The Dutch Tweede Kamer is unique among parliaments because here the agenda is actually determined in a public, plenary meeting of all MPs. In the Dutch Tweede Kamer 30 members of parliament (MPs) can request a plenary debate. Many opposition parties request these debates, but only 23% of these are actually held. We examine the question ‘under what conditions do political party groups cancel or maintain proposals for minority debates?’ as a way to gain insight into the black box of parliamentary agenda setting. We examine two complementary explanations: issue competition and parliamentary style. We trace all 687 minority debates that were proposed between 2012 and 2021 in the Netherlands. This allows us to see what proposals for debates MPs make and when they are retracted. We find strong evidence that anti-elitist parties maintain more debate proposals than do other parties

This article examines the economic agenda of the Dutch Freedom Party. It finds that this party mixes left-wing and right-wing policy positions. This inconsistency can be understood through the group-based account of Ennser-Jedenastik (2016), which proposes that the welfare state agenda of radical right-wing populist parties can be understood in terms of populism, nativism and authoritarianism. Each of these elements is linked to a particular economic policy: economic nativism, which sees the economic interest of natives and foreigners as opposed; economic populism, which seeks to limit economic privileges for the elite; and economic authoritarianism, which sees the interests of deserving and undeserving poor as opposed. By using these different oppositions, radical right-wing populist parties can reconcile left-wing and right-wing positions.

This article takes up Lijphart’s claim that consensus democracy is a ‘kinder, gentler’ form of democracy than majoritarian democracy. We zoom in on contemporary welfare state change, particularly the shift towards social investment, and argue that the kinder, gentler hypothesis remains relevant. Consensus democracies stand out in regard to the extent to which their political institutions help to overcome the politically delicate intricacies of governing for the long term. We theorize the features that can help to solve the problem of temporal commitment in democracy through processual mechanisms and illustrate these with short case studies of the contrasting welfare state reform experiences in the Netherlands and Belgium.

In line with international and national legislation, the Netherlands offers certain services, including a temporary residence permit, to third country nationals who have fallen prey to human traffickers. Over the years, concerns have been often expressed about the perceived misuse of this regulation by foreigners who aim at legalising their stay. Based on interviews and file analysis the present article seeks to provide insight into to what extent it is possible to measure this misuse and the policy implications of the findings. In addition, the authors take into account non-use of the programme. The article confirms existing worries about misuse, provides indicators for misuse, but also concludes that at the level of individual cases practitioners cannot discern misuse from rightful use. At the same time, there are also groups that fall outside the reach of the programme. The article concludes with some policy recommendations on the basis of the findings.

On January 1, 2013 an amendment entered into force, increasing the administrative fines in social security legislation and labor laws. The amendment also redesigned the way these fines were calculated. In this article these new fines are assessed for consistency. On the one hand consistency with the dominant tendency of localization of welfare states and on the other hand consistency with other penalties. Based on this assessments it is concluded that the new fines do not match the tendency of localization of the welfare state. Compared to other fines the increase itself suites the type of violation, but not with the type of offender. Moreover the amendment deviates with regard to the doubling of the fine, since the fine is based on the amount of the unduly paid benefits that have to be recovered as well. Finally the amendment deviates since the legislator obliges the administration to impose the fine: the administration has no discretion whatsoever.

At the start of the century, the organisational fields belonging to the public employment service and social security, which previously were strictly institutionally separated with their rules and norms, have been brought under one umbrella or network structure in the Netherlands. We discuss how within this structure adaptive and reflexive forms of governance enhance information feedback and simultaneous learning processes both at the top and in the execution level of social security. Based upon document study, interviews and a case study of a sectoral experiment on integral service provision, we illustrate which learning elements occurred in bridging the planning and control cycle of New Public Management at the top with the horizontal mutual adjustment between organisations at decentral level.

By means of a re-analysis of the most relevant data source (Nieuwbeerta & Ganzeboom 1996), this paper criticizes the newly grown consensus in political sociology that class voting has declined since World War II. An increase of crosscutting cultural voting, rooted in educational differences, rather than a decline of class voting proves responsible for the decline of the traditional class-party alignments. Moreover, income differences have not become less, but more consequential for voting behavior during this period. It is concluded that the new consensus has been built on quicksand. Class is not dead – it has been buried alive under the increasing weight of cultural voting, systematically misinterpreted as a decline of class voting, due to the widespread application of the Alford index.

In 1992, the Walloon Region modified its investment incentive legislation. The new legislation applies the notion of SME to any business employing up to 250 people and which turnover does not exceed 20 million ECU, and replaces the former interest subsidies and capital premiums by a grant calculated as a percentage of investment. According to the size of the business, the activity sector and the area, the maximum aid may vary from 13 to 21 %. The grant total percentage is calculated by summing up the percentage of aid obtained for five criteria under which job creation is by far the most important (up to 8 %). The new legislation gives a partial answer to traditional criticisms against investment incentives. First of all it aims at reducing the risk of accelerated substitution of capital for Labour. Besides, it simplifies adminsitrative procedures and reduces the "sprinkling" (spreading of the available budget over a large number of business which makes the impact by investment project almost negligible). It should also reduce the risk of inefficient allocation of resources thatarises when grants go to loss-making entreprises. But the question of whether investment incentives actually increase the level of investment (effectiveness) remains largely unanswered. Evidence suggests that investment incentives might have contributed to attract foreign investments hut have little impact on thelevel of domestic investment. Nevertheless, as far as SMEs are concerned, public grants might contribute to increased investment not by reducing the cost or increasing the profitability of the project but rather by increasing the means available in the business.

In an economy of concertation, organisations of employers and of employees are legally involved in the process of decision making on economic and especially on social policy. Government recognises officially the so called social partners as the autonomous represents of the industry. They leave them a number of tasks in the creation and administration of social regulations. Within a legal institutional framework of councils, on national, sectoral and local level, bargaining between social partners is aimed to consensus, which is formalized in social pacts or collective agreements on wage formation, working hours, social insurance etc. Social legislation is always advised and often written by the socialpartners (in the National Council of Labour). From 1960 up to now (with an interruption in the period of crisis 1981-86) social development has been shaped by national and sectoral pacts. In the evolution of social insurances for workers the influence of the social partners was also eminent. This model was also working in matters of national health policy, linked to health insurance. The overall evaluation of this system is positive. The role of government and parliament has beenrestrained. But, on a legal base, free cooperation between virtual antagonists has been realised, and the number of conflicts minimized. Trade-unions were integrated in the process of decision making.