This article tackles the particular issue of split-ticket voting, which has been largely overlooked in Belgian election studies thus far. We contribute to the literature by answering two particular research questions: (1) to what extent and (2) why do voters cast a different vote in the elections for the provincial council as compared to their vote in the elections for the municipal council?
The article draws on survey data collected via an exit poll in the ‘Belgian Local Elections Study’, a research project conducted by an inter-university team of scholars.
Our analysis shows that nearly 45% of the total research population cast a split-ticket vote in the local elections of 2018. However, this number drops to one out of four if we only consider a homogenous party landscape at both levels by excluding the numerous votes for ‘local’ lists (which occur mostly at the municipal level). This finding underlines the importance of accounting for the electoral and institutional context of the different electoral arenas in research on split-ticket voting in PR systems. In the Belgian context, split-ticket voting in 2018 also differed between the different parties and regions. Furthermore, it was encouraged by a higher level of education and familiarity with particular candidates. This candidate-centred and strategic voting was matched by party identification and the urban municipal context favouring straight-ticket voting. Other factors such as region, a rural municipal context and preferential voting seemed more relevant to determine voting for local parties than using the instrument of split-ticket votes as such.

By examining the Belgian case, this article aims to show that methodological nationalism is strongly present in the literature on nationalization of party offer and voting behaviour. In nationalization studies, Belgium is often presented as a typical example of a denationalized country. This is true for the party offer, as it is de facto split between the two language groups since the 1980s, and therefore also voter response at the national level. However, voter response within each separate subnational party system is very homogeneous and shows interesting differences between these party systems that inform us about important electoral dynamics. We argue, on the basis of our results, that rather than stretching the concept of nationalization, it is preferable and justified to treat the concepts of nationalization of the party offer and homogenization of voter response as analytically distinct and not as two sides of the same coin.

Belgium has long been described as a typical case of a consociational or consensus democracy. This article aims at identifying whether political parties in Belgium share the internal characteristics of parties in consensus democracies: passive mass memberships, the importance of purposive and material incentives for joining, and representation of a clear subculture in the social and attitudinal profiles of their members and via overlapping memberships with related organizations. We mobilize longitudinal party membership data and party member surveys conducted in three different time periods. We show that pillar parties still exercise their role of mobilization and representation of societal segments, but these segments tend to become smaller over time. New parties offer alternative options of mobilization and representation, although not always in line with the specific institutional arrangements of consociational democracy.

Particracy has been widely used to describe Belgian politics after World War II. Yet, Belgian politics has changed. We examine five changes – the federalisation of the state architecture, diversification of the demos, erosion of political support, party’s dealignment and personalisation of politics – to evaluate how they have affected particracy in Belgium. The answer is twofold: particracy is still very strong, but it has changed. The three traditional party families that had institutionalised particracy in Belgium (Christian-democrats, socialists and liberals) had to face new challengers. They co-opted the most moderate ones (greens, regionalists), while excluding others (radical right/left). Intraparty democracy/participatory/transparency reforms, or changes to the electoral system, all of them opening the political system, were also implemented, but parties were able to overcome them. Yet, the ever-growing gap between traditional parties and citizens and the growth of new parties building upon voters’ dissatisfaction with traditional parties, may put particracy more radically into question.

The electoral rise of the Belgian regionalist party New-Flemish Alliance (N-VA) from scratch to the country’s largest party is remarkable. We explore here to what extent the party has shifted in ideological terms compared to its less successful predecessor VU. We make use of party member survey data (a dynamic indicator of a party’s position). We distinguish three factors that impact on parties’ positions: institutional reforms, the influx of new members and changes in the internal power distribution. The results show a clear change: on each of the five policy dimensions (centre-periphery, socio-economic, moral-ethical, post-materialist and migration issues), significant differences could be found.

Advocacy groups can contribute to the public debate in many different ways. In this contribution we compare the presence of Belgian advocacy groups in two crucial arenas: the media arena and the political arena. We analyze the presence of advocacy groups in the 12 strategic advisory councils of the Flemish government (political arena) and the 19 o’clock newscasts of the most important public and commercial television stations in Flanders. We argue that while each arena has its own logic, elements of the political logic are echoed in the media logic. Our results show that access to both arenas is cumulative: the same organizations dominate both arenas. Both arenas are not perfect reflections of each other though. Organizations lacking access to the political arena can rise in the media arena by offering conflict and spectacle. However, this is the exception rather than the rule, as most ‘political outsiders’ gain little attention from journalists. We conclude that mass media tend to follow and reinforce political power, rather than offering challengers a level playing field.

On January 1, 2013 an amendment entered into force, increasing the administrative fines in social security legislation and labor laws. The amendment also redesigned the way these fines were calculated. In this article these new fines are assessed for consistency. On the one hand consistency with the dominant tendency of localization of welfare states and on the other hand consistency with other penalties. Based on this assessments it is concluded that the new fines do not match the tendency of localization of the welfare state. Compared to other fines the increase itself suites the type of violation, but not with the type of offender. Moreover the amendment deviates with regard to the doubling of the fine, since the fine is based on the amount of the unduly paid benefits that have to be recovered as well. Finally the amendment deviates since the legislator obliges the administration to impose the fine: the administration has no discretion whatsoever.

To live in a safe neighbourhood is to live in a neighbourhood where one knows what to expect and can navigate the public space. This article argues that issues of public safety in urban disadvantaged neighbourhoods are often understood as depending on crime and social control; but it may well be that whether or not people feel safe depends just as much on the degree of public familiarity of the context in which they live – and consequently on their abilities to know who to trust and distrust – as it depends on the usual suspects of crime rates, social cohesion, broken windows and collective efficacy. Using empirical data from four neighbourhoods in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, the article shows that data may substantiate this claim, formulates some policy recommendations and proposes an agenda for further research.

In the run up to the elections, parties have several ways of communicating with voters. In the current paper, we focus on one piece of the puzzle: advertisements of political parties in the mass media. More specifically, we are interested in the choice of candidates within these ads. In countries where parties are the dominant actor, they are faced with a choice: not all candidates can be promoted in the campaign, as this would be too costly and inefficient. Thus, the first question we want to answer is what factors determine candidate choice in political ads? Secondly, does candidate choice in political ads have an effect on the subsequent coverage in media as well? Agenda setting research has shown that as far as issues are concerned, ads do set the media agenda. We investigate whether this also holds for candidate choice. The results indicate that both internal party hierarchy, as well as external visibility of candidates determines candidate choice in political ads. Furthermore, the agenda setting effect of political ads is confirmed as well.

The last local elections in Wallonia were marked by the introduction of a new legislation concerning the way mayors are appointed. Before 2006, mayors were appointed by the regional government. Since the last elections, a new decree institutes that is automatically appointed mayor the candidate having most preferential votes from the list having most seats. In this article, we explore how the new legislation has affected the way voters behave in 2006 and also how it has affected parties when it comes to coalition agreements. What appears is that the new legislation has a fairly limited impact. Voters did not cast more preferential votes in 2006 than in 2000. The logics of coalitions have not been changed significantly. Finally, the only notable – even if not spectacular – impact of the new Walloon decree is that the elections have been much more focused on the candidates that were leading their list, the ones that were presented by their party as their candidate to become mayor. These candidates have more often been appointed mayors in 2006 than in 2000 and the proportion of preferential votes that they have received is higher in 2006. In that sense, even if the degree of change must not be exaggerated, Walloon local elections are slightly turning into a horse race between candidates leading their list.

Parties supposedly take great care to assure an equilibrium in the socio-geographical composition of their lists of candidates. In this contribution it is investigated whether the parties which participated to the 2004 regional elections in Brussels indeed presented lists in which the criterion of equilibrated geographical distribution was taken into account. We compared the presence of candidates living in disfavoured neighbourhoods, middle class neighbourhoods and rich neighbourhoods for the different lists which participated in the elections. It is shown that elected politicians overwhelming tend to live in the richer areas of the Brussels Capital Region. This is not due to a funnel effect in which predominantly the candidates living in richer neighbourhoods were able to get elected. Parties had, indeed, in general distinct socio-geographical profiles of their candidates and these merely got reflected in the overall results of those getting elected.