In this article I argue that the commonplace interpretation of neoliberalism in the Netherlands is mistaken. According to this interpretation the term ‘neoliberalism’ refers to a series of policies, including privatisation and deregulation, that were implemented in the Netherlands in the 1980’s in imitation of Thatcher and Reagan. I argue that it is not this series of policies but the justification underpinning them that is of a neoliberal nature. To support this claim I offer a brief genealogical history of neoliberal thought, which developed in the interwar period, by explicitly distinguishing itself from both 19th-century classical liberalism and contemporary modern liberalism. On the basis of this historical account I assert that neoliberalism adopts the foundational principles of classical and modern liberalism, but that it prescribes different formal principles of rational government. I conclude that this diction makes it possible to write a critical history of neoliberalism.

This article analyzes the US internal justification to invade Iraq in 2003 through a study of the ‘Bush Doctrine’ of 2002, several Congressional acts and resolutions on Iraq, and Presidential speeches before and during the mobilization of US forces. It argues that in order to find domestic support, regime change was one of the main goals, despite the references the US made to UN resolutions. Second, this paper uses Rawls’ ideas to analyze the US decision to democratize Iraq. The results of this study show how political philosophy can be used and abused to shape foreign policy. Rawls’ theory could have provided the US with a moral justification based on the liberal peace assumptions that were underlying their foreign policy. However, the US did not make a consistent appeal to those assumptions and acted like a Rawlsian ‘outlaw state’ instead. Therefore, this paper argues, the US lost the liberal justification to overthrow Saddam Hussein’s regime in favor of democracy.

This introductory article sketches the problématique of this special issue on ‘Subsidiarity in the European Union and beyond’. It starts with a short historical overview of the origins, meanings and implementation of the subsidiarity principle within the EU. Subsequently, it problematizes the concept and application of subsidiarity in a multilevel governance context by examining two fundamental characteristics of this essentially contested concept that render it fascinating to study: its complexity and power-relevance. The relatively new concept of global subsidiarity is briefly discussed to situate the intra-EU discussion in a wider context. This introduction ends by discussing some of the findings of the special issue’s two substantial articles – that both deal with policy topics in which different competence regimes meet – in light of the subsidiarity problématique.

By means of a re-analysis of the most relevant data source (Nieuwbeerta & Ganzeboom 1996), this paper criticizes the newly grown consensus in political sociology that class voting has declined since World War II. An increase of crosscutting cultural voting, rooted in educational differences, rather than a decline of class voting proves responsible for the decline of the traditional class-party alignments. Moreover, income differences have not become less, but more consequential for voting behavior during this period. It is concluded that the new consensus has been built on quicksand. Class is not dead – it has been buried alive under the increasing weight of cultural voting, systematically misinterpreted as a decline of class voting, due to the widespread application of the Alford index.

The decline of traditional class voting is at the centre of the Class Politics debate. From the framework of traditional class analysis a labourer’s right wing vote appears ‘unnatural’. A right wing vote is thought to damage the interests of the economically precarious groups. This paper attempts to understand the phenomenon of so-called unnatural voting behaviour starting from the populism concept. From a theoretical literature study we analyse the relationship between populism and attitudes regarding the economic left-right cleavage. We argue that right-wing populism appeals to a cry for equality, yet at the same time mobilises this sentiment against the institutions of the welfare state. In that way populist right parties succeed in attuning their economic discourse to the socio-economic attitudes of broad layers of the population, including economically precarious categories. The empirical relevance of this hypothesis is tested on the case of Flanders.

In this article, we argue that there are indications for the emergence of a third phase in the idea of global governance. After the phase of extensive state intervention and etatism (1945-1980) and the phase of deregulation and marketization (1980-now), this third phase aims at restoring typically governmental functions (e.g. social cohesion, financial stability, public health). Indications are international measures against the drawbacks of globalization (e.g. financial instability), the eroding legitimacy of the market-oriented WTO regime, the formulation of new security concepts establishing links between national interest and transnational problems and the enhanced interest in global policy coordination (e.g. UN Millennium Development Goals). Yet today, unlike in 1945-1980, globalization and complex interdependence are accepted as facts, and we also witness attempts to realize ‘governmental’ functions at the global level. But the direction which global governance will follow the years ahead, remains to a large extent a matter of political choice.

In January 1990, the Parti Réformateur Libéral (PRL) inaugurated a brand new management, called "bicephalism ": instead of the traditional presidentialsystem, one "ticket" with a president (Antoine Duquesne) and a vice-president (Daniel Ducarme) was commissioned to ensure the leadership of the party. The bicephalism was only the result of a tricky internal compromise, stemming from the discontent following the return of the party in the opposition (May 1988) and strengthened after the defeat at the European polls (fune 1989). The "two-headed" system wanted to restore the credibility and to reinforce the cohesion of the PRL. In fact, this genuine political "curiosity" mainly revealed the structural and ideological deficiency which made its coming possible. Its ultimate defeat - at the 24 November 1991 polls - caused itsfalling down. The bicephalism was bound to an identity problem of the french Belgian liberalism but also some features of the experience refer to a more general crisis of the values carried by the old traditional political movements.

Taking into account the limits of such data, this study analyses the shifts in voting behaviour from the national elections in 1985 to those in 1987 in Flanders, using log-linear modelling. The use of data from poll surveys for estimating shifts between subsequent elections poses some methodological problems. The second part presents the results of the analysis. About 13,51 % of -the 1985-voters switched. Although there are significant shifts between all the political parties, the Christian Democratic Party (CVP) loses on all fronts. A log-linear analysis of party-reference by sex, age and occupational status shows the strength and weakness of each party in different societal categories. In conclusion, an interpretation of the shifts is proposed. The following factors can account for the major shifts: the desintegration of the catholic pillar, the emergence of a dual society, the affinity between neo-liberalism and yuppie-culture and the conflict between the language communities.

If a comparison is made between the constitutional principles of 1831 with regard to the working of the parliamentary system and presentday political practice, then it appears that there has been an evolution in which the role of the parties is fundamental. Until about 1850 virtually no party-system existed in Belgium. The monarchy supported by the conservative forces of the nobility, the church and the landowners controlled the system. In the second half of the century there was a simultaneous increase in the influence of parliament and the breakthrough of economic and political liberalism without the parties yet being able to impose the rules. Such rule making did not happen until around the turn of the century when the civil parliament became democratic and the big parties became integrated within it. From then on control over parliament and executive decision-taking came about through the party-structures. The period of crisis preceding the second world war obviously weakened this trend considerably; after 1945 it re-emerged even more strongly.

During the 19th century, the Belgian Liberal Party was frequently divided between its «progressive» or «radical» wing and its conservative majority.Between 1880 and 1900, the program of the progressive liberalism was worked out and stated precisely during seven political meetings.The one hold in 1887 put the headlines into shape, chiefly: big extension of the franchise, compulsory education, disestablishment of the Church. In spite of their small number of members, the progressists were surely most influential upon the adoption of the universal franchise.