The police use all sorts of information to fulfil their tasks. Whereas collection and interpretation of information traditionally could only be done by humans, the emergence of ‘Big Data’ creates new opportunities and dilemmas. On the one hand, large amounts of data can be used to train algorithms. This allows them to ‘predict’ offenses such as bicycle theft, burglary, or even serious crimes such as murder and terrorist attacks. On the other hand, highly relevant questions on purpose, effectiveness, and legitimacy of the application of machine learning/‘artificial intelligence’ drown all too often in the ocean of Big Data. This is particularly problematic if such systems are used in the public sector in democracies, where the rule of law applies, and where accountability, as well as the possibility for judicial review, are guaranteed. In this article, we explore the role transparency could play in reconciling these opportunities and dilemmas. While some propose making the systems and data they use themselves transparent, we submit that an open and broad discussion on purpose and objectives should be held during the design process. This might be a more effective way of embedding ethical and legal principles in the technology, and of ensuring legitimacy during application.

In the Netherlands and surrounding countries, there is reason to ask the question whether levels of segregation according to country of origin (mainly non-western) and in terms of socioeconomic position (mainly social arrears) are sufficiently high to legitimate anti-segregation policy. When will segregation become problematic? If segregation is regarded a problem, what, then, would be the best remedy? Spatial intervention? Or broader societal intervention? In this article developments and mechanisms will be discussed that lead to segregation; also political views on segregation and the framing of segregation will be scrutinized. A confrontation of knowledge, insights, visions, and framings offers material for new perspectives on residential segregation and is reason to argue for a more relaxed attitude towards segregation. We should acknowledge that the process of matching households to residential environments results in some – generally unproblematic – segregation. Only if segregation causes problems that pass certain intensity and/or a certain spatial range, non-spatial or spatial interventions are becoming a necessity. Levels of segregation are relatively moderate still. We ought to be more aware of the fact that strong negative framing actually stimulates segregation, social exclusion, division, discrimination, marginalisation, stigmatisation, fear, estrangement, and the development of first- and second-rate citizens.

Dutch mayors are expected to act both as moral person and as moral managers. However, the extent to which council members express such requirements when selecting candidates remains underexplored. To identify possible changes in these expectations following the implementation of a 2016 integrity law, which made the mayor responsible for ‘advancing the administrative integrity of the municipality’, the current article quantitatively analyses 349 vacancy texts for Dutch mayoralty for the time period 2008-2019. Unexpectedly, the authors find that moral person requirements still feature prominently in job advertisements, but that attention is declining. In addition, they find a significant shift from moral-person requirements to moral-management requirements, which indicates that vacancy texts mirror the increasing importance of moral leadership requirements for Dutch mayors. Further, whereas the complex integrity concept requires tailoring to the unique circumstances in municipalities, the authors find that councilors make little effort to provide their own definition of integrity in vacancy texts, which leaves ample room for local customization.

In this article we discuss the role and position of different types of low income households in Dutch renewable energy transition processes using the concept of energy poverty. We explore which benefits and/or (dis)advantages (unintentionally) result from energy policies and regulations. And to what extent the distribution of these (dis)advantages benefit the position of different types of households. To this end we present an analytical perspective that enables us to evaluate renewable energy transition policies and governance on procedural and distributional aspects: paying attention to issues of recognition, equity and justice. The perspective draws on ideas in environmental justice literature and on ideas in social resilience literature. Combining these ideas in a new analytical framework proved to be useful in articulating some major policy challenges in relation to energy poverty in the Netherlands today.

Een reflexieve kijk op beleidsonderzoek gaat uit van continue dynamiek tussen kennisontwikkeling en beleids- en uitvoeringspraktijken. Beleidsonderzoekers zoeken naar houvast om gedegen en relevant onderzoek te blijven doen, onderwijl inspelend op onzekerheden, onvoorspelbaarheid en kritische geluiden die kenmerkend zijn voor de huidige kennissamenleving. Via omgevingsbewust werken kunnen zij hun onderzoeksaanpak leren afstemmen op de kenmerken en maatschappelijke context van beleidsdossiers. Via kwaliteitsbewust werken kunnen zij leren inspelen op de verwachtingen rondom een bepaalde expertrol en onderzoeksaanpak binnen de eigen contexten van onafhankelijkheid en wetenschappelijke verantwoording.
Aan de hand van een casus – de lerende evaluatie van het Natuurpact, een innovatieve evaluatiestudie bij het Planbureau voor de Leefomgeving – laten we zien hoe een reflexieve aanpak helpt om onderzoek in de nabijheid van de dynamische beleidspraktijk uit te voeren. Doordat deze aanpak buiten de comfortzone van onderzoekers ligt, is omgevingsbewust en kwaliteitsbewust werken voor onderzoekers geen vanzelfsprekendheid. We roepen beleidsonderzoekers zelf, de organisaties waar ze werkzaam zijn en beleidsmedewerkers op om hun reflexieve vaardigheden verder te ontwikkelen via het inrichten van lerende processen, effectieve kennisdeling via Communities of Practice en leerwerktrajecten, en open en adaptieve kennis-beleidsarrangementen.

In this article, we investigate the moderating role of political sophistication on the vote for populist parties in Belgium. Building on the literature about the diverse determinants of populist party support, we investigate whether issue considerations and populism-related motivations play a bigger role in the electoral calculus of politically sophisticated voters.
Using data from the 2019 general elections in Belgium, we focus on the cases of Vlaams Belang (VB) and Parti du Travail de Belgique- Partij van de Arbeid (PTB-PVDA). We find evidence suggesting that political sophistication enhances the impact of populism-related motivations on populist party support, although the effects are contingent on the party. Moreover, we show that, for issue considerations, the moderation effect only comes into play for VB voters: the impact of anti-immigrant considerations is greater at increasing levels of political sophistication.

This study investigates how protest attitudes and ideological considerations affected the 2019 election results in Belgium, and particularly the vote for the radical right-wing populist party Vlaams Belang (VB) and for the radical left-wing populist party Partij van de Arbeid-Parti du Travail de Belgique (PVDA-PTB). Our results confirm that both protest attitudes and ideological considerations play a role to distinguish radical populist voters from mainstream party voters in general. However, when opposed to their second-best choice, we show that particularly protest attitudes matter. Moreover, in comparing radical right- and left-wing populist voters, the article disentangles the respective weight of these drivers on the two ends of the political spectrum. Being able to portray itself as an alternative to mainstream can give these parties an edge among a certain category of voters, albeit this position is also difficult to hold in the long run.

Recently, studies have burgeoned on the link between populism and demands for democratic reforms. In particular, scholars have been debating the link between populist citizens or voters and support for referendums. In this article, we examine voters of populist parties (Vlaams Belang (VB) and Parti du Travail de Belgique-Partij van de Arbeid (PTB-PVDA)) in Belgium in 2019 and we look at their attitudes towards various types of democratic reforms. We find that voters of populist parties differ from the non-populist electorate in their support for different kinds of reforms of representative democracy. Voters of VB and PTB-PVDA have in common stronger demands for limiting politicians’ prerogatives, for introducing binding referendums and for participatory budgeting. While Vlaams Belang voters are not significantly different from the non-populist electorate on advisory referendums, citizens’ forums or technocratic reform, PVDA-PTB voters seem more enthusiastic.

While authorities sometimes make it appear that the coronavirus outbreak in the first half of 2020 did not allow for policies other than those in place, we saw remarkable variations in policy approaches in Western Europe. Governments almost everywhere pushed for ‘social distancing’, but differences in wording and communication, and implementation and enforcement emerged that could not be entirely explained by differences in the manifestation of the coronavirus. In order to understand and explain such differences, this article points out the institutional filter that exists between the corona threat and policy action. The interaction between two central components of the institutional filter – national culture and state tradition – is elaborated in this article for six Western European countries in particular: the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom, on the one hand, and Belgium, France and Italy, on the one hand. Policy action in these countries is largely consistent with what could be expected given the combinations of national culture and state tradition in these countries. The institutional filter forms a comprehensive framework with which more specific explanations from social trust or manifest public leadership can be placed.

This article is about how the number of downfalls of aldermen can be controlled or reduced. Behind this main question are two sub-questions: should the alderman, who is now filling his office increasingly professionally, professionalize even more? Or should the alderman take a pause for reflection by thinking about how to hold the office in a more politicizing way, so that it remains accessible to untrained administrators? The answers to these questions are based on the research conducted on the downfalls of aldermen in four consecutive board periods from 2002 to 2018 in the Netherlands. The investigation shows that, for at least half of the downfalls, the alderman directly influenced his fall through his own behaviour or omissions. Better preparation, sharper selection and more professional implementation and guidance during the aldermanship is desirable to reduce the large number of downfalls that are detrimental to the image, role and position of the office of alderman. At the same time, more professionalization of the office because of the desire for efficient and effective implementation, as well as simultaneous decentralization and regionalization, is turning the alderman more and more into a manager. That could mean the end of political aldermanship. The relevance for practitioners is that this article shows that (a) the early departure and the political downfall of aldermen in the period 2002-2018 shows a stable pattern; (b) for at least half of the downfalls the alderman fall through his own behaviour or neglect of influence; (c) better preparation, sharper selection and more professionalization may limit the number of political downfalls of aldermen.

The integration of refugees in the Netherlands has been suboptimal for years. After receiving a residence permit, refugees are distributed across the country and dispersed over neighborhoods. However, since the 2015 refugee crisis, the municipality of Amsterdam has adopted a different approach. Here, refugees that have been granted residence live together with Dutch young adults in projects where they share facilities and play a role in managing the project. To what extent can such mixed housing projects help the integration of refugees? The Startblok Riekerhaven, which was the first project, was studied for a year with qualitative research. The findings show that mixed housing projects can stimulate the formation of social connections. In this way they can contribute to the integration of refugees in the Netherlands. Given the suboptimal results of the current dispersal policy, this is relevant for science and policy.

The refugee crisis of 2015-2016 prompted European governments to quickly institute new asylum seeker centres. Often however, plans for opening new reception centres are met with protest in surrounding localities. Gaining public support for new ASCs has become a pressing governance issue facing local governments. This research looks at whether a policy strategy of ‘giving back’ to the neighbourhood rather than ‘giving in’ to the demands of protesters can minimise local opposition and alleviate negative attitudes . A door-to-door survey of N = 511 neighbourhood residents is combined with semi-structured interview data of N = 31 neighbourhood residents. We find that attitudes were already neutral to fairly positive shortly after the centre opened and fears of nuisance and crime did not materialise. Those who became involved in the ASCs’ courses and activities are a small and selective group who were already fairly accepting of the centre. Contact between asylum seekers and neighbours developing within and beyond the ASC was valued but did not develop into stronger ties due to frequent moves of asylum seekers and early closure of the ASC.

The Netherlands has been struggling with the question of how to facilitate the integration of refugees who crossed into Europe during the 2015/2016 ‘refugee crisis’. Dutch municipalities aim for the dispersion of refugees over various neighborhoods under the assumption that the ethnic composition of the neighborhood is conducive to integration. In the current study, I test this assumption using a new and representative survey (N = 768 predominantly Syrian refugees living in 45 neighborhoods, response rate 85%) linked to neighborhood data situated in the most ethnically diverse city in the Netherlands; Rotterdam. Multilevel analyses revealed that, generally, a larger share of people without a migration background in the neighborhood was related to more frequent contact with neighbors without a migration background. A larger share of people with a Moroccan background was related to more frequent contact with people with a Moroccan background, but predominantly for Syrian refugees. The neighborhood was not related to contact with people from the same background of with people with a Turkish background. Hence, meeting opportunities in the neighborhood only appear to facilitate social integration if they coincide with refugees’ social preferences.

This article describes the main trends in refugee policies in sixteen Dutch cities, offering an overview of the local approaches to the reception, housing and integration of refugees that the cities rapidly had to develop in response to the increased refugee inflow in 2015. In contrast to other studies that often focus on capital and gateway cities, this article illustrates the variety of local approaches to migration diversity and refugee integration. By illustrating the different positions municipalities take, the article shows the local power to innovate. In this article clusters of cities with comparable approaches to refugee policies are identified to aid cooperation and knowledge exchange between cities, in which the big cities are not necessarily always the relevant partners.

This article examines what explains the performance of Dutch local party branches in the recruitment of candidates for municipal councils. Fielding a list of candidates is the most basic function of political parties. In the Netherlands, party branches are under pressure from the low number of party members. To analyse how branches fulfil their role in recruitment, we employ our own survey of the secretaries of party branches held in the run-up to the 2018 municipal election. We find that party membership drives the successful fulfilment of the recruitment function but that, more than the absolute number of members, the crucial factors are how these party members cooperate, the number of active members and the development of this number.

This article investigates the feminisation of local politics. Starting from the observation that the representation of women in local electoral politics lags behind the regional and federal level, and taking into account the relevance of local party branches in the recruitment and selection of candidates for elections, we examine the extent to which there is an ‘internal’ feminisation of local party branches and how this links to the ‘external’ feminisation of local electoral politics. Based on surveys among local party chairs, the article maps patterns of feminisation over time and across parties, investigates problems local branches encounter in the recruitment of candidates for local elections, and analyses the (attitudes towards the) measures taken to further the integration of women in local electoral politics. We conclude that internal and external feminisation do not always go hand in hand and that local politics continues to be a male-dominated political biotope.

As a response to the perceived legitimacy crisis that threatens modern democracies, local government has increasingly become a laboratory for democratic renewal and citizen participation. This article studies whether and why local party chairs support democratic innovations fostering more citizen participation. More specifically, we analyse the relative weight of ideas, interests and institutions in explaining their support for citizen-centred democracy. Based on the Belgian Local Chairs Survey in 2018 (albeit restricting our analysis to Flanders), the central finding is that ideas matter more than interests and institutions. Ideology is alive and kicking with regard to democratic innovation, with socialist and ecologist parties and populist parties being most supportive of participatory arrangements. By contrast, interests and institutions play, at this stage, a minor role in explaining support for participatory innovations.

While many new churches were built in the Netherlands sixty years ago to meet the demands of religious communities for space for their worship, the situation in 2020 is completely different. It is true that a church is sometimes built here and there in the Netherlands, but the general picture is that many churches have been withdrawn as places of worship in recent years, that a number have been demolished and that many have been given a new designated purpose. The fate of a church building often evokes many emotions in people. For example, we experienced this when we, together with the Parisians, watched in disbelief as fire destroyed parts of Notre Dame. This is related to the fact that for many people churches are more than just ‘beautifully stacked stones’. They are directly linked to the highs and lows of people’s individual and collective lives. People were baptized and married in that church, funeral services of loved ones were held there and the church is still a familiar part of the image of city or village. Rightly so that churches are also seen as ‘affective monuments’. The central question, however, is how to deal with religious heritage (policy related) now that churches are emptying? In this article the authors first give a brief outline of the background, nature and scope of what they call the ‘church problem’. Then they discuss the ‘battle for churches’ associated with this problem, which they subsequently try to interpret from a number of Public Administration theories. The role of certain individuals and organizations in the ‘battle for churches’, the so-called ‘entrepreneurs’, is further explored. They pay specific attention to the role of the municipality in this as a whole and call on all parties involved to deal (politically) with the ‘church problem’ rather than ‘spasmodically’.

Participatory and responsive approaches to research strive to be democratic, inclusive and impactful. Participatory researchers share a commitment to epistemic justice and actively engage citizens and users as well as other stakeholders in the co-creation of knowledge for social change. While more and more researchers and policymakers feel attracted to these approaches in practice, the normative ideals of social inclusion and justice are sometimes hard to realize, because of established interests, power relations and system requirements. In this article I argue that participatory researchers and evaluators have a moral responsibility to do ‘ethics work’. This is more than just following ethical principles and codes of conduct. ‘Ethics work’ entails the labour and effort one puts into recognizing ethically salient aspects of situations, developing oneself as a reflexive practitioner, paying attention to emotions and relationships, collaboratively working out the right course of action and reflecting in the company of critical friends. In this article I present the theory and ethics of participatory approaches, illustrate ethical issues and ethics work related to collaboration, politics and power, and share lessons based on ten years of practice in the field of health and social well-being.