This article provides a computer-assisted morality framing analysis of Vlaams Belang’s 2019 manifesto. The VB is regarded in the literature as a prototypical example of the Populist Radical Right (PRR). We first concisely review what PRR politics is and what it consists of, tentatively distinguishing four elements that we hypothesise will materialise in corresponding subframes running throughout the manifesto. We point to a mismatch between the omnipresent role of morality in all PRR subframes and the little attention devoted to the concept in the PRR literature. We introduce a useful theory from social psychology into framing literature to create a novel methodological approach to frame analysis that builds a bridge between a qualitative content and a quantitative context approach. The results support our hypothesis that populism, nationalism, nativism and authoritarianism can be distinguished from one another. Additionally, we detect a fifth PRR subframe, crimmigration, by its unique role of morality.

Particracy has been widely used to describe Belgian politics after World War II. Yet, Belgian politics has changed. We examine five changes – the federalisation of the state architecture, diversification of the demos, erosion of political support, party’s dealignment and personalisation of politics – to evaluate how they have affected particracy in Belgium. The answer is twofold: particracy is still very strong, but it has changed. The three traditional party families that had institutionalised particracy in Belgium (Christian-democrats, socialists and liberals) had to face new challengers. They co-opted the most moderate ones (greens, regionalists), while excluding others (radical right/left). Intraparty democracy/participatory/transparency reforms, or changes to the electoral system, all of them opening the political system, were also implemented, but parties were able to overcome them. Yet, the ever-growing gap between traditional parties and citizens and the growth of new parties building upon voters’ dissatisfaction with traditional parties, may put particracy more radically into question.

There is a growing consensus that politics have become mediatised. News media have become more independent and are more guided by their own routines and standards and less by what political actors deem important. However, this paper argues that this has not led to a decrease of the power of political parties. In Belgium, particracy and mediatisation seem to go hand in hand. There are mainly two reasons for this. Firstly, media attention focuses heavily on politicians with power and in that sense, media logic and party logic overlap. Secondly, parties have adjusted well to the media and their logic, among others by integrating journalists in the party organisation. We expect that social media will gradually become more important for politicians, but that this evolution too will change little to the central position of political parties in our democracy.

Between 1950 and 1954 Belgium had a homogeneous catholic majority in Parliament. Theoretically this brings about a stable government, but in real term it caused a lot of trouble. The Christian People's Party changed its prime minister three times. Different reasons explain this attempt to further the particracy from a party one had not expected this. First, the outcome ofthe Royal Question creates a tension between the party and the government. The party can not fulfill its election promises. Second, the homogeneous majority is based on a heterogeneous party, where progressives and conservatives, Flemish and Walloon politicians determine the decision-making. Moreover, the party as such claims its position in the decision-making process. The parliamentary groups and the government are considered as executors ofa partyprogram and must thereforebe subordinated to the party. The process where parties expanded to the dominant actor in the political system, becomes clear.

The aim of this article is to demonstrate the discussion on neocorporatism with refering to the Belgian socio-economie concertation system. The central thesis is to understand neo-corporatism as a functional specific concertation system alongside or in function of the traditional parliamentary-democratic decision-system. The fact that this neo-corporatist socio-economic concertation system is interwoven with the parliamentary system (and especially with the particracy or compromise democracy in Belgium) stands for its strength and strategie facilities to come to a socio-economic concensus between trade unions, business organizations and the state. Specially the fact that neo-corporatism is not always very structured, and works more or less in an informal way puts our attention to the traditional formal democratic way of decision-making and the informal concertation between workers, employers and the state. This difference between formal and informal, or legally institutionalized and semi-institutionalized concertation plays a major role in the functioning of the Belgian socio-economic concertation system.

The Belgian political system is of ten qualified as a particracy, this is a variation of the classical parliamentary democracy, in which political parties dominate the political decision-making process more than the other subsystems, such as parliament, the government, the public administration, the judiciary power, the broadcasting institutions, the written press etc. This preponderancy is achieved by the partypolitisation of the positions in and the functio ning of these subsystems. Partyleaders exert nowadays a major influence on the constellation of a new government and the designation of its ministers. Through the governmental program and special extraparliamentary pacts they map out more and more government's future policies. The ministerial cabinets execute the control over the public administration on behalf of the parties of the majority and aften take over some of its peculiar functions. The recruitment of public servants and their promotion depend highly upon the institutionalized patronage of the governmental parties. The power to select the candidates for the general elections has shifted away from the rank-and-file member to the local and national partyleaders. Partydiscipline is one of the major causes of the shift of the government making function, the legislative and controlling functions of parliament to the party headquaters. The recruitment and the promotions of magistrates was already before World War II largely politicized. Although the structural integration between the newspapers and parties has decreased since 1945, the political parties have strengthened their control over the designation of the diree:tors and administrators of the Belgian broadcasting institutions.

The Belgian polyarchy has developed into a «particracy» in which the political parties have a preponderant impact on the political decisionmaking. As in every polyarchy, the political parties fulfill a set of vital functions in the Belgian system. But that does not explain its «particratie» particularity. The particracy arises as a consequence of four factors. The parties are fixed by the «zuilen» (pillars) into an «internal-imperialistic» role. The power of the parties increased considerably, an increase of which the politization of the instruments for, and the agencies of, policy is one of the most important, together with the capability of making and unmaking issues. The impact and power of the opponents of the parties in the decision-making process have been diminished to a considerable extent. This weakening involves the king, the parliament, theadministration, the electorate, and, ultimately, the cabinet because of the growing impact of the parties on policy design and policy output as well as on the appointment of ministers. Finally, the choice of the consociational pattern of politics of accomodation by the elite indicates the instrumental function of particracy in Belgian politics.

The political debate in Western polyarchies readily points to a «Parteienstaat», «particrazia», or particracy. Empirical verification, however, is by far more difficult to carry out, though it is a descriptive necessity for further analysis of this phenomenon. An initial attempt to detect the particraties in Western Europe has been performed and revealed two particracies: Belgium and Italy. Other polyarchies have either the cabinet or the president as the most influential actor, an,d some seem to have a real concurrence of approximately equivalent actors. The reliability of this first attempt, however, must be improved.