Zoekresultaat: 11 artikelen

x
Artikel

Het vernieuwde toezicht in het onderwijs

Hooggespannen verwachtingen van kwaliteitszorg, bestuurskracht en maatwerk

Tijdschrift Bestuurskunde, Aflevering 4 2018
Trefwoorden Inspectorate of Education, Renewed customized work approach, Policy Theory, Effects, Supervision
Auteurs Dr. Marlies Honingh, Prof. dr Melanie Ehren en Dr. Cor van Montfort
Samenvatting

    This paper presents the policy theory of the Dutch Inspectorate of Education’s 2017 framework. The framework includes a set of indicators and working methods for the inspections of school boards which are expected to lead to improved quality and organizational learning of the schools and colleges within each board’s portfolio. Inspection feedback, quality assurance, stakeholder involvement and governance are the key mechanisms through which customized inspections are assumed to affect change. These customized inspections start from a set of legal requirements schools and colleges have to meet, but add inspections modules which are agreed on with each school board at the start of an inspection visit. As these inspections are currently being implemented, there is no evidence yet on the validity of these assumptions.


Dr. Marlies Honingh

Prof. dr Melanie Ehren

Dr. Cor van Montfort
Artikel

Naar bestuursgericht toezicht in de zorg: een zoektocht naar passendheid

Tijdschrift Bestuurskunde, Aflevering 4 2018
Trefwoorden healthcare governance, management-oriented regulation, experimenting, recoupling, reflective regulation
Auteurs Dr. Annemiek Stoopendaal en Dr. Hester van de Bovenkamp
Samenvatting

    In this article, we discuss how regulation of governance in healthcare has been shaped over the past decade. We describe the presuppositions under this movement. Searching and balancing was needed to meet the complexity of care management. This has to do with the fact that the external pressure on the regulator after incidents is high. Due to this pressure, it is necessary to constantly ensure that management-oriented regulation does not narrow to the supervision on the actor with final responsibility. The regulation of good governance requires reflectivity of the inspectors and is aimed at stimulating recoupling between management and shop floors. This requires space for experimentation for both managers and inspectors. To provide this space, we do not only need a political and social debate about the quality of care and its management, but also attention and appreciation for the difficult considerations of organizing care.


Dr. Annemiek Stoopendaal

Dr. Hester van de Bovenkamp

    With the term ‘system responsibility’ the authors (both working for the Dutch Scientific Council for Governmental Policy) mean the responsibility for the functioning of complex ‘administrative systems’. In these complex administrative systems supervision can have different roles: to assess the functioning one-sided from the perspective of the government, but also to put on reflective glasses (‘from afar glasses’) that aim at the bigger picture of divergent rationalities of the actors involved. In the second case, there is ‘system responsible supervision’. This essay explores the ‘what’ and the ‘how’ of the desirability of system responsible supervision in a society with complex, compound administrative systems. Such supervision can contribute to a somewhat better understanding of these systems and a somewhat better ability to adjust these complex systems. These supervisors can be seen as a necessary complement of the withdrawal of the government and the rise of ‘horizontal administration’, in which the hierarchical decision-power of the central government has gradually shifted to other actors. As unelected and as relatively independent actors they occupy a new, hybrid place in the ‘trias politica’, because on the one hand they have taken over functions of elected politicians and administrators and on the other hand they function in many respects as a quasi-judicial power.


Dr. Peter de Goede
Dr. P.J.M. de Goede is senior wetenschappelijk medewerker van de Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid. Hij is voormalig redactiesecretaris en hoofdredacteur van Bestuurswetenschappen.

Prof. dr. André Knottnerus
Prof. dr. J.A. Knottnerus is voorzitter van de Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid.
Artikel

Vertrouwen in toezichtbeleid

Tijdschrift Beleid en Maatschappij, Aflevering 3 2014
Trefwoorden Trust, regulatory policy, accountability, control, supervision regime
Auteurs Lydia Paauw-Fikkert MSc, Dr. ir. Frédérique Six en Prof. dr. Paul Robben
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie

    Regulatory supervision and inspection have become key features of public governance, some authors even talk about the ‘audit society’ or the age of ‘regulatory capitalism’. Despite international research showing the importance of trust in supervisory relations, there is still a fierce debate about the role of trust in Dutch supervisory relations. Several inspectorates have incorporated trust as a central theme in their supervisory policy. This article describes the role of trust within the policy of the Dutch Healthcare Inspectorate (IGZ). This research addresses four themes in dealing with the concept of trust in supervisory relations: from transparency to accountability, from output performance to performance and risk management, from trust or control to trust and control, and, finally, a special regime for reliable inspectees. The empirical analysis in this paper contributes to the knowledge about the role of trust in supervision (policy) and to the debate about the role of trust in regulatory supervision policy.


Lydia Paauw-Fikkert MSc
Lydia Paauw-Fikkert MSc is senior adviseur bij de Inspectie voor de Gezondheidszorg.

Dr. ir. Frédérique Six
Dr. ir. Frédérique Six MBA is universitair docent aan de VU Amsterdam.

Prof. dr. Paul Robben
Prof. dr. Paul Robben is adviseur bij de Inspectie voor de Gezondheidszorg en bij iBMG-Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam
Artikel

Governance by numbers: risico’s verbonden aan de internationale benchmarking en ranking van pensioensystemen

Tijdschrift Beleid en Maatschappij, Aflevering 2 2013
Trefwoorden Governance by numbers, Commensuratie, comparatief onderzoek, doelmatigheid van pensioenen, standaardisatie
Auteurs Drs. Hans Peeters en Dr. Gert Verschraegen
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie

    This article points out some of the pitfalls and ambiguities involved in quantified cross-national policy comparisons by looking at the construction and use of standardized indicators in the field of pension policy. The empirical analysis looks at three cases where the OESO and EU use standardized pension indicators to score and rank the performance of national pension systems. The cases illustrate some of the problems associated with scoring and ranking the outcomes of unique and complex pension systems by means of internationally standardized indicators. Our results show that internationally standardised indicators for pension systems are not neutral in the sense that they favor countries with certain institutional pension policy mixes over others. When particular institutional characteristics are treated differently under the same metric, systematically distorted conclusions about the performance of national pension systems may, and likely do, result. Consequently, these observed biases hinder reliable cross-national comparison that is based on these indicators. The article concludes with some recommendations on the construction and use of international indicators in the field of pension policy. It also discusses where research on the process of commensuration – transforming qualities into quantities − in a comparative context should go from here.


Drs. Hans Peeters
Hans Peeters is wetenschappelijk medewerker aan het Centrum voor Sociologisch Onderzoek van de KU Leuven, België, hans.peeters@soc.kuleuven.be.

Dr. Gert Verschraegen
Gert Verschraegen is docent sociologie aan de Universiteit Antwerpen, België, Gert.Verschraegen@ua.ac.be.
Artikel

Morele verantwoordelijkheid te midden van meervoudigheid

De toegevoegde waarde van het kritische individu in complexe omgevingen met meervoudige belangen

Tijdschrift Beleid en Maatschappij, Aflevering 4 2012
Trefwoorden financial markets, financial regulation, lobbying, financial crisis, policy paradigms
Auteurs Dr. Liesbeth Noordegraaf-Eelens en Lotte van Vliet MA
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie

    The lessons learned from the financial crisis are not necessarily limited to the financial sector. Both the financial sector and the public sector have to deal with perverse effects. The effects can be related to a reduction of complexity and plurality through introducing (oversimplified and one dimensional) models and financial incentives. However, in doing this, complexity and plurality are often lost: the neglect of multiple interests, goal replacement and too much focus on short term results. As a consequence perverse effects arise.
    Public sectors and organizations face internal and external pressure to act as they do. At the level of organizations or groups this may involve groupthink; at institutional level uniformity is promoted by the dynamics of isomorphism. This article is a critique on simplification and a plea for the (re)introduction of plurality. More specifically, we stress the importance of individual moral responsibility as a resource for and a way to preserve plurality. Not because that is the only option, but because it is an option that we believe deserves more attention. Other options such as changing regulations and changing the structure of supervision are already broadly discussed. We want to draw attention to the individual as parts of multiple organizations and systems. Individuals are therefore a natural carrier of multiplicity and plurality. Taking moral responsibility serious is not an easy task, but a meaningful step towards awareness of perverse effects due to reduction of complexity and plurality.


Dr. Liesbeth Noordegraaf-Eelens
Liesbeth Noordegraaf-Eelens is als universitair docent verbonden aan de Erasmus School of Economics. Eerder verschenen van haar De overspelige bankier (2004) en Op naar de volgende crisis (2009). In 2010 promoveerde zij op het proefschrift Contested Communication. A Critical Analysis of Central Bank Speech. Liesbeth Noordegraaf-Eelens is een van de auteurs van het RMO-advies Tegenkracht organiseren. Lessen uit de kredietcrisis. Correspondentiegegevens: Dr. Liesbeth Noordegraaf-Eelens, Erasmus School of Economics, Burgemeester Oudlaan 50, 3000 DR Rotterdam, noordegraaf@ese.eur.nl.

Lotte van Vliet MA
Lotte van Vliet MA werkt als senior adviseur bij de Raad voor Maatschappelijke Ontwikkeling (RMO). Zij is een van de auteurs van het RMO-advies Tegenkracht organiseren. Lessen uit de kredietcrisis. Correspondentiegegevens: l.vliet@adviesorgaan-rmo.nl.
Artikel

Ontbrekende alternatieven en gevestigde belangen

Een studie naar de posities van overheden in hervormingsdebatten tijdens de financiële crisis

Tijdschrift Beleid en Maatschappij, Aflevering 4 2012
Auteurs Daniel Mügge PhD en Bart Stellinga MA MSc
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie

    The credit crisis that began in the summer of 2007 has fundamentally challenged much financial regulation and the political institutions that produced it. Measured against the criticisms that have been brought forth against previous financial governance, the extent of governments’ overall reform ambitions has been disappointing. Starting from this observation, this article asks: what explains governments’ reform choices, and thus also their limited ambitions? To explore this question, this article focuses on the positions that four governments central to global financial regulation (the USA, the UK, Germany and France) have taken in advance of the G20 meetings in 2009 across four key issue areas: accounting standards, derivatives trading, credit ratings agencies and banking rules. It evaluates both the overlap between positions across domains and governments as well as the differences between them. Such variation, we argue, provides key clues to the overall drivers behind reforms – as well as their limits. The overall picture that emerges can be summarized as follows: governments have been staunch defenders of their national firms’ competitive interests in regulatory reforms. That has not necessarily meant that they followed industry preferences across the board. It has been the relative impact, compared to foreign competitors, that counted in reform positions, not the absolute impact. These differences of opinion have played out within the context and the limits of the overall debates about thinkable policy alternatives. In spite of fundamental criticisms of pre-crisis regulatory orthodoxy, convincing and coherent alternatives have been forthcoming slowly at best. This has made reform proposals less radical than criticisms, seen on their own, might suggest.


Daniel Mügge PhD
Daniel Mügge is universitair docent politicologie aan de Universiteit van Amsterdam. Correspondentiegegevens: D. Mügge, PhD, afdeling Politicologie, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Oudezijds Achterburgwal 237, 1012 DL Amsterdam, d.k.muegge@uva.nl.

Bart Stellinga MA MSc
Bart Stellinga is medior wetenschappelijk medewerker bij de Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid. Correspondentiegegevens: B. Stellinga, MA MSc, Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid, Lange Vijverberg 4-5, 2500 EA Den Haag, stellinga@wrr.nl.
Artikel

Laveren tussen belanghebbenden

Reële autonomie en financieel toezicht

Tijdschrift Beleid en Maatschappij, Aflevering 4 2012
Trefwoorden regulatory governance, de facto autonomy, financial supervision, bureaucracy, institutional reform
Auteurs Dr. Caelesta Braun
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie

    De facto autonomy, the actual potential of regulatory agencies to go about their daily work, is often conceived to be more important to explain regulatory capacity than its formal autonomy and responsibilities. In this article we investigate whether external context factors, such as the financial and economic crisis have an impact on de facto autonomy. More specifically, we investigate whether the de facto autonomy varies after the crisis and distinctively so for specific subsets of employees within regulatory agencies. According to literature, mid-level managers of agencies are key to de facto autonomy and building a secure reputation for the agency in question. We test these external and internal effects on de facto autonomy with a survey among employees of the Dutch Financial Market Authority (N = 248). The findings show that the perceived influence of stakeholders is relatively constant, but that it is more dynamic for European stakeholders. Both middle managers and employees working at strategic and policy departments of the agency conceive the impact of European stakeholders as increasing in nature. The findings have important implications for our studies of de facto autonomy of regulatory agencies as well as reform potential after major institutional crises.


Dr. Caelesta Braun
Caelesta Braun is universitair docent aan het Department of Governance Studies, Vu University en als gastonderzoeker verbonden aan Antwerp Centre for Institutions and Multilevel Politics (ACIM), University of Antwerp. Correspondentiegegevens: Dr. Caelesta Braun, afdeling Bestuurswetenschappen, faculteit Sociale Wetenschappen, De Boelelaan 1081, 1081 HV Amsterdam, c.braun@vu.nl.
Artikel

Handelingsperspectieven in het politiek-financieel complex

Tijdschrift Beleid en Maatschappij, Aflevering 4 2012
Trefwoorden financial crisis, action logics, decision-making theories, regulatory bodies, financial institutions
Auteurs Dr. Kutsal Yesilkagit
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie

    The world-wide meltdown of financial markets is one of the largest human-made crises in modern times. The question that trembles on the lips of many researcher is why the main actors, all considered as rational, have displayed such self-destructing behaviour. Answers have been sought and partially found in theories as varied as ‘regulatory capture’, ‘failed regulation’, and inadequate crisis management. In this special issue, an alternative view is suggested. The financial sector, like any other complex sector, is made up of loosely coupled actors and actor settings (i.e. financial institutions, regulatory bodies, political actors), each driven by different action logics. The studies in this special issue each deeply examine the action logic of one actor group. The purpose of this issue is hence to parcel out the various action logics and suggest directions for further research to combine better the various actors and their differing action logics.


Dr. Kutsal Yesilkagit
Kutsal Yesilkagit is universitair hoofddocent bestuurskunde aan de Universiteit Utrecht. Correspondentiegegevens: A.K.Yesilkagit@uu.nl.
Artikel

Coördinatie en wederzijdse afhankelijkheid in europese reguleringsnetwerken

Tijdschrift Bestuurskunde, Aflevering 3 2012
Trefwoorden regulation, European Union, networks
Auteurs Karin van Boetzelaer en Sebastiaan Princen
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie

    In recent years, European networks of national regulators and supervisors have emerged in a variety of policy fields. These networks are seen as a way to coordinate national implementation and enforcement of EU legislation in situations where centralization of these activities at European level is undesirable or politically infeasible. This article explores whether such networks indeed lead to a higher level of coordination between the member states. The authors do so by comparing four directives (two in the field of financial market supervision and two in the field of environmental policy) the implementation of which was coordinated within European networks. The results of this study show that coordination is strongest for those directives where the interdependence between national supervisors is greatest and national supervisors thus have a direct interest in coordination. This implies that European regulatory networks are only an effective form of coordination for issues involving strong interdependencies between national supervisors.


Karin van Boetzelaer
K.G. van Boetzelaer MSc werkt bij het ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties.

Sebastiaan Princen
Dr S.B.M. Princen is universitair hoofddocent bij het Departement Bestuurs- en Organisatiewetenschap van de Universiteit Utrecht.

    Climate change forces to a fundamental reconsideration of our strategic policy, and especially of the relationship between policy and law. With regard to political urgent topics, a tendency towards policy instrumentalism always lies in wait. In the current policy practice this problem manifests itself in the application of law (in many detailed norm prescriptions) and – curiously – also in its policy counterpart: the search towards informal but even goal specific policy processes.

    The authors plead for dealing with spatial climate challenges by creating room for a strategic policy perspective and a sustainable approach of the relation between law and policy. A qualitative approach of policy and law necessitates an innovative juridical transformation: the use of general normative rules which give direction to flexible policy processes in multiple, specific policy situations.


Marleen van Rijswick
Prof. mr. H.F.M.W. van Rijswick is hoogleraar Europees en nationaal waterrecht aan de Universiteit Utrecht en verbonden aan het Centrum voor Omgevingsrecht en beleid. Correspondentiegegevens: Prof. mr. H.F.M.W. van Rijswick Universiteit Utrecht Achter Sint Pieter 200 3512 HT Utrecht h.vanrijswick@uu.nl

Willem Salet
Prof. dr. W.G.M. Salet is algemeen hoogleraar planologie aan het Amsterdam Institute for Social Science Research van de Universiteit van Amsterdam.
Interface Showing Amount
U kunt door de volledige tekst zoeken naar alle artikelen door uw zoekterm in het zoekveld in te vullen. Als u op de knop 'Zoek' heeft geklikt komt u op de zoekresultatenpagina met filters, die u helpen om snel bij het door u gezochte artikel te komen. Er zijn op dit moment twee filters: rubriek en jaar.