Last year the first Dutch municipalities declared themselves TTIP-free and the list is growing. The count now stands at 27 Dutch municipalities, three Dutch provinces and two Dutch water boards. TTIP means that foreign companies can be confident that investments in a host country are secure and cannot simply be eliminated or nullified. But what if investments are at odds or will be become at odds with measures a government has taken or intends to take, for example to protect the environment? Does the government still have that freedom under TTIP? Or is it only if it is prepared to pay large amounts of money? Comparable practices show that it may involve significant amounts of money. What can we expect from TTIP in this respect? The question central in this essay is if and, if so to what extent, does the investment protection that TTIP offers, in combination with the arbitration that is foreseen in the treaty, impede local authorities in taking decisions in the general interest.

Within the past two years, hydraulic fracturing for shale gas became a highly contested technology in the Netherlands. Possible negative environmental impacts are at strained terms with possible economic, energy and geo-political benefits. In addition, there are many scientific uncertainties about, for example water contamination, methane emissions, the amounts of gas to extract and the risk of earth quakes. Societal conflict and scientific uncertainties make fracking for shale gas a wicked problem for decision makers. This article demonstrates that the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs has implemented several instruments for deliberation, such as a consultation round with stakeholders and a sound board for an independent research. These failed to lead to the desired support for fracking. In this contribution, I demonstrate that these instruments led to reason giving but not to structuring of the problem. They were used by governmental actors and protest groups as a political platform that was fuel for the political conflict.

This special issue focusses on deliberative elements in deciding over wicked problems. We present four case studies in which some form of deliberation was organized: the placement of mobile phone masts, hydraulic fracturing for shale gas, the failed HPV vaccination campaign and climate dialogues organized to enhance deliberative knowledge production over climate change. The case studies demonstrate how each of the deliberative processes has become politicized and that deliberative governance runs the risk of turning into a technocratic policy approach.