According to many observers, multicultural integration policies have strongly eroded in the Netherlands since the early 1990s and particularly following the rise of Pim Fortuyn in 2002. In this view, the Netherlands now follow harsh, assimilationist policies that threaten the foundations of democracy. Policy studies on the local level have however found strong continuities. This article investigates changes and continuities in Dutch integration policies on the national level. The cross-national policy data compiled in the Migration Policy Index show that the Netherlands are in 2007 still among the European countries that offer immigrants and their descendants the largest degree of legal equality. Comparative data on accommodation policies regarding immigrant cultures and religions show that Dutch policies are still culturally pluralist compared to most other European countries, e.g., by recognizing immigrants' ethnic and religious identities and practices, subsidizing and incorporating their associations, and providing preferential access to public sector jobs. Quantitative comparative policy data are supplemented by qualitative examples of pluralist policies in the media, the police force, and nature conservation and recreation. The article concludes that in spite of rhetoric to the contrary, there is strong path dependence in Dutch integration policies, also on the national level.

In public debate on immigrants' political ties with their country of origin, two assumptions prevail. The first assumption is that many immigrants engage in transnational political activities. The second is that forms of transnational citizenship are an impediment for the development of local citizenship. However, so far little research has been done on the importance of, and the relationship between, local and transnational citizenship. In this article, we focus on local and transnational forms of active citizenship, here understood as the total of political practices and processes of identification. Our study, conducted among middle-class immigrants in Rotterdam, indicates that the importance of active transnational citizenship should not be overstated. Among these middle-class immigrants, political practices are primarily focused on the local level; political practices directed to the home country appear to be quite rare. If we look at processes of identification, we see that a majority of the middle-class immigrants have a strong urban identity. Many of them combine this local identification with feelings of belonging with people in their home country. These local and transnational identifications seem to reinforce, rather than impede, each other.

In the Netherlands, the rise of new parties such as the Lijst Pim Fortuyn, the Partij voor de Vrijheid, lead by Geert Wilders and the movement Trots op Nederland, lead by Rita Verdonk, have attracted much attention. In an attempt to interpret and explain the (temporary) advance of these parties, both commentators and political scientists have often used the notion of populism. In most commentaries however, it remains unclear what the term exactly means and whether it has any explanatory value. The aim of this article is to investigate whether Rita Verdonk and Geert Wilders and their movements may actually be labelled as populist. By discerning the presence of the features of an ideal-typical populism in discourse and performance of both politicians their ‘degree of populism’ is measured. The differences in degree of populism also helps to explain why Geert Wilders and his party proved (thus far) more successful and durable.

Since the nineties of the last century, there has been a modest rise of local referendums in the Netherlands. This article describes the important role played by independent local referendum committees, one of the most remarkable characteristics of the recent Dutch referendum experience. Their task is among others to advice about the wording of the question, to supervise the organisation of the referendum and the campaign and to handle complaints. The need to use an independent body to support the referendum process is missing in countries as Switzerland and the United States. The lack of referendum experience and the lack of confidence in Dutch local authorities forced them to introduce independent local referendum bodies. The role of these institutions fits in the traditions of the Dutch consensus democracy to engage experts to depoliticise delicate political problems.

Belgium did not organise a referendum on the European Constitution, like the Netherlands, even though there were some initiatives to make it legally possible. In the Netherlands there is also more experience with referenda at the local level. For decades there has been a debate about how to make it legal at the national level, but after many attempts, there is still no law that makes referenda possible at that level. The aim of this article is to compare Belgium and the Netherlands in order to identify similarities and differences. Some explanation can be found in the past, which clarifies why Belgium is reluctant to referenda and why at the local level this tool is not as often used as in the Netherlands. The main conclusion is that in spite of the referendum on the European Constitution in the Netherlands and the more frequent use of local referenda in that country, the political classes in Belgium and the Netherlands are comparable in their reluctant attitude towards this consultation of their citizens. Both countries continue to evaluate referenda as not in accordance with the system of representative democracy.

This special issue about the practice of local referendums in the Netherlands and Flanders, Belgium, focuses in particular on the relationship between referendums and the consensus model of democracy. On the one hand, referendums are widely conceived of as a typical majoritarian device. On the other hand, the legal possibility of referendums forces political elites to reach broad agreement, in order to prevent a popular vote in which decisions would be recalled. The three contributions to this issue demonstrate that consensus democracy influences the debate about referendums in the legislative, as well as how the practicalities are organised, in more varied ways. Studies of independent referendum bodies in the Netherlands and question wording in referendums in Flanders show that the nature of consensus democracy enables both countries to find solutions to potential problems, but also brings new problems. Guidelines for how these may be prevented in future referendums are provided.