This article poses the question whether the Dutch system of organized interest representation faces a transformation from neo-corporatist mediation to lobbyism similar to Scandinavian countries. Its main claim is that this has so far not been the case, because two essential features of neo-corporatist interest mediation have remained prominent in the Netherlands. First, policies regarding labour conditions continue to be determined within a network of employers' organisations, trade unions, and the government that is essentially closed to outsiders. Second, the system continues to be hierarchical in nature: the government, often below the surface, demonstrates a considerable capacity to steer the participants in its preferred direction. Such a closed network still allows for lobbying the parliament by both network members and outsiders. Lobbying may thus be complementary to closed neo-corporatist networks rather than a substitute. The article offers a research agenda exploring the latter suggestion.

This paper offers an introduction to the research theme of 'lobbyism'. Recent Scandinavian research shows that lobbyism is a modern mirror view of corporatism, which develops through changes in the structure of decision-making and implementation by interest groups and government. Three questions are put forward: (a) what is the empirical evidence for the phenomenon of lobbyism? (b) what potential contribution could the concept of lobbyism make to a better understanding of corporatism in the Netherlands? (c) what are, according to the theory of collective decision-making, the most important differences between influence strategies in corporatist negotiation structures, and those in lobby networks?