Governance is a human activity and is therefore unquestionably about relationships. Relationships between public and private parties. Relationships in existing steering-oriented structures (the political administrator as guardian, magistrate) and also relationships in new forms of cooperation that are often focused on good relationships (government participation). Public-private partnerships are inevitably accompanied by conflicting interests that place different demands on interactions. One-size-fits-all does not fit there, but customization is required, with constant alignment with what is – and what is not (yet). And so the ability to make contact requires much more attention, and from there to explore and grasp perspectives. How do you work on the tensions that you find on your way? It is there that the method of communication influences how the process of cooperation and steering proceeds. This is not a matter of whether-or, but and-and. Both perspectives are characterized by a different relationship with those involved and a different way of contact and interaction. This article focuses on contact from a collaborative perspective. The classical administrative side already has a rich history, while the cooperation side is often still an unknown and unexplored territory. The central question is: how can you, as a director and public professional, deliver tailor-made solutions and therefore adapt to complex tasks? The authors look at complex situations from a communicative perspective and they introduce ‘appreciative communication’ as the art of aligning with what really moves people, as a frame of view of the inconvenience caused by the differences present. They highlight a number of generic tensions that can arise in cooperation situations. A case study into the approach to regional innovation in the field of mobility serves as an illustration.

In the implementation of the Dutch Youth Act, since the so-called ‘transition’ of 2015 under the responsibility of the municipalities, there are three major problems: the municipalities are short of money, the implementation of youth aid is accompanied by high administrative burdens and there are serious quality concerns, especially where different care providers must work together for one client. This article deals with the possibilities of the economic transaction cost theory for realizing improvements through organizing more effective collaboration between municipalities and healthcare providers. Transactions are a ‘forgotten’ cost source. There are three sources of transaction costs: limited rationality, opportunistic behavior and ‘asset specificity.’ In this article the authors analyze twelve problems documented in the literature on youth care from this perspective. This creates a framework from which municipalities can tackle these problems in order to improve the quality of youth care, to keep costs under control and to reduce the administrative burden. In a number of sectors and large projects ‘linking zones’ appear to be a way to increase the trust between players in a chain, so that transaction costs fall. Where poor cooperation between chain partners in youth care is a major cause of the problems, municipalities can make significant gains by establishing linking zones with care providers contracted by them. This article outlines the method in a linking zone.

In dit artikel gaan we in op de aanleiding voor het onderzoek dat wij in 2016 uitvoerden naar het programma Stad en Regio van de provincie Gelderland en de uitkomsten van het onderzoek. Daarnaast laten we zien hoe we hebben ingezet op de doorwerking van het onderzoek, ook buiten het provinciehuis. Die doorwerking leidde uiteindelijk tot het winnen van de Goudvink, de prijs voor het beste rekenkamerrapport.

Singapore and the Netherlands are small, export- and trade-dependent countries that perform excellently in many areas, such as good governance and integrity, policy effectiveness, liveability, innovation, and e-government. At the same time there are clear differences in political culture and history: Singapore has a more authoritarian governance style including limitations in press freedom, freedom of speech, and political activism. Within these contrasting contexts, both countries have introduced and implemented similar public management reforms since the 1990s. The aim of these reforms is to maintain public service excellence in a dynamic environment but the countries make contrasting choices in achieving this aim. This article describes how administrative excellence is organised and pursued in Singapore and identifies five lessons for the Netherlands: (1) Use positive narratives about government often; (2) be nuanced about capping top-level remuneration; (3) enhance the attractiveness of government as an employer; (4) invest in life-long learning; (5) be an authoritative expert amidst horizontalisation hypes.

South Africa underwent an unprecedented transition in 1994. The country changed from the Apartheid regime into a system founded on the principles of the rule of law and equal treatment for all. Along with this political regime change, a wide range of social rights were included in the Constitution, which grants al citizens a constitutional right to a wide range of social services. Moreover, the system of governance and organisation of services was designed according to the latest insights from the then emerging new public management paradigm. Now, twenty years later, the system is crumbling; many of the basic services are not properly provided to citizens. Partly, this is a consequence of a basic absence of integrity in parts of the political class and in elements of the civil service. However, as we illustrate in a case analysis of the Water Boards in the Western Cape Province, the problem is also a consequence of the design of the system of governance. The combination of unlimited constitutional access to services and a stringent regime of new public management principles in the organisation of service provision has led to a serious crisis of performance. Therefore, the solution for the problem may be to redesign the system according to other governance principles, such as learning governance and networked governance.

In the past years, Flemish municipalities have been confronted with a plethora of new public management reforms. The two probably most salient reforms include the introduction of a strategic planning system entitled the policy and management cycle (PMC) as well as the provision of financial incentives for municipalities that undertake a merger. These reforms are not unique to the Flemish context. Indeed, similar reforms took place in the Netherlands, where policy and management instruments (PMI) – a strategic planning system – were introduced in the eighties and municipal mergers have been part of the political agenda for several decades. But similar reforms also took place in, for instance, the United Kingdom (i.e. the best value regime in 1999) as well as Denmark (i.e. the municipal mergers in 2007). In this essay, these Flemish reforms are critically evaluated, taking into account following question: which public values are triggered through these reforms, and what might this imply for the Flemish and Dutch local public sector? This essay uses new public governance principles such as strategic thinking and the learning organisation to answer this question.

In international comparative research, a dominant image often emerges of Denmark as a frontrunner in innovative governance, gaining top results in international rankings.
Based on four recent examples of national public reforms, this article studies the dynamics of reform implementation in Denmark, which can be characterised as expeditious and efficient. Three explanatory factors are discussed: a political, systemic and managerial factor. What is Denmark, a country in many ways similar to the Netherlands, doing differently? The article concludes that, for the Netherlands, the guiding element of Danish public reforms can be found not in the results of these reforms, but in the efficiency with which they are implemented.

The democratic deficit is generally observed to be one of the largest challenges facing the European Union. This is in spite of the fact that the member states introduced transparency in 1992 to address this legitimacy problem. This article asks why, after several decades, the transparency policy has still not delivered on its promise. In doing so, it bases itself on new empirical data that was collected in the context of a recently presented dissertation (Hillebrandt, 2017), while drawing a strict distinction between the empirical policy change question and the normative desirability question. From a longitudinal comparative analysis, a differentiated empirical image arises. On the one hand, a clear enhancement of legislative transparency can be discerned; on the other hand, a plurality of transparency-evasive practices has emerged in the area of non-legislative decision-making. This equivocal image supports contrasting normative responses, according to which transparency is respectively cast as an indispensable ideal, a fiction, or a solution in search of a problem.

In this special issue, recent public sector reforms in South Africa, Denmark, Belgium, Mexico, Singapore and Denmark are analysed. Reforms in the public sector are by and large explained as a chronological development from traditional bureaucracy, via New Public Management to New Public Governance. This is also the way the many administrative reforms in the Dutch public sector are often explained.
The articles give insight in the administrative developments in these countries and their background. They also offer the opportunity to make comparisons with administrative developments in the Netherlands, and to draw lessons. The analyses show that the dominant explanation of reforms in the public sector (from traditional bureaucracy, to New Public Management to New Public Governance) is helpful in making sense of administrative developments, but they put this explanation into perspective too.
For the Dutch situation yet another insight came to light. We often complain that the Dutch processes are cumbersome, take long and involve many -if not all- stakeholders. A close reading of the contributions from abroad must inevitably change this pejorative view on our national sport: the cumbersome process provides valuable checks and balances, that will help to fight the drawbacks and risks that we have seen in the international cases.

Since the late eighties, Mexico has experienced profound economic modernisation and political democratisation. However, the corresponding administrative reforms have lagged: professionalisation of the public sector, improvement of public service delivery and development of modern management principles are plagued by a lack of coherence, implementation, and continuity. This can be traced back to several historically rooted and structural characteristics of Mexican public administration, which reproduce vicious circles of low trust and dysfunction. For example, (1) the extreme spoils system maintains a culture of distrust towards civil servants; (2) Mexico’s weak state capacity is a consequence of a lack of collective action, but also further undermines citizens’ trust in government; (3) strong labour unions are a response to poor labour rights, but also uphold a system of capture and confrontation; and (4) corruption is inevitable if cooperation depends on personal loyalties.

The introduction of the euro led to large macroeconomic imbalances between Euro countries. Under pressure from the euro crisis, the European Commission adopted EU regulations 1174/2011 and 1176/2011 in 2011 with the aim of reducing these macroeconomic imbalances. These measures include the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure to identify macroeconomic imbalances and, if necessary, to prompt Member States to take corrective action. This article provides an overview of this recent EU policy for countering imbalances and provides a political-economic analysis of the macroeconomic imbalances in Europe and its consequences. In particular, it focuses on the conflicting interests of the euro-area countries with current account surpluses and deficits. This article also analyses the possibilities offered by the 2019 European election for European policy makers to strengthen this policy. The article concludes that the surplus countries, despite the apparent advantage of trade balance surpluses, do have an interest in reducing imbalances in the EU but fail to translate this into actual policy. The Commission’s role in reducing imbalances is likely to remain limited, even after the 2019 European elections.

Reflection and debate initiates academically inspired discussions on issues that are on the current policy agenda.

The European project currently faces not only an economic crisis, but a moral one as well. The economic growth model of social justice combined with market-oriented policies, also referred to as the European social model has lost much of its meaning after ten years of austerity and financial calamities. In 2012 ECB President Draghi says in the Wall Street Journal that the European social model is “gone”, a thing of the past. While only a couple of years later the European Pillar of Social Rights is put in place. What is happening with ‘Social Europe’? And how do trade unions, as a historical motor of social policy in the member states, relate to the European social model, especially since the financial crisis. This article deals with the position of trade unions vis-à-vis European social policy and the European institutions. The European social model, economic governance and the collective bargaining system are discussed as examples of post-crisis European social policy. It will be argued that although the European Commission gives institutional space to social policy and to a role for trade unions, it has always been subordinate to economic integration. And moreover that the recent economic crisis is used at the European level to obtain almost complete control over social policy in the member states.