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    The Dutch minister of Home Affairs, Ronald Plasterk, has resolved to obligate municipalities to set up an independent audit office. Other variants of the audit office function, in which counselors themselves are members of local audit offices or commissions, will be forbidden. The minister’s assumption is that an independent audit office will control the municipal government more effectively. The disappearance of counselors as member of audit offices (or commissions) may have implications for the impact of local audit reports. The supposed effect of the membership of counselors is that there will be better coordination between the local audit office (or commission) and the need for control of the municipality. In addition one might suppose that the presence of counselors in the audit office guarantees that the audit reports will receive enough attention in the municipal council. Both effects concern the impact of local audit investigation. In this article, the authors study the extent to which membership of counselors really contributes to the impact of local audit investigation on the basis of quantitative (a survey amongst secretaries of local audit offices) and qualitative (an explorative case study in a number of Dutch municipalities) research. The results show that the membership of counselors as such does not lead to a greater impact, but that a proper consultation is required between the audit office and the municipal council.


Mr. Paul Koster
Mr. B.P. Koster is jurist bij de gemeente Delfzijl en raadslid in de gemeente Bedum.

Mr. dr. Albertjan Tollenaar
Mr. dr. A. Tollenaar is universitair docent bestuursrecht en bestuurskunde aan de Rijksuniversiteit Groningen.
Artikel

Aanscherping sanctiebeleid SZW-wetten beoordeeld: vliegt de wetgever uit de bocht?

Tijdschrift Beleid en Maatschappij, Aflevering 2 2013
Trefwoorden Administrative fines, sanctions, social security, labour legislation
Auteurs Mr. dr. Albertjan Tollenaar
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie

    On January 1, 2013 an amendment entered into force, increasing the administrative fines in social security legislation and labor laws. The amendment also redesigned the way these fines were calculated. In this article these new fines are assessed for consistency. On the one hand consistency with the dominant tendency of localization of welfare states and on the other hand consistency with other penalties. Based on this assessments it is concluded that the new fines do not match the tendency of localization of the welfare state. Compared to other fines the increase itself suites the type of violation, but not with the type of offender. Moreover the amendment deviates with regard to the doubling of the fine, since the fine is based on the amount of the unduly paid benefits that have to be recovered as well. Finally the amendment deviates since the legislator obliges the administration to impose the fine: the administration has no discretion whatsoever.


Mr. dr. Albertjan Tollenaar
Albertjan Tollenaar is universitair docent van de vakgroep Bestuursrecht & Bestuurskunde aan de Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, a.tollenaar@rug.nl.
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