates a new societal arena: biopolitics. This so-called NBIC-convergence strengthens the promise that live, including our bodies (e.g. genes), brains (e.g. attention) and social environment (e.g. social contacts and consumer behaviour), can be brought into the domain of technological manipulability. NBIC-convergence, therefore, raises many social and ethical issues. The dominant naïve belief in progress through technology often stands in the way of a timely and adequate governance of these issues. The current situation in which the information revolution is mainly developing on the political sidelines, can lead to thorny societal and political problems in the mid and long-term.

In this article we aim to provide an insight in one of the specifics of the dynamic relationship between government and society; the delegation of public tasks to (civil) society. The concept ‘Big Society’ in the United Kingdom generated immense expectations in this respect. By making use of an explorative case study, we examine the origins, visions and best practices in successively the UK, Australia and Scandinavia in order to generate a better understanding of this dynamical relationship. The major insights following from this analysis relate to the economic and cultural background, the political reality and rhetoric, as well as to concrete practices to understand what civil society has to offer in the delegation of public tasks. Finally, as a first step towards theory development, we formulate five concrete lessons for the delegation of public tasks to the civil society.

This article explores the intellectual, political and pragmatic origins of the concept Big Society. The authors argue that although the concept has become intertwined with the political ideas of UK’s Prime Minister David Cameron, the concept has also become firmly rooted in society and is thus likely to survive the political life of Cameron. Also outside the UK, the concept has acquired political attention. The authors explore the meaning of Big Society for the Netherlands. Thus far, the concept has reached the political agenda, but time will tell how the concept succeeds to sustain.

Amidst the turbulence of recent crises, governments’ capacity to govern and to deliver public value is under serious pressure. Public institutions are working hard to come up with new and improved schemes for dealing with complex and wicked policy issues that have emerged or just wont go away. But government alone cannot solve most of these issues. Governments already attempted to make ‘better, smarter policy’ in the hopes of raising performance. They also invested heavily in ‘participation’ of citizens, by inviting them to ‘co-create’ policy or ‘join-up’ with government agencies. However, this image of collaboration is one-sided. Besides the efforts initiated by governments themselves, there is a wide array of emerging activities. In these practices, it is not the government that takes action, but society takes ‘public matters’ into its own hands. Just as in many other countries, in The Netherlands groups of citizens have started to organize certain services, tasks or activities that used to be provided by the central or decentralized governmental institutions by themselves (and in most cases, for themselves). This article conceptualizes these emerging practices and analyses how they affect the world of policy making and what they may mean for public administration research.

The factor time is an often neglected issue in the literature on network governance. In this article we analyze the differences in perceptions on time between actors involved in water governance and describe the managerial interventions aimed at synchronizing time horizons, managing the available amount of time and the tempo of the governance process. Two case studies of governance processes in the district of Water Board Delfland are included to provide insight in the question how the factor time influences the governance processes and how aspects of time are managed. The case studies show that different perceptions of time may cause tensions in collaborative relationships, and even cause the end of collaborations. This underscores the importance of time-sensitive governance.

De facto autonomy, the actual potential of regulatory agencies to go about their daily work, is often conceived to be more important to explain regulatory capacity than its formal autonomy and responsibilities. In this article we investigate whether external context factors, such as the financial and economic crisis have an impact on de facto autonomy. More specifically, we investigate whether the de facto autonomy varies after the crisis and distinctively so for specific subsets of employees within regulatory agencies. According to literature, mid-level managers of agencies are key to de facto autonomy and building a secure reputation for the agency in question. We test these external and internal effects on de facto autonomy with a survey among employees of the Dutch Financial Market Authority (N = 248). The findings show that the perceived influence of stakeholders is relatively constant, but that it is more dynamic for European stakeholders. Both middle managers and employees working at strategic and policy departments of the agency conceive the impact of European stakeholders as increasing in nature. The findings have important implications for our studies of de facto autonomy of regulatory agencies as well as reform potential after major institutional crises.

Urban government is expected to contribute to the solution of major urban problems. At the same time, urban government is riddled with problems itself, often denoted in terms of governing and democratic deficits. In this article, options for governance reform in the urban realm are being explored along five lines, following up on recent research in the Netherlands and abroad. Both more aggregative arrangements (electronic ‘straw polls’, knowledge polls, prediction markets, ‘dot gov’ competitions for ‘best solutions’) and more collaborative arrangements (electronic co-creation, wiki governance, vital coalitions, urban regimes) are being assessed. The conclusions is that there are good arguments for, at least, more experimentation along these lines - not only from a functionalistic, but also from a democratic and social-psychological point of view.