In this paper we analyze Fortuyn’s political inheritance in the Netherlands. Going beyond the mere electoral popularity of his neo-rightist successors, we analyze the changing political culture since Fortuyn entered the political stage. More specifically we show that his ideological beliefs – Fortuyn voiced an unprecedented combination of liberal views towards homosexuals and gender equality with critical views pertaining to immigration, and he was critical of political and administrative elites – caught on in current Dutch politics. Moreover, his highly personal communicative style, placing him outside the inner circle of Dutch politics underscoring his adversity to these political elites, also caught on in mainstream political campaigning. This new personal style, however, did not mean a demise of ideology. On the contrary, Fortuyn actively tried to appeal to the electorate with ideals and ideology – hence marking the rebirth of the so-called ‘fact-free politics’ after the de-ideologized purple governments in the Netherlands. Since Fortuyn, mainly parties on the right side of the political spectrum have followed this path of re-ideologization. The paper ends with a comparison of the counterculture originating in the 1960s and post-Fortuyn right-wing politics, which surprisingly shows great continuity. We therefore argue that we are currently witnessing a veritable counterculture 2.0.

For several years, Dutch and international survey research programmes, such as the European Values Studies, the Eurobarometer, and the Dutch Parliamentary Elections Studies, have registered the judgements of (Dutch) citizens regarding a wide variety of topics. The Legitimacy-monitor Democratic Governance (Hendriks, Van Ostaaijen & Boogers, 2011) assembles those statistics that together present a layered picture of the legitimacy of democratic governance in the eyes of Dutch citizens. For this article, we review those statistics and take the ‘Fortuyn-year 2002’, the year in which Fortuyn shook up Dutch politics, as a demarcation point. Among the many continuities in pre- and post-Fortuyn statistics, we register a number of marked changes in the judgements of citizens regarding democratic governance in the Netherlands. The most salient, we conclude, is the growing thirst for vigorous ‘leadership’, which not only breaks with the trend of several decades (ever weaker preference for strong leadership), but also the logic of Dutch consensus democracy (many hands and not one head).

When people think of Pim Fortuyn, most of them mainly remember his national campaign and (electoral) debates. However, Fortuyn also had an impact in local politics. With the local party Liveable Rotterdam (Leefbaar Rotterdam) he won the 2002 Rotterdam municipal elections with almost 35 procent of the votes and was involved in coalition talks with the Liberal Party and the Christian Democratic Party. Without Fortuyn, who was murdered in 2002, Liveable Rotterdam was able to implement several parts of its electoral programme (Van Ostaaijen 2010, 2011). But Fortuyn’s anti-establishment attitude was not unprecedented at the local level. Many local parties, meaning parties not affiliated to a national party, already portrayed styles of anti-establishment, especially the so-called ‘Liveable’ (Leefbaar) parties. In this article, the development of those parties, mainly since 2002, is described and discussed. The electoral results of these parties are, where possible, linked or hypothesised to the rise of Fortuyn.

The Dutch electorate is the most volatile of Western Europe. At its height in 2002 more than 30 percent of the seats in the Dutch Lower House changed to another party. But what does the increased electoral volatility mean? Are volatile voters whimsical, behaving randomly like drift-sand? Or are volatile voters emancipated, no longer committed to a single political party but still loyal to their own preferences?We answer these questions by analysing the 1VOP panel data set, which covers 55.847 adult respondents who participated in at least 2 of the 58 waves between November 2006 and June 2010.First, we assess the presence, frequency, and direction of changes in voters’ party preferences. More than half of the respondents (52 percent) changed party preference at least once. However, they mostly stick to one of two ideologically coherent party blocks.Second, we explain why some voters are more likely to change party preference than others. Especially middle groups are volatile: people with modal income and average levels of education, and people who position themselves in the political center. However, the lower educated are more likely to switch between dissimilar parties. These findings support the view that increased volatility reflects voter emancipation.

In deze bijdrage plaatsen we de gezagscrisis van de hedendaagse wetenschap in cultuur en politiek in een breder, cultuursociologisch perspectief.

This study analyses the news coverage of female politicians in Flanders (Belgium). We investigate whether the deficiency of media attention for female politicians is due to structural factors or whether the news media themselves create a gender bias. For this purpose, we examine eleven possible explanations for the gender bias. On one hand the characteristics of the politicians, such as their function, can influence their news exposure and on the other hand the features of the news media, such as the broadcasting station, can be of importance. Overall, our evidence suggests that mainly the function determines the news exposure of female politicians and not their gender. Nevertheless, female politicians still get less speaking time, even when controlling for all other variables. We can conclude that a real gender bias exists in the Flemish television news: journalists and editors give significantly less attention to female politicians compared to their male colleagues.

In this paper we study both long term and short term individual effects of political participation at the local level. Participatory theorists argue that political participation could lead to individual emancipation in terms of a rise of political knowledge and, in the long term, political trust. Indeed, in the short term the increased political knowledge associated with participation might enable citizens to better define their self-interest, which may be inconsistent with actual policies pursued by the local authorities and thus might be conductive to distrust. In the empirical part we will test these assertions using two-wave panel data for a random sample of 457 individuals in the district of Deurne (Antwerp – Belgium). Our results suggest that in the short term participation leads to more local political knowledge and distrust in the local administration. However, we do not find a significant increase in political trust in the long term.

This paper reviews developments in political-administrative relations in Dutch central government from 2002-2012. It highlights the strengths/weaknesses of Dutch structures and processes in managing the interface between ministers and the public service. It signals a number of key trends in the political context of executive government that are going to put pressure on the status quo, and examines the much more centralised and politically orchestrated Australian system for pointers towards possible ways in which these contextual changes are going to be.

Urban government is expected to contribute to the solution of major urban problems. At the same time, urban government is riddled with problems itself, often denoted in terms of governing and democratic deficits. In this article, options for governance reform in the urban realm are being explored along five lines, following up on recent research in the Netherlands and abroad. Both more aggregative arrangements (electronic ‘straw polls’, knowledge polls, prediction markets, ‘dot gov’ competitions for ‘best solutions’) and more collaborative arrangements (electronic co-creation, wiki governance, vital coalitions, urban regimes) are being assessed. The conclusions is that there are good arguments for, at least, more experimentation along these lines - not only from a functionalistic, but also from a democratic and social-psychological point of view.

Sustainability, the question of how our system of prosperity could be maintained, is one of the main issues of the coming decades. To combine economic growth and a pleasant environment, society needs to scale back its resource use and the ensuing pressures on the environment, by a factor of five. The challenge is to do more with less; something for which there is no instant solution. The city is the place where this change will begin, not by ‘big’ government with ‘big’ plans, but by the energetic society. Citizens and the business community are motivated by their wish for a clean economy and a pleasant living environment. The rise of the information society has increased their ability to exchange knowledge and ideas, releasing creativity and creating new solutions. If city governments are to tap into the strength of society, they must embrace the initiatives and join citizens and business in the empowered deliberative search for sustainable solutions. The goal of a clean economy is within reach, but it demands comprehensive physical and cultural change, in which local initiatives may lead the cultural change towards a broad vision of a strong, sustainable society. A large role for government remains, but high quality, low carbon cities may be the winners of the future.

In recent decades, professionals in the public sector have been faced with increasingly detailed demands concerning accountability and performance. It is often argued that this increased accountability and its bureaucratic pressures limit professionals’ discretionary space and autonomy. However, this critique is hardly based on empirical research on the experiences and perceptions of professionals themselves. In this article we present an investigation into these perceptions and experiences with accountability in one particular brand of the public sector, namely youth care.
Our research indicates that professionals in youth care are hardly interested in greater autonomy or discretion. They rather want clarity, security and options for learning. Moreover, we found ‘bureaucratic attachment’: attachment to bureaucratic procedures particularly as a reaction to increased fears to be sued when something goes wrong with clients. In the recurrent arguments for reduction of bureaucracy, this other face of bureaucracy is often disregarded.
Regarding working conditions however, the professionals we interviewed do want more discretion. Especially concerning occupation of beds, as the requirement for permanent occupation is viewed to augment risk. We therefore argue for better backing of professionals in youth, for a more precise battle against unnecessary bureaucracy, and for professionalization in order to handle more discretion.

In many European countries immigrants play an important role as employees in the elderly care sector. They are employed by a care providing organisation, or directly by a family as private care assistant. By contrast, in the Netherlands such a development is hardly visible. This article investigates why relatively few migrant workers are employed in Dutch elderly care. The Dutch situation is compared with developments in Italy, Great Britain and Austria. I assess explanations based on demand side, supply side and cultural factors and conclude that especially the large public investments in Dutch elderly care can explain the limited demand for migrant workers. A restrictive immigration policy and language and historical factors play only a minor role. Whether a larger demand for migrant workers will emerge in the future, therefore depends on developments in public elderly care policy.

The private security sector is rapidly growing and their operations more and more comprise policing and public order maintenance, tasks which to date have been government’s primary responsibility. Some fear this development because the private sector is characterized by market values as profitability and efficiency instead of public sector values such as lawfulness and impartiality, putting the quality of public safety at risk. In this article the professional values, norms and motivations of police officers and private security employees in the Netherlands are compared on the basis of a standardized survey. The main conclusion is that there are large differences in how both groups perceive each other, however the underlying professional morale is actually more similar than different.

Deliberative democrats claim that political deliberation among citizens increases the legitimacy of and support for democratic decision-making. The question is, however, whether deliberative democracy can realize its added value in the real world of politics where political discussion is characterized by persisting inequalities. This paper tries to contextualize the gender gap in political talk by taking into account the social (i.e., discussion networks) and political context (i.e., campaign effects) in which political debate takes place. Based on previous research we argue that women prefer to discuss politics in relatively like-minded, cohesive networks, while men prefer more confrontational networks. Moreover, we expect the gender gap to depend on the electoral context, in that the gender gap disappears in later campaign phases. These two arguments were tested and confirmed using data gathered in the Partirep Regional Election Survey in 2009.

This introductory article sketches the problématique of this special issue on ‘Subsidiarity in the European Union and beyond’. It starts with a short historical overview of the origins, meanings and implementation of the subsidiarity principle within the EU. Subsequently, it problematizes the concept and application of subsidiarity in a multilevel governance context by examining two fundamental characteristics of this essentially contested concept that render it fascinating to study: its complexity and power-relevance. The relatively new concept of global subsidiarity is briefly discussed to situate the intra-EU discussion in a wider context. This introduction ends by discussing some of the findings of the special issue’s two substantial articles – that both deal with policy topics in which different competence regimes meet – in light of the subsidiarity problématique.

In the Netherlands there is an ongoing discussion on the preferred or even necessary scale of government. Basic assumption in this decades-long discussion is that the mere seize of government affects the functioning and quality of government. This article questions that specific assumption, by applying two criteria; government performance and democratic legitimacy. It is concluded that the supposed relationship between seize and quality hardly exists, theoretically nor empirically. Recent government proposals for further up-scaling are being critically assessed. Main conclusion is that thinking in terms of scale and seize is no longer feasible in a modern network society.