Theorieën en methoden uit de gedragswetenschappen betreden steeds nadrukkelijker de beleidsscene. Gedragsinzichten en nudging beloven beleid te verrijken en te versterken. Het begin van deze gedragswetenschappelijke omslag of behavioural turn laat men doorgaans samenvallen met de publicatie van het boek Nudge van Richard Thaler en Cass Sunstein in 2008. In dit artikel plaatsen we nudging in perspectief en argumenteren we dat het concept zowel een zegen als een vloek betekent, en zowel een katalysator als een rem is voor de bredere toepassing en verankering van gedragsinzichten in beleid. Ondanks het aantrekkelijke narratief botst nudging op functionele limieten en ethische bezwaren. Om de gedragswetenschappelijke, experimentele en evidence-based beleidsbeloften alsnog in te lossen, zien we een strategie van steeds verdere verbreding. Het programma van de Behavioural Insights-beweging op basis van vijf pijlers leek in eerste instantie een oplossing te bieden, maar kampt door een eendimensionale interpretatie met interne spanningen. De nog bredere en ambitieuzere Behavioural Public Policy-agenda biedt nieuwe perspectieven, maar moet op functioneel en ethisch vlak nog verder onderbouwd worden.

In Flanders, every political party has its own political foundation or study centre. Although their importance for the party organisation is widely recognised, a systematic and comparative analysis of these study centres is still lacking. This article is the first attempt to address this empirical void. Based on document analysis, interviews and survey material, we analyse the basic characteristics of the study centres of seven Flemish parties, covering all major political families. We compare their size, internal structure and autonomy vis-à-vis the party, explore the advisors’ profile and background and discuss the generation and products of advice. We conclude that despite their heterogeneity Flemish study centres share a common but limited functionality, being more of an extension of political parties than classical think tanks.

In België voert de Vlaamse overheid een eigen beleid in tal van domeinen, onafhankelijk van de andere regionale overheden in Brussel en Wallonië en van de federale overheid. Zij laat zich bij haar beleid ondersteunen door een netwerk van universiteiten, hogescholen, departementale studiediensten en kenniscentra, en een beperkt aantal verzelfstandigde Vlaamse wetenschappelijke instituten. Daarnaast maakt de Vlaamse overheid ook gebruik van analyses en studies van commerciële gespecialiseerde beleidsonderzoeksbureaus. Sinds de start van het nieuwe millennium wordt de organisatie van beleidsonderzoek in Vlaanderen enerzijds gekenmerkt door een toegenomen institutionalisering van beleidsgerichte onderzoeksprogramma’s, waarbij gekozen werd voor een grotere formalisering en structurering. Anderzijds hebben meer commerciële spelers zich op de markt van beleidsadvisering begeven.

This article examines the differences and similarities in public policy of the Dutch and Belgian government in the policy field of socially responsible investing (SRI). In particular the authors discuss both the content and the consequences of the Dutch arrangement 'Groen beleggen' and the Belgian 'Kringloopfonds'. Our empirical evidence states that, although both public policies are very similar (a tax incentive for investors investing financial means in socially responsible funds), they had a different influence on the socially responsible investment market. The Dutch arrangement 'Groen beleggen' lead to more assets under management, more green private funds, more financed projects and a bigger influence on the market of socially responsible investment products. This is mainly caused by the nature of the funding: the choice for private funds in the Netherlands, instead of a public fund like in Belgium.

The Belgian politico-administrative relationship is known for its large ministerial cabinets who operate as interfaces between ministers and civil servants. According to Dierickx & Majersdorf (1994) ministerial cabinets are the central nodes in the Belgian policy-making networks, reducing the policy role of civil servants and shielding them from all relevant policy-making interactions. They found that pressure groups hardly ever turned to civil servants and stated that civil servants lived in an administrative beguinage. This article tests whether the conclusions of Dierickx & Majersdorf (1994) are still valid. Next, it seeks to explore the policy-making interactions of both actors in a more detailed way, since Dierickx & Majersdorf (1994) only measured the frequency of their contacts, not the direction, goal and/or content of the interactions. Based on a unique written survey-research among top civil servants and ministerial advisers, we discuss the role differences with regard to their interactions in four ‘arenas’

On the 24th of november 1991 the Belgian voters elected the 716 members of the nine provincial councils. The socialists are the biggest losers of this election, with the Volksunie as a close second. Also the Christian Democrats suffered a serious decline, mainly caused by the loss of the CVP in Flanders. The electoral gain of the Flemish Liberals is neutralized by the decline of the Liberal party in Wallonia. The Greens gain 32 seats, the Far Right 35. These national aggregates hide striking regional differences. The national success of the Green is mainly due to the spectacular growth of Ecolo in the Walloons. The success of the Far Right is the sole result of a multiplication of votes for Vlaams Blok in Flanders. These results show that both the Flemish and the Walloon voters have sanctioned the traditional parties in a similar way. They opted, however, for totally different alternatives: the Flemish for the Far Right, the Walloons for the ecologists. The outcome of the provincial elections in the bilingual province of Brabant neatly mirrors these tendencies. In 1991 the outcome of the provincial elections showed a profile quite different from that of the national elections which were held on the same day. This is explained by the fact that the Flemish party Rossem, which won 3.2% of the votes, only ran for the national elections and not for the provincial elections. Hence, a considerable difference in voting behaviour on the national versus the local level. The comparison of the results of the national elections with those of the provincial confirms the claim that smaller parties generally score better at a lower level. In 1991 it can, however, not be said that the bigger parties did better on the national level.