Contemporary western democracies, such the United States, Great Britain, and The Netherlands have become diploma democracies. They are ruled by the well educated, whereas the least educated, even though they still comprise about half of the population, have virtually vanished from most political arenas. Of course, the well educated have always been more politically active than the less educated, but in the past decades this gap has widened substantially. Well-educated citizens are more inclined to vote, to write letters to the editor, or to visit consultative or deliberative meetings than citizens with a low level of education; and most, if not all, members of parliament, all the political officials, and almost all of the political advocates and lobbyists, have college or graduate degrees. The paper substantiates the rise of diploma democracy in The Netherlands, discusses what is problematic about such an educational meritocracy in the context of democracy, and looks at what could be done to mitigate or remedy some of its negative effects.

Fraud seems to be on the rise. That feeds a demand for controls. This paper sketches the diversity of supply in reaction to this demand: public regulators of course, but also commercial information providers and benchmarkers, self-regulating associations, hallmark producers, certification and accreditation bodies, and internal business management control systems, whereby ever more levels of control are piled on top of each other. More than a million Dutchmen earn a living in this booming control-industry, or 14% of the working population. In addition to fraud, other causes of this trend are being discussed, among them, paradoxically, neo-liberalist deregulation policies. All these causes contribute to a sense of risk and uncertainty. Although this trend has a number of negative consequences, it has a major benefit: jobs! Economists may have long thought that transaction costs are there for the transactions. But it looks as if transactions exist to produce transaction costs.

During the last decennium, social theory has provided us with path-breaking insights into the emergence of a new type of social risks (post-industrial, manufactured risks), and on policies which might deal with these risks (life politics; the social investment state). Especially the writings of Anthony Giddens are relevant in this respect. Unfortunately, these abstract ideas have thus far hardly been tested in empirical research. This article aims to fill this gap, by focussing on a telling example of a new, lifestyle related risk, which is the problem of overweight. How useful are Giddens' ideas on risk and social policy when applied in a concrete analysis of this particular problem and related policies? To answer this question, a comparative analysis has been carried out in two welfare states, the British and the Dutch. It will be argued that Giddens' abstract notions can indeed be applied effectively in a practical and fruitful framework for policy analysis. In this respect, the concepts of life politics and the social investment state seem promising, both for the practise and analysis of social policy development in European welfare states.

In February 2004, a highly debated research report with the title 'A Burdened Relation. 25 Years Development Aid between the Netherlands and Surinam' was sent to parliament. The study was conducted by a Netherlands scientist and a Surinam senior official (Kruijt and Maks, 2004). Their central aim was to execute a 'quick scan lessons learned evaluation' in order to arrive at a research agenda for a more detailed and profound study of the bilateral development aid relations of the two countries. In spite of this, the Netherlands minister for Development Aid decided in June 2005 to terminate the research project. Main argument she put forward to underpin the decision was that further research would add just about nothing to what already was known, or could be thought relevant for policymaking. The author of this article questions the validity of the argument of the minister. She scrutinizes the threefold research task, the research process and the results of the joint exercise. This demonstrates that the review holds a future scientific research agenda that is both innovative and provocative. Furthermore, she points out that the political ups and downs that accompanied the publication contain some additional practical insights.

In the Netherlands, an ambitious policy goal of 1,000 MW of wind power capacity by the year 2000 had already been formulated in 1985 and remained the official basis for wind energy policy until 2000. The pace of realisation of wind turbines however did not keep up with this policy objective. An important reason is that it proves difficult to provide enough locations for wind turbines in spatial plans. Over the last 15 years two covenants have been concluded between the Dutch central government and provinces in order to overcome this problem: the 1991-Governmental Agreement on Planning Problems Wind Energy (BPW), and the 2001-Governmental Agreement on the National Development Wind Energy (BLOW). In the BLOW provinces have agreed to work towards the realisation of wind turbines with a total capacity of 1,500 MW in 2010. For this purpose provinces need the co-operation of municipalities, wind power project developers and local communities. Municipalities have a crucial role because of their discretion of detailed allocation of land use in local spatial plans. They are no partners to the covenant however. Provinces can use several governance strategies for mobilising co-operation: from top-down governance in which provinces specify locations to bottom-up approaches in which the initiatives are left to municipalities and project developers. This paper compares both covenants and assesses the effectiveness of different governance strategies employed by three distinct provinces.

Traditionally, technological transitions in infrastructure bound sectors are matters for the private sector. History teaches us that as soon as technological transitions proved successful, government sooner or later got involved with the distribution. Most of this involvement, both in history and now, has taken the form of public regulation with the help of various formal legal instruments.

This article aims to answer three questions, namely (1) what ideational and materials drives can be distinguished in the government's involvement in these technological transitions, (2) through what legal instruments are these objectives expressed and how , and (3) what are the incentives of these formal legal instruments on innovative private entrepreneurs for their further technological pursuits. How were their behavioural options affected by the use of statutory acts, concessions, permits and/or licences? Incentives to private innovators are qualified as positive, neutral or negative. The research method chosen has been inspired by insights from legal sociology, public choice theory and strategic actor behaviour in qualitative simulation-games, but follows distinct methodological steps. Throughout the article a case study on the transition from telegraphy to telephony in The Netherlands will be used to illustrate the discussion.