In 2019, the world witnessed an exceptional wave of climate protests. In this case study, we scrutinise who participated in the protests staged in Belgium. We ask: did the exceptional mobilising context of the 2019 protest wave also bring exceptional protesters to the streets? Were thanks to the unique momentum standard barriers to protest participation overcome? We answer these questions by comparing three surveys of participants in the 2019 protest wave with three surveys of relevant reference publics. Our findings show that while the Belgian 2019 protest was in many ways exceptional, its participants were less so. Although participants – especially in the early phase of the protest wave – were less protest experienced, younger and unaffiliated to organisations, our findings simultaneously confirm the persistence of a great many well-known socio-demographic and political inequalities. Our conclusion centres on the implications of these findings.

Governments around the world responded at roughly the same time but in several different ways to the emerging threat of COVID-19 in early 2020. This article sets out the nature of the different strategies that emerged over the course of the pandemic, focussing on the policy tools deployed. Some of these efforts were successful in containing the coronavirus while others were not, in some cases due to poor initial choices and in others due to poor implementation of the chosen strategy. Although the initial understanding each government had of the nature of the disease was the same, different state capacities and different levels of preparedness and effective leadership can be seen to have resulted over time in the emergence of six distinct approaches to the pandemic which, once deployed, proved difficult, although not impossible, to change as the pandemic unfolded.

This article digs into the relationship between voters’ political resentment and their electoral choice in 2019 by focusing on the respondents’ emotions towards politics. Using the RepResent 2019 voter survey, eight emotions are analysed in their relation to voting behaviour: four negative (anger, bitterness, worry and fear) and four positive (hope, relief, joy and satisfaction). We confirm that voters’ emotional register is at least two-dimensional, with one positive and one negative dimension, opening the possibility for different combinations of emotions towards politics. We also find different emotional patterns across party choices, and more crucially, we uncover a significant effect of emotions (especially negative ones) on vote choice, even when controlling for other determinants. Finally, we look at the effect of election results on emotions and we observe a potential winner vs. loser effect with distinctive dynamics in Flanders and in Wallonia.

In a democracy citizens should actually have influence on the choices that directly influence their lives. Citizens have two ways for this influence: directly by participating in the policy process (in its formulation, its decision making or its implementation) or indirectly by voting for a political party or representatives through which citizens have influence on the outcomes. These two are not opposite to each other, but rather complementary. My main argument in this article is that the smaller the scale, the greater the possibilities for citizens to exert direct influence. The larger the scale, the more important it is that this influence runs through their representative institutions

Recent developments on the Dutch labour market raise questions about the emergence of new social dividing lines. In this paper we discuss two cases. Both address labour market disadvantages which can easily deepen and sharpen with unchanged policies. The first case shows that there are groups that are less able to respond to the defined trends in the labour market due to a lack of education or disabilities. In the second case we focus on the question of sustainable employability as such that creates dividing lines. A first conclusion from our contribution is that a thorough analysis of existing dividing lines in the labour market is crucial for effective policy, but that knowledge about deepening old and creating new dividing lines is at least as relevant. A second conclusion is that the outlined assumptions in policies around self-reliance of, for example, people with a disability or the possibilities of employers to realize sheltered work and to focus on retraining, for example outside working hours, are not always realistic. Much more will have to be done to match the real possibilities of people and organizations to achieve this. Financial, but also organizational and personal. The motivations and behaviors of employees, employers and educational authorities appear to be very relevant explanatory factors in practice, which are often not sufficiently taken into account. Recent experiences with the Participation Act and lifelong learning show us that. More interaction is needed in the coming years between research, policy and the practice of the labour market.

The concept of self-reliant citizens reflects an ideology of citizenship that is multiple and flexible. It could be regarded as a ‘plastic’ word, malleable and adjustable according to convictions, needs and purposes. This study shows the importance of considering the way in which ideological views on citizenship are transferred, adjusted and enacted in an organizational context. On the basis of a case study at the Dutch Tax and Customs Administration (DTCA), we contribute to knowledge on the way processes of framing interrelate on micro, meso and macro levels. We found that frames on self-reliance are enacted in a way that tensions and dilemmas are neutralized or reduced. In a dynamic context of conflicting goals and limited resources, DTCA-employees create meanings of self-reliance which legitimate practices and policies. By doing this they reproduce both organizational and social perspectives. Accounts of citizenship play an important role in this process. Self-reliant citizens are presented as active and responsible. The need of help is imagined as a normal and yet an atypical situation. This study promotes attention to the possibility that organizational systems reproduce perspectives in a way that alternative views remain unnoticed, whereas organizational choices are silently accepted as natural facts.

Taking Lijphart’s work on consensus democracies as our point of departure, we signal a major shortcoming in Lijphart’s focus being almost exclusively on the political hardware of the state structure, leaving little attention for the administrative and bureaucratic characteristics of governance systems. We propose to expand the Lijphart’s model which overviews structural aspects of the executive and the state with seven additional features of the bureaucratic system. We argue that these features are critical for understanding the processes of policymaking and service delivery. Next, in order to better understand the functioning of the Netherlands and Belgium as consensus democracies, we provide a short analysis of the historical context and current characteristics of the political-administrative systems in both countries.

In recent years few political ambitions enjoyed so much political support as the striving to let the welfare state become more of a ‘participation society’. This ‘participation society’ should be a society with self-reliant citizens; before turning to the state for support, citizens should first of all look at their own capacities, and only in the last case ask the state for help. The premise is promising: collective well-being. However, the fundamental assumptions behind this notion do raise questions. This article argues that the notion for citizens to be self-reliant easily builds on questionable assumptions; these assumptions on the one hand raise hope for collective well-being, but on the other hand easily catalyze citizens’ contemporary uncertainties. It indeed is desirable to restate the relation between state and citizens, but the contemporary focus on citizens’ self-reliance should watch for building on unstable foundations to easily.

Much has been written about the decline of trust in societies: trust in governments and political systems is a popular field of research. Trust of governments in citizens however, is a relatively unknown field. This article presents a research into the trust the Dutch government has in its citizens. By conducting a discourse analysis on policy documents regarding the participation society, the degree of trust was examined. The results show that the government has trust in the capabilities of citizens, but does not trust the intentions of citizens. This results in many control measures, high transaction costs, a fragile base for public cooperation and a disturbed relationship between the government and citizens. In order to gain more trust in citizens the government has to change the way it uses language regarding citizens.

This article is about how education administrators value complex issues or dilemmas they are confronted with in their governance practices, and which strategies they adopt to cope with them. Professional governance of school organisations was introduced gradually over the past fifteen years, and at the same time governance in education has gained in complexity and raises considerable risks, requiring more time, knowledge and expertise of education administrators. We draw on the theoretical perspective of coping to investigate the potential of education administrators to deal with the complexity, impediments and social and regulatory pressure in their daily practice. Our study consists of a comparative case study of six education administrators in secondary education. Their agency has been researched qualitatively with the help of the hierarchical model of coping strategies of Skinner and colleagues. The results show that the issues and dilemmas education administrators find most complex are about educational innovation and numbers of students enrolled. Education administrators value these issues or dilemmas hardly as threatening, and they adopt various proactive coping strategies to deal with them, such as information seeking or bargaining.

In 2015, Dutch local governments have become responsible for youth care, social welfare, employment and income assistance programs, as a result of decentralization. Many municipalities have set up service delivery networks and community teams, in which they collaborate with healthcare providers and civic organizations to build integrated care services. It is assumed that these networks will improve outcomes in terms of enhanced people’s self-reliance and healthcare cost control; by operating close to citizens they are in a position to know the client, activate a client’s social network and mobilize specialized professional expertise if necessary. However, a comparative case study of 26 emerging local networks in the Arnhem area indicates that healthcare providers use the networks mainly for presentation purposes in an effort to secure business continuity, that the role of local governments is fuzzy, and that citizen participation only thrives when actively encouraged in a climate of trust.

Behind many notions of ‘governance’, there lies the image of a ‘modest’ or ‘retreating’ state. The assumption is that local and national authorities can only perform effectively if in cooperation with other public and private actors. Generally, it is said, governments increasingly lack the legitimacy for top-down interventions and hence the need of including participative citizen involvement in policy making and implementation. In recent years this democratic image has been disputed in scientific debates because of its lack of attention for new forms of interventionism by the state in societal processes, e.g. crime, youth care, immigration and integration. In this article, we aim to contribute to this other understanding of modern governance by analysing Dutch political discourse between 2001 and 2010 on (implicit) notions of the role and responsibility of the state. We show how the idea of ‘responsibilisation’ of citizens is turned into an argument for more instead of less state involvement in societal processes and citizens’ lives. By emphasizing ‘shared responsibilities’ between government and society, a tricky picture of parity is sketched of this relation. Dutch government presents itself as ‘an ally’ of citizens in fighting pressing social problems, but in the meantime an ideal of ‘responsible behaviour’ is constructed, namely, citizen behaviour in concordance with government’s policy ambitions. Within this political discourse, the socio-liberal idea of ‘responsibility’ turns into ‘responsibilisation on government’s terms’ and ‘irresponsible’ behaviour becomes a legitimate focal point for deep state interventions through techniques of governance.

In this article, we argue that there are indications for the emergence of a third phase in the idea of global governance. After the phase of extensive state intervention and etatism (1945-1980) and the phase of deregulation and marketization (1980-now), this third phase aims at restoring typically governmental functions (e.g. social cohesion, financial stability, public health). Indications are international measures against the drawbacks of globalization (e.g. financial instability), the eroding legitimacy of the market-oriented WTO regime, the formulation of new security concepts establishing links between national interest and transnational problems and the enhanced interest in global policy coordination (e.g. UN Millennium Development Goals). Yet today, unlike in 1945-1980, globalization and complex interdependence are accepted as facts, and we also witness attempts to realize ‘governmental’ functions at the global level. But the direction which global governance will follow the years ahead, remains to a large extent a matter of political choice.