The aggression and violence towards political office-holders underline the importance of rethinking public authority. This essay contains an exploration of contemporary sources of authority for political office-holders and especially local executives. This is done on the basis of a review of the literature and an analysis of empirical research in this area. After an exploration of the sources of authority for Dutch mayors and aldermen, these sources of authority are related towards aggression and violence towards political office-holders with the help of the political theory of Chantal Mouffe. Based on this exploration the author argues that political office-holders who invoke generally accepted principles, values and norms, or who use personal sources of authority, are more favorable in the struggle against aggression and violence than other local executives who invoke institutional or delegated sources.

Worldwide, cities are becoming increasingly important in global networks. The rise of cities and urban regions is widely described in academic literature. Cities are becoming essential players in networks on three scales: on an international scale as a hub in global networks, on a regional scale in partnerships as a consequence of the necessity of upscaling and on a local scale, in cooperation with citizens. This article addresses what this rise of the city, operating in complex networks on different scales, means for the position and tasks of the mayor, as a representative of the city. The article describes the modern challenges for the mayoral function and role in an emerging network society and addresses the growing importance of strong personal and transactional leadership while operating in networks both inside and outside the municipality.

In this closing article we summarize the results of the individual articles of this themed issue and draw common lessons. With regard to cities as living labs, we conclude that three challenges need more attention: (1) unclear or contradictory goals and expectations, (2) organizational confusion, and (3) the lack of institutional links. Based on these, we offer a number of recommendations for research and practice in public administration.

The first report (2013) by the Association of Netherlands Municipalities think tank deals with the question of how local governments can improve their own performance regarding the current trend of social initiatives in which citizens organize themselves to tackle problems in their neighborhoods. Kleistra and Walraven discuss the method, content and findings of the report. They question the widely used citizen perspective that is adopted by the think tank as a starting point for further research on the topic; its uncritical stance with regard to the highly debated issue of citizen participation; the limited research effort that underpins its overall findings and conclusions; and in particular its unequivocal call for large scale municipal experimenting and improvising without further elaborating on the key question of ‘how to proceed’ for the benefit of municipal policymakers. This brings them to the conclusion that the report itself generates highly relevant questions, but that these questions should be addressed more effectively than has so far been the case, by connecting in-depth empirical research on municipal performance with regard to citizens initiatives to the large body of scientific knowledge on citizen participation.

There are many practical and academic concerns about public professionals and the pressures and burdens they experience. Professional autonomies and skills are reduced, it is argued, as a result of businesslike new public management, in order to control service results. The solution is clear: organizational logics must be weakened, professional autonomies must be enlarged and professional ways of working must be ‘rescued’. In this paper we re-interpret this presumed problem by analyzing: the interaction between organizational and professional logics, by relating these to a broader institutional logic and by tracing the contribution of individual professional motivations. Professionals, it is shown, can be motivated by broader ambitions to serve society. Such public service motivation consists of three types of motives: rational/instrumental, affective and normative. Our results show that employees in different public professional services show different patterns of motives, which we mainly explain by relating their motivations to the nature of the services they render – whether they render people-changing or people-processing services. These institutional dimensions imply that professional work can be managed, not so much by businesslike ‘market logic’ but by strengthening the meaning of the work professionals do. Professional pressures against organizations do not have to be suppressed – they can be productively used.

The Dutch government aims at a participatory society, for example by striving for a larger amount of self-responsibility in providing social care, since the introduction of the Societal Support Law (in Dutch called ‘Wet maatschappelijke ondersteuning’ or in short Wmo). Does public opinion in the Netherlands reflect this change of mentality? This article investigates (a) how far public opinion on responsibility for social care for the elderly has changed between 2003 and 2010, (b) which factors explain why some people put most responsibility on the government and others on the family and (c) which factors explain intra-individual changes of attitude. This research has used survey data from the Netherlands Kinship Panel Study (2003, 2006/07, 2010). A shift in public opinion appears to have taken place in line with government policy: less responsibility for the government and more for the family. However, a majority of the Dutch population still puts most responsibility on the government. Attitudes appear to be connected with normative motives rather than with utilitarian motives. Intra-individual changes in attitudes in the direction of less government responsibility are mainly explained by normative factors and not by factors related to self-interest.

Professionals often have problems with governmental policies they have to implement. This can lead to diminished legitimacy and lower policy performance. The goal of this article is to identify the main reasons why professionals resist implementing new policies. An interdisciplinary approach is taken. From public administration literature, I use the policy alienation model, which consists of five dimensions: strategic, tactical and operational powerlessness, societal meaninglessness and client meaninglessness. These are possible reasons why professionals resist public policies (‘resistance to change’, a concept drawn from change management literature). I test these assumptions using a survey among 1,317 healthcare professionals. The results show that when professionals experience that a policy is meaningless for society or for their own clients, they show strong resistance. A lack of perceived influence is much less important in explaining resistance, although this is partly dependent on the particular profession someone belong to. The policy alienation model can help policy makers and managers to develop policies which are accepted by professionals. The article ends with practical recommendations for policy makers, managers and professionals.

Since Pim Fortuyn, discontent has become a central issue in public and political debates in the Netherlands. The government tries to ban out all risks and polarisation between citizens, because it fears this will have a destabilising impact on society. However, these measures do not seem to decrease discontent. In this article, we analyse why discontent so persistently keeps dominating debates. We argue that it is prominently and continuously expressed due to the position of opinion polls and the interaction between politicians, journalists and citizens and due to the platform that social media offer. But meanwhile, means to convert discontent into constructive, collective action are diminishing. As a result we continuously gather superficial information about people’s discontent. In order not to hinder constructive debates with this kind of information, as happens in current political discussions, different and more detailed information about the public opinion is needed. Politicians and researchers should make a more clear distinction between discontent itself and the incapacity of citizens to deal with it. Moreover, a revitalisation of the role of civil organisations is important to channel discontent.

The (changing) relations between citizens and administration are in the middle of attention and therefore the Dutch cabinet indicated in a white paper on ‘do-democracy’ (that is a literal translation of the Dutch word “Doe-democratie”) its willingness to contribute actively to the transition to more ‘do-democracy’ (a form of co-decision making of citizens by handling societal issues themselves). In a number of examples the cabinet showed which possibilities it sees to support civilian forces, but also mentioned several dilemmas, risks and objections it brings about. The white paper received praising as well as critical reactions. Especially from the critical reactions we can learn in which respects further action or reflection is necessary. To stimulate thinking and especially doing this article treats four criticisms not enough dealt with in the white paper itself: 1) ‘do-democracy’ is just a cover-up for expenditure cuts; 2) ‘do-democracy’ does a moral appeal on (affective) citizenship; 3) ‘do-democracy’ is reserved for the wealthy and the high-educated: a ‘do-aristocracy’; 4) it not a real form of democracy, because no control is handed over. To help our government every criticism is accompanied by a reply. In a short conclusion the author (himself secretary of the white paper) calls the government to make a start with the actual implementation of the ideas of the white paper.

More than twelve years after the appearance of the report of the Dutch Committee on the Future of Government Communication (‘Commissie Toekomst Overheidscommunicatie’) communication as the responsibility of the government is an important issue of debate and a discipline that is alive and kicking. We may even conclude that communication – in the terminology of this report – has conquered a place in the heart of policy. A lot is still unclear about the communicative function of government. On the normative question ‘why should the government communicate’ diverging answers are possible. However, the question is hardly discussed in practice and in science. For this reason the positioning of government communication as a separate discipline is also unclear. Reflection on the elementary values behind the discipline can reveal themes that have been invisible so far. The article investigates which values and motives are attached in theory and in practice to communication as a governmental function. For this reason a content analysis has been carried out of a number of volumes of five Dutch magazines (practical and scientific). The authors conclude that for professionals communication mainly is an instrument to support policy goals. The possibility to make a purposeful contribution with government communication to democratic values hardly is brought about, not so much in Communication Science as in Public Administration.

The traditional authority of mayors and aldermen is readily challenged. Formal positions do no longer constitute authority. For that reason, new political repertoires are being sought after and are being developed by local political-executive leaders. This article analyses and compares the sources of authority for mayors and aldermen: how can they develop, maintain, and strengthen their authority? It develops an innovative typology of sources of authority. A distinction is made between institutional, positional, and personal sources of authority. The model is applied to the mayors and aldermen in relation to relevant socio-political developments that affect the two offices. It is found that the authority of mayors rests on institutional sources of authority more so than that of aldermen. For the latter, positional and personal sources of authority are more important. At the same time, personal sources of authority have become very important for mayors as well as aldermen. The results call upon mayors and aldermen’s skills and competences to develop personal authority through persuasion.

Over the past decade, policy attention for ‘active citizenship’ and ‘bottom up’ citizen initiatives has strongly increased. Nowadays, governments tend to approach citizens more and more as practical ‘doers’: as active citizens that can initiate projects in the public domain – for instance to increase the livability of their neighborhood. The dominant policy perspective on what is called the ‘democracy of action’ is one of a small government (to make room for a ‘big society’) that is not directive but supportive to active citizens.
In this article, we first argue that in practice we observe two ‘silent ideologies’ that suppress this policy perspective of the democracy of action. We call these the silent ideologies of ‘professional centralism’ and of ‘instrumental support’; we claim that in practice these ideologies enable the dominance of professionals over citizen initiatives (and nót that of the citizens). Second we state that the policy perspective of the democracy of action itself contains a silent ideology: it assumes a highly depoliticized form of citizenship. In the short term, this may be convenient for administrators and policy makers but in the long run this can lead to a less democracy because the voices of critical citizens are not heard.

Onderzoek van Bureau Onderzoek en Statistiek van de gemeente Amsterdam en het Verwey-Jonker Instituut wijst uit dat het ervaren van overlast door kinderen en jongeren een van de belangrijkste oorzaken van spanningen tussen bevolkingsgroepen in buurten is. De mate van publieke familiariteit is bepalend voor de mate waarin deze overlast voor spanningen zorgt. In buurten met weinig publieke familiariteit (her)kennen bewoners elkaar niet en voelen ze zich niet vertrouwd. Ze durven jongeren en hun ouders niet aan te spreken, waardoor het ervaren van jeugdoverlast kan leiden tot opgekropte irritaties en spanningen. Hetzelfde geldt voor buurten waar bewoners weinig ruggensteun ervaren van instanties. Bewoners hebben het gevoel dat hun meldingen van overlast niet serieus genomen worden en dat ze er alleen voor staan, wat leidt tot frustraties en spanningen.

The involvement of citizens in discussions about policy arrangements has been growing in the past decades. These forums of decision-making often provoke criticism because of a so-called ‘lack of representativeness’. Often a small group of active citizens takes the lead and decides which problems have to be dealt with. Some active residents primarily focus on improving the neighbourhood, regardless of whether their activities have everyone’s consent. This raises many questions related their representativeness. Do these participants form an adequate cross-section of the population? Are they speaking on behalf of others? Maybe passive citizens feel fine with the opinions of active citizens and agree that a small group of citizens is taking the lead. In this paper these active citizens are viewed as ‘trustees’: informal representatives who take responsibility to look after the neighbourhood’s interests, expecting that passive residents would support their efforts. The paper has two central questions: First, which ideas do active participants have about representation and representativeness? Second, in what respects can active citizens be characterized as ‘trustees’? In the theoretical part we contend that the notion ‘trustee’ may function as a theoretical framework to understand present-day citizen participation. In local policy networks many informal representatives express views and interests that are recognizable for many citizens. They are trusted, as long as their activities can be checked. The second part of the paper focuses on three projects of citizen decision-making within local safety policies (The Dutch cities Amsterdam, Deventer and Rotterdam). Within these projects, participants prioritize what kinds of activities and interventions police officers and other frontline workers should carry out. A main finding is that many active citizens function as contact persons who are continuously available for other residents. They do not wish to speak ‘on behalf’ of others but they are bestowed – often reluctantly – with the role of representative, as they demonstratively express neighborhood interests (‘clean, intact and safe’). Their reputation seems to be decisive.

Over the last decades an increasing number of mergers and acquisitions between Dutch healthcare organizations has taken place (up scaling). More recently there is a rise in the numbers of new small-scale healthcare organizations and small-scale care facilities (down scaling in the numbers). The wide variety of scales, each with its pros, cons and (historical) contexts, makes the existence of one optimal scale an illusion. Our research question is: when, and on the basis of which values, is scale of healthcare organizations legitimate? We answer this question by analyzing 650 newspaper articles from fourteen national newspapers. By using theory about legitimacy and values, we argue that five values underlie the public discussion on scale: governance, the human size, quality of care, market power and efficiency. We conclude that achieving legitimate scale involves dealing with those five values, which are not always commensurable and sometimes conflicting. With this article we contribute to the scientific debate about scale and values. We also give recommendations to policy makers and executives that can be used to improve the legitimacy of scale decisions.

The recent scholarly debate on policies and discourses with regard to citizenship in the Netherlands point to a moralization or culturalization of citizenship. This article aims to contribute to this debate by zooming into the current contents of citizenship education. We make a comparative analysis of the contents of textbooks for citizenship education that are used for civic integration courses for migrants and for primary and secondary school students in the Netherlands. Our findings show that citizenship has indeed gained a moral content in both contexts but that the difference lies in the norms that are stressed and how they are conveyed to the target population of future citizens. Whereas civic integration books for migrants emphasize the importance of learning local procedures and habits in order to belong to the Dutch national community, primary and secondary school books underscore the importance of dealing with cultural diversity in the multicultural society.

In recent decades, professionals in the public sector have been faced with increasingly detailed demands concerning accountability and performance. It is often argued that this increased accountability and its bureaucratic pressures limit professionals’ discretionary space and autonomy. However, this critique is hardly based on empirical research on the experiences and perceptions of professionals themselves. In this article we present an investigation into these perceptions and experiences with accountability in one particular brand of the public sector, namely youth care.
Our research indicates that professionals in youth care are hardly interested in greater autonomy or discretion. They rather want clarity, security and options for learning. Moreover, we found ‘bureaucratic attachment’: attachment to bureaucratic procedures particularly as a reaction to increased fears to be sued when something goes wrong with clients. In the recurrent arguments for reduction of bureaucracy, this other face of bureaucracy is often disregarded.
Regarding working conditions however, the professionals we interviewed do want more discretion. Especially concerning occupation of beds, as the requirement for permanent occupation is viewed to augment risk. We therefore argue for better backing of professionals in youth, for a more precise battle against unnecessary bureaucracy, and for professionalization in order to handle more discretion.

Currently the Dutch government funds dozens of social interventions designed to tackle polarization and radicalization issues. It is still unknown whether the assumptions underlying these interventions are valid. This article puts the theories of change of such interventions to the test. Underlying causal assumptions of four dominant Dutch social policies were confronted with scientific evidence: (1) the system-based approach, (2) peer mediation, (3) intergroup contact and (4) self-esteem enhancement. System-based approaches – comparable to multi-systemic therapy (MST) – seem effective in reducing extremist behaviour in radical youth, but do not necessarily lead to an ideological change. In peer mediation, the causal link between the deployment of young people and the positive outcomes of such methods remains unclear. Peer mediation is also more likely to contribute in conflicts that have not yet escalated. Intergroup contact reduces prejudices about other groups, but has a limited effect. There is also no evidence for a long term effect and positive outcomes of intergroup contact do not automatically apply to adolescents. Finally, it is questionable that enhancing the self-esteem of (moslim) youth makes them more resilient against radical tendencies. In the same vein, the scientific evidence is ambiguous about whether increasing self-esteem results in social desirable behaviour or improved social relations.

In their book Diploma Democracy Mark Bovens and Anchrit Wille state that positions in the field of politics are dominantly held by people with higher levels of education. Because of diverging political preferences between citizens with a higher level of education and those with a lower one this results in a lack of representation of the latter, they argue. Tonkens replies to this position from a perspective of active citizenship.