Local policy freedom is often equated with the formal policy freedom of municipalities and thus with the formal boundaries that determine the local playing field. In this article, we question this approach. It is not clear to what extent formal policy freedom is a good measure for the ‘real’ policy freedom of municipalities, and thus for the policy freedom that municipalities use in policy implementation. Does more formal policy freedom necessarily lead to more used policy freedom? Moreover, not every municipality uses formal policy freedom in the same way. To indicate variance in policy discretion used, reference is often made to official capacity, scale and political changes. However, it is unclear to what extent these variables have an impact on local policy freedom. The authors investigate the link between formal and used policy freedom, official capacity, scale and political change on the basis of Flemish policy reform. Based on an analysis of financial data, they conclude that more formal policy freedom can be an incentive for more used policy freedom, but also that the explanatory power of administrative capacity, scale and political change is limited. In both research and policy, we need more attention for the value of social interaction, soft skills and networking.

New ict and robots in the workplace may raise productivity but can have negative effects on people. A human-centered approach and human-centered technology may prevent negative outcomes. In the present article, this is outlined for the diverse and vulnerable group of ‘people with distance to the labour market’.
These people face difficulties in getting a job and holding a job for a long period of time. For getting a job, they may need support in getting motivated and acquiring the necessary skills. For holding a job, support may be needed for adequate task performance, for staying healthy and vital, for personal development and for being able to switch from one job to another.
Various technologies may provide one or more of these types of support. In particular, cognitive support technology has a great potential to make difficult work easier and therefore more accessible to more people. In three case descriptions we illustrate the application of a human-centered approach and the potential of operator support technology for cognitively impaired people.
The case description shows the surplus value of the human centered approach, analyzing first the barriers and needs of the people involved, before iteratively testing and developing the technology with an active involvement of end-users. The described cases as well as other small-scale pilots contribute to our insight in the potential of operator support technology in increasing the accessibility of jobs for cognitively impaired people. The quantification of effects on work participation requires application of this type of technology on a much larger scale.

Substantial and continuous shifts in skills demands urge us to rethink education, labour market and reintegration policies and practices. In this article, we argue for a more skills based approach to (re)integration. This skills based (re)integration practice is based more on up-to-date, complete and validated skills sets of candidates, than on diplomas and other, more or less, outdated and incomplete proxies to one’s current skills. Such a new reintegration practice seems feasible if the actual and complete skills set of an individual becomes the starting point for both matching, guidance and (up/re)skilling efforts. Intersectoral mobility, alternative career pathways and suitable training and development routes can be designed on a more fine-grained skills basis, with occupations considered more as dynamic sets of tasks requiring specific skills. This new (re)integration practice presupposes a common skills language, which is being developed in the Netherlands, Competent NL. Sectoral and intersectoral experiments with skills instruments using this language, such as skills passports, are conducted to optimize their quality and effectiveness. Since first experiments with skills instruments seem promising, we argue that more room for experiment is required. So that integration in the labor market can be sustained and reintegration practices can be prevented.

This article examines the experiences of Dutch municipalities with the so called ‘basic job’. Basic jobs are primarily meant for individuals lacking realistic prospects on the mainstream labour market. These jobs should provide good work on a permanent basis. In both Groningen and Rotterdam, the basic job is used to improve the labour market perspectives of long-term job seekers. These are still relatively small interventions, which show that the basic job contributes to an improvement in the participants’ chances of work, their health and well-being. At the same time, it’s a costly experiment, in which the municipalities are net contributors and scalability only seems possible through the introduction of a national room for experimentation with accompanying monitor research and by adopting a broader perspective on economic growth. Only then, a more definitive judgment can be made about the viability of the basic job.

This article assesses the size and diversity of Belgium’s interest group population by triangulating four data sources. Combining various sources allows us to describe which societal interests get mobilised, which interest organisations become politically active and who gains access to the policy process and obtains news media attention. Unique about the project is the systematic data collection, enabling us to compare interest representation at the national, Flemish and Francophone-Walloon government levels. We find that: (1) the national government level remains an important venue for interest groups, despite the continuous transfer of competences to the subnational and European levels, (2) neo-corporatist mobilisation patterns are a persistent feature of interest representation, despite substantial interest group diversity and (3) interest mobilisation substantially varies across government levels and political-administrative arenas.

The Western European social security systems are founded on the need to offer universal social protection, as was for example advocated in the Beveridge report of 1942. The universalistic endeavour has led to the development of the all-embracing welfare states of today, but already for many decades dissatisfaction with the direction of the welfare state has led to a diversion of the universalistic pretention. In the current debate, universalism seems to be on the rise again. The Dutch think tanks CPB, WRR and SCP increasingly pay attention to the divide that is becoming manifest between those with better chances in the society and who are left behind. The think tanks have all formulated policy options in order to address this divide by offering better social security protection for excluded groups. In this article we discuss whether the options presented fall back upon the post-war notion of universality.

Recent developments on the Dutch labour market raise questions about the emergence of new social dividing lines. In this paper we discuss two cases. Both address labour market disadvantages which can easily deepen and sharpen with unchanged policies. The first case shows that there are groups that are less able to respond to the defined trends in the labour market due to a lack of education or disabilities. In the second case we focus on the question of sustainable employability as such that creates dividing lines. A first conclusion from our contribution is that a thorough analysis of existing dividing lines in the labour market is crucial for effective policy, but that knowledge about deepening old and creating new dividing lines is at least as relevant. A second conclusion is that the outlined assumptions in policies around self-reliance of, for example, people with a disability or the possibilities of employers to realize sheltered work and to focus on retraining, for example outside working hours, are not always realistic. Much more will have to be done to match the real possibilities of people and organizations to achieve this. Financial, but also organizational and personal. The motivations and behaviors of employees, employers and educational authorities appear to be very relevant explanatory factors in practice, which are often not sufficiently taken into account. Recent experiences with the Participation Act and lifelong learning show us that. More interaction is needed in the coming years between research, policy and the practice of the labour market.

This paper lays out a proposal for a basic income system for the elderly. The proposed basic income allows elderly people to retire from the work place, or to keep on working (full time or part time). In the latter case employers are allowed to take part of the basic income into account in calculating the wages for their older workers. This characteristic makes employing older workers financially more attractive to employers. On the other hand, the basic income enables workers in physically and/or mentally challenging jobs, which are mostly low-paid jobs, to quit their job early. The effects on the government budget are calculated, based on different assumptions on the labour-participation effects of such a basic-income system. If the starting age of the basic income is 60 years and if the system incites older workers to increase their labour participation, introducing a basic income can have minor effects on the government budget. On the other hand, if the basic income has the same the labour-supply effects as the previous, but far more generous early-retirement schemes, the budgetary effects can be strongly negative. With a starting age of 65, however, positive budgetary effects can be obtained relatively easy.

Sub-constituency campaigning occurs when parties focus their campaign resources on specific geographical areas within an electoral district. This behaviour was traditionally thought to occur only in single-member plurality elections, but recent research demonstrates that proportional systems with multi-member districts can also elicit sub-constituency campaigning. However, most studies of sub-constituency campaigning rely on self-reported measures of campaigning, not direct measures of campaign intensity in different regions and communities. We present novel data on geographical variations in the intensity of Flemish parties’ campaign advertising during the 2014 general elections in Belgium, which provides a direct measure of sub-constituency campaigning. Our findings show clear evidence of sub-constituency campaigning: parties campaign more intensely in municipalities where they have stronger electoral support and in municipalities with greater population density.

This article examines the economic agenda of the Dutch Freedom Party. It finds that this party mixes left-wing and right-wing policy positions. This inconsistency can be understood through the group-based account of Ennser-Jedenastik (2016), which proposes that the welfare state agenda of radical right-wing populist parties can be understood in terms of populism, nativism and authoritarianism. Each of these elements is linked to a particular economic policy: economic nativism, which sees the economic interest of natives and foreigners as opposed; economic populism, which seeks to limit economic privileges for the elite; and economic authoritarianism, which sees the interests of deserving and undeserving poor as opposed. By using these different oppositions, radical right-wing populist parties can reconcile left-wing and right-wing positions.

The introduction of the euro led to large macroeconomic imbalances between Euro countries. Under pressure from the euro crisis, the European Commission adopted EU regulations 1174/2011 and 1176/2011 in 2011 with the aim of reducing these macroeconomic imbalances. These measures include the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure to identify macroeconomic imbalances and, if necessary, to prompt Member States to take corrective action. This article provides an overview of this recent EU policy for countering imbalances and provides a political-economic analysis of the macroeconomic imbalances in Europe and its consequences. In particular, it focuses on the conflicting interests of the euro-area countries with current account surpluses and deficits. This article also analyses the possibilities offered by the 2019 European election for European policy makers to strengthen this policy. The article concludes that the surplus countries, despite the apparent advantage of trade balance surpluses, do have an interest in reducing imbalances in the EU but fail to translate this into actual policy. The Commission’s role in reducing imbalances is likely to remain limited, even after the 2019 European elections.

The European project currently faces not only an economic crisis, but a moral one as well. The economic growth model of social justice combined with market-oriented policies, also referred to as the European social model has lost much of its meaning after ten years of austerity and financial calamities. In 2012 ECB President Draghi says in the Wall Street Journal that the European social model is “gone”, a thing of the past. While only a couple of years later the European Pillar of Social Rights is put in place. What is happening with ‘Social Europe’? And how do trade unions, as a historical motor of social policy in the member states, relate to the European social model, especially since the financial crisis. This article deals with the position of trade unions vis-à-vis European social policy and the European institutions. The European social model, economic governance and the collective bargaining system are discussed as examples of post-crisis European social policy. It will be argued that although the European Commission gives institutional space to social policy and to a role for trade unions, it has always been subordinate to economic integration. And moreover that the recent economic crisis is used at the European level to obtain almost complete control over social policy in the member states.

The labour market participation of recent female refugees in the Netherlands is very low. This is caused not only by the fact that a large proportion of the female refugee population has a greater distance to the labour market (than male refugees), but also because municipalities – for various reasons – offer more support to male refugees seeking to enter the Dutch labour market. This article is based on an explorative study we carried out into the labour market opportunities of recent female refugees and job guidance policies of Dutch municipalities. First, we explore how background characteristics of the group of female refugees and the municipal focus on supporting male refugees to quickly join the workforce, influence each other negatively and greatly limit the chances of female refugees at finding paid work. We then discuss the consequences for the participation and integration of these newcomers and their families, both for the short and long term. Finally, we discuss how female refugees can be supported more effectively towards labour market participation.

Ten years ago, now, the Eurozone began to shake on its foundations. This article traces the genesis of the crisis and the present state of affairs. As to the causes of the global financial crisis in 2008, I argue that contrary to common understanding, the financial crisis had its deeper causes in a decades old tendency towards crisis in the real economy, produced by the continuous overaccumulation of capital which can only return profits by undertaking speculative short-term investments (a phenomenon known as ‘financialisation’). I then trace how the global financial crisis morphed into a crisis of public deficits and debt in 2010-2011, particularly in the Eurozone. Three factors are shown to be responsible: financialization, design faults in the European monetary union, and the neo-mercantilist strategy of especially Germany and the Netherlands. The paper next looks at the five main traits of the policy responses in the Eurozone: bailing out governments and banks through creating emergency funds; imposition of austerity and budget discipline for member state governments; attempting to create and complete a Eurozone banking union; subsequently the European Central Bank engaged on an unprecedented scale in ‘quantitative easing’; and finally, institutional reform in an attempt to repair the most pressing design faults of the EMU. The paper concludes that the underlying structural factors leading up to the crisis have only been addressed incompletely: the overaccumulation of capital continues, the completion of the banking union is in an impasse, quantitative easing has mostly just intensified financialization by pushing up asset prizes, and institutional reform has taken the form of a fundamentally undemocratic attempt at monetary and political union by stealth. The broader legitimacy of the European project has been substantially undermined, and Europe is not in a better position than eight years ago in case of a new global crisis.

Municipalities have increasingly adjusted their policies in order to better respond to the problematic social and economic participation of permit holders. The core elements within the chosen policies seem to consist of an early activation, combining language and professional training, and providing customization in the support of these newcomers. In this article, this policy change has been studied in the municipalities of Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Utrecht. It becomes clear that a more successful approach only succeeds when permit holders are offered additional and tailored support. For all three municipalities, this means that more permit holders are reached by the available support measures and that local policy makers can better respond to individual needs and possibilities. In addition, these municipalities pay more attention for sustainable labour market participation. At the same time, it is evident that no rapid successes are being made with this new course. In particular, more vulnerable permit holders, including those with low levels of education and women, are not always reached by municipalities. We also see that many of these newcomers must be supported for a long time, even if after have found a place on the labour market. Therefore, evidence suggests that without additional measures there is a good chance that the perspective on social and economic participation for many permit holders in the Netherlands will be extremely limited.

The groups studied for this article came to the Netherlands as asylum-seekers, mostly from Syria and Eritrea. After receiving a residence permit it has been difficult for them to find paid work. In recent years many municipalities in the Netherlands developed initiatives to support refugees seeking work. In this article we describe two of such interventions: Vluchtelingen Investeren in Participeren (Refugees Invest in Participation), a nationwide initiative of VluchtelingenWerk Nederland, and NVA Werktrajecten (Trajectories to Work), carried out by a local organisation for integration and participation of refugees. We studied VIP in nine municipalities in the eastern part of the Netherlands and NVA Werktrajecten in the Dutch municipality of Amersfoort. We have focused on the perspective of the participants taking part in the initiatives. The research questions addressed are: How did the participants experience the interventions and how did the interventions meet up to their needs in their search to paid work? We describe the experiences of the participants during several steps in the trajectories, such as obtaining practical skills, practising oral and written presentations, meeting employers during the training and in the workplace, and gaining work experience. The article is based on sixty in depth interviews with refugees.

This article takes up Lijphart’s claim that consensus democracy is a ‘kinder, gentler’ form of democracy than majoritarian democracy. We zoom in on contemporary welfare state change, particularly the shift towards social investment, and argue that the kinder, gentler hypothesis remains relevant. Consensus democracies stand out in regard to the extent to which their political institutions help to overcome the politically delicate intricacies of governing for the long term. We theorize the features that can help to solve the problem of temporal commitment in democracy through processual mechanisms and illustrate these with short case studies of the contrasting welfare state reform experiences in the Netherlands and Belgium.

In practice, diversity interventions do not always appear to be effective. One argument is that there is little or no match between the perspectives of public organizations on diversity and the interventions used. This article provides an overview of the underlying rationales for diversity policy and discusses the perspectives on diversity from the diversity literature, HRM, and management literature and how these overlap, complement each other and differ from each other. What these perspectives have in common is that they all emphasize the added value of diversity. In the diversity literature, the emphasis is on the four perspectives equality, legitimacy, creativity, and the labour market. HRM literature focusses on managing differences. In public administration, there is a shift from active representation by individuals to connecting by all employees. Furthermore, the binding perspective is gaining more and more importance in the public domain because it may be possible to close the gap between the government and its citizen. This perspective emphasizes the importance of the long-term relationship with citizens to strengthen the trust of citizens in the government for realizing social tasks and responsibilities. It makes diversity an issue for all employees. For Hassan and Havva, and also for Hans and Hanna.

In this feature authors review recently published books on subjects of interest to readers of Beleid en Maatschappij.