It has been claimed by politicians as well as researchers that economic openness poses a threat to the welfare state. This article investigates whether there is such a threat. Based on the literature four different hypotheses are distinguished; economic openness is negatively, positively, curvilinear or not related to the welfare state. The first and the third hypothesis state that economic openness does threaten the welfare state, whereas the other two hypotheses argue that this is not the case. The empirical studies investigating the relationship between economic openness and the welfare state are systematically reviewed in this article. The analysis shows that economic openness does not threaten the welfare state.

The EU is one example of how national states try to manage transnational problems. Countless national civil servants meet in EU working groups and committees with representatives of (non-governmental) organisations to exchange information, harmonise policies and regulations, and decide on implementation. To what extent and in which way do Dutch civil servants participate in these networks? How are their activities steered by politicians? One of the main conclusions of this study is that public policymaking within highly Europeanised departments is highly embedded within these transnational government networks, whereas policymaking within weakly Europeanised departments is to a substantial degree shielded from these government networks for reasons of, among others, the protection of national sovereignty of the Member State in their field.

The application to animals of biotechnological techniques raises moral dilemmas and requires collective agreements. Under what circumstances, for example, are applications permissible? The technological and ethical complexity of biotechnology makes it difficult to arrive at such agreements. With the recent Animal Biotechnology Act, the Dutch Minister of Agriculture has created an arrangement that should facilitate social learning. Did the arrangement work out as planned? This evaluation study demonstrates that very little substantive learning has taken place: positions have become more rigid and antagonists continue to contest one another in a legal discourse. The legalization has hindered learning processes but presents the opportunity for a polarized debate to be conducted within the same institutional framework.

In this article the question of bureaucratic autonomy of Europeanised civil servants is addressed. As a test bed we examine the political and administrative steering and control of Dutch national civil servants who are seconded to the European Commission (SNEs). The empirical analysis benefits from survey data (N = 90) and interview data (N = 28), acquired from both present and former Dutch SNEs. Based on this material we argue that despite the formal impossibility of steering and control from the member state, in practice SNEs do fulfill a bridging function between the two levels of governance. This may happen by means of frontloading (either consciously, after instructions from the national administration; or unconsciously, as a result of their national-cultural perspective) and signaling (transmitting strategic information and positions from one level of governance to the other). Although the SNEs' contacts within the Commission are generally preserved after the expiration of the secondment, the intensity of the contacts with other types of actors within the policy network mostly decrease rapidly.

The degree to which individuals accept to face risks appears to be declining. Therefore, individuals put pressure on the government to take measures to reduce risks. The risk society tends to be associated with an instrumental view on criminal law, i.e. risk reduction is considered the main goal of criminal law. In this article factors that may cause a reduction in risk acceptance are investigated. Moreover, implications in the field of civil and administrative law are discucced.

Although long recognized as beneficial, a global language has not come to fruition despite considerable past efforts. A major reason is that many policy makers and citizens fear that such a universal language would undermine the particularistic, constituting primary languages of local and national communities. This dilemma can be greatly diminished by a two tier approach, in which efforts to protect the primary language will be intensified but all the nations involved would agree to use the same second language as the global one. Although theoretically the UN or some other such body could choose such a language, in effect English is increasingly occupying this position. However, policies that are in place slow down the development of a global language, often based on the mistaken assumption that people can readily gain fluency in several languages.

Horizontal governance arrangements potentially conflict with the very principles of representative democracy and, likewise, with the existing political institutions. This conflict manifests itself in the interaction between representatives and the executive power: although the former have the formal power, the latter participates in horizontal networks and therefore has the resources that are necessary to form good policy. This erodes the power position of representatives. Frame work setting is commonly suggested as an arrangement for representatives to enhance their grip on policy processes in network-settings. The authors of this contribution examine the effects of frame setting as coupling mechanism between horizontal networks and vertical politics in six policy processes in a Dutch Province. Based on both theory and research findings they redefine the concept of framework setting in order to make it more attuned to the complex, interdependent and dynamic nature of policy-making in networks.

The Netherlands has a well-developed, internationally unique system of expert advice founded in law. In addition to being instrumental for problem solving, advisory bodies are assigned tasks in mid- and long-term strategy formulation, putting new issues on the agenda, and organizing countervailing powers and checks and balances in national policy formulation. A decade ago, the number of advisory bodies was drastically reduced. Present cabinet policy pursues a second round of slimming advisory infrastructure. Through political centralization of demand for advice, and a further reduction in the number and diversity of advisory bodies, serviceable and instrumental expert advice for policy is prioritized. In times of new wicked problems for governance, there is a serious threat of erosion of expert policy advice as countervailing power. Does the present cabinet suffer from 'anorexia consulta'?

Municipalities expect that outsourcing, autonomization and privatization will reduce costs or even create revenues. Such decisions also have costs. An analysis of 38 reports by local audit offices shows that municipalities are not aware or unable to calculate these costs. Based on thirteen cases of autonomization and privatization in a large Dutch municipality, this article shows for example that personnel costs can be very high. Municipalities should therefore make better informed decisions, based on managerial considerations, rather than political reasons.

In the Netherlands, new horizontal forms of accountability have in recent years been introduced for executive agencies. These forms of accountability address other stakeholders besides the hierarchical principal. It includes for example demonstrating responsiveness to clients, independent overseers or professional standards. In this article, two related questions are answered. At first the question is posed whether horizontal accountability can be regarded as a substitute for democratic accountability or as complementary to it. The second question is how their introduction fits with traditional (vertical) forms of accountability. The article is based on a qualitative research that was carried out in 2005 and 2006 on nine large Dutch executive agencies. It focuses on two types of horizontal accountability: accountability of agencies to boards and to an independent evaluation committee ('visitation'). The article concludes that horizontal accountability is best regarded as complementary to democratic accountability. Horizontal accountability has added value because it invokes learning processes. In addition, the introduction of horizontal forms of accountability creates a redundant accountability regime for executive agencies in which they account for the same actions to different accountees. Redundancy has the advantages that it mitigates information asymmetry and incorporates the different expectations for agencies.

Demand-steering policies in healthcare are understandable but problematic answers to the desire for democratization that dates from the seventies of the former century. Prominent critics such as Achterhuis and Illich were very critical of the undemocratic character of health care. Yet their romantic idea of society excused them from the need to articulate democratic alternatives. The empty space that they left was filled by the concept of demand-steering. Demand-steering, however, rather than strengthening democratic practices, merely undermines them, by preferring exit above voice, by putting up new bureaucratic barriers between clients and professionals and by undermining the quality of the relationship between clients and professionals.

Doing more justice to the democratic impulse is possible and desirable. A new step towards this aim is being taken by a fourth logic of steering, (next to the familiar logics of the market, bureaucracy and professionalism) that centers on improving the dialogue between clients and professionals. The one variant, democratic professionalism, starts from the position of the professional and aims at intensifying democratic control, while the other variant, collaboration, starts from the client and aims at providing him with more influence and responsibility for the health care process. This fourth logic however can only provide a new impulse to democratization when the vague notion of the dialogue is elaborated more thoroughly.

In this article, we introduce the concept of 'policy alienation'. We define policy alienation as a general cognitive state of psychological disconnection from the policy program being implemented, here by a public professional who regularly interacts directly with clients. By introducing policy alienation, we want to contribute to the contemporary debate on the role of public professionals. According to some authors, professionals are experiencing increasing pressures, as managers have turned their backs to work floors and primarily opt for results, efficiency, and transparency. Conversely, other scholars note that it is questionable whether managers can be blamed for all perceived problems at work floors and in service delivery. We are able to examine these opposing claims using the policy alienation perspective, as this perspective not only takes into account the role of management, but also the influence of policy makers and politicians, as well as the claims of the more emancipated clients. After conceptualizing policy alienation, we use a case of insurance physicians and labor experts to illustrate how the concept can be researched empirically.

In the Netherlands, an ambitious policy goal of 1,000 MW of wind power capacity by the year 2000 had already been formulated in 1985 and remained the official basis for wind energy policy until 2000. The pace of realisation of wind turbines however did not keep up with this policy objective. An important reason is that it proves difficult to provide enough locations for wind turbines in spatial plans. Over the last 15 years two covenants have been concluded between the Dutch central government and provinces in order to overcome this problem: the 1991-Governmental Agreement on Planning Problems Wind Energy (BPW), and the 2001-Governmental Agreement on the National Development Wind Energy (BLOW). In the BLOW provinces have agreed to work towards the realisation of wind turbines with a total capacity of 1,500 MW in 2010. For this purpose provinces need the co-operation of municipalities, wind power project developers and local communities. Municipalities have a crucial role because of their discretion of detailed allocation of land use in local spatial plans. They are no partners to the covenant however. Provinces can use several governance strategies for mobilising co-operation: from top-down governance in which provinces specify locations to bottom-up approaches in which the initiatives are left to municipalities and project developers. This paper compares both covenants and assesses the effectiveness of different governance strategies employed by three distinct provinces.

Traditionally, technological transitions in infrastructure bound sectors are matters for the private sector. History teaches us that as soon as technological transitions proved successful, government sooner or later got involved with the distribution. Most of this involvement, both in history and now, has taken the form of public regulation with the help of various formal legal instruments.

This article aims to answer three questions, namely (1) what ideational and materials drives can be distinguished in the government's involvement in these technological transitions, (2) through what legal instruments are these objectives expressed and how , and (3) what are the incentives of these formal legal instruments on innovative private entrepreneurs for their further technological pursuits. How were their behavioural options affected by the use of statutory acts, concessions, permits and/or licences? Incentives to private innovators are qualified as positive, neutral or negative. The research method chosen has been inspired by insights from legal sociology, public choice theory and strategic actor behaviour in qualitative simulation-games, but follows distinct methodological steps. Throughout the article a case study on the transition from telegraphy to telephony in The Netherlands will be used to illustrate the discussion.

The EU is transforming the function and power of the Dutch parliament as an institution, and the way in which its principal actors, the governing and opposition parliamentary party groups, interact with each other and the government. This article seeks to address the question: How does parliamentary scrutiny over EU decision-making function in the Netherlands and how has this new role for parliament changed both parliamentary and executive relations in the country and the interaction of parties in parliament? For the purposes of this research, this paper uses the typology of King. The author has conducted a number of in-depth interviews with Dutch MPs. Overall, this article concludes the process of parliamentary scrutiny over EU matters in the Netherlands is no longer exclusively about finding a national consensus towards the outside world, but increasingly mirrors the rough and tumble of normal, domestic politics.