

Massmedia, Propaganda and Nationalism

by Marjan MALEŠIČ

Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Social Sciences and
Head of Defence Studies Division at the University of Ljubljana, Slovenia

Introduction

This article is based upon the results of the research project "*Propaganda in War*".¹ As the title suggests, the subject of the research project was the formulation and dissemination of propaganda messages specifically related to a state of war. The research group investigated the media of Croatia and Serbia. We focused our attention on the manner in which they treat the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Briefly put, the subject under research was propaganda (as a part of psychological warfare) conducted by the mass media during war. Although we, as researchers, are fully cognizant of the fact that any propaganda campaign is waged prior to a war, throughout a war, and after armed conflict has ended; we are also aware that the mass media are by no means the only tools employed in the dissemination of propaganda, both in war and generally. The research project primarily provides a qualitative analysis of messages conveyed through the media.

We have, therefore, studied war-related propaganda disseminated via the media in countries where, for the most part, there was no war, even though the countries concerned were either indirectly involved or denied any direct involvement in the war of a neighbouring country.

When carrying out a qualitative analysis there exists a real danger of adopting a subjective approach, to the detriment of objectivity. In other words, researchers tend to fill up their own theoretical model of propaganda by selecting those parts of media messages which correspond to their expectations, i.e., those which are compatible with their model, while ignoring other parts. However, if no such theoretical model is available from the outset, it is quite probable that by the end of the research we shall end up with a model that is limited by the experience of a particular media environment (the subject of study), and as such it would be inadequate to be used for arriving at general conclusions.

In the project "*Propaganda in War*" we strove to achieve the objectivity of our research on the basis of a representative sample of the media engaged in disseminating propaganda; through the constant chronology of events in the Bosnian war, and through a conclusive theoretical concept of propaganda - all of which are preconditions for an appropriate methodological approach.

1 The research group was comprised mainly of research fellows of Defence Research Centre, Institute of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana, and of two colleagues, one from Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb, and one from Belgrade Centre for Human Rights. The members were: Marjan Malešič, Ph.D., Igor Kotnik, M.Sc., Sandra Basić, M.Sc., Zoran Krunić, B.A., Vlatko Cvrtila, M.Sc., and Branislav Milinković, M.Sc. The research was accomplished in conjunction with Styrelsen för psykologiskt försvar (SPF), Stockholm, Sweden. SPF publishes the entire report in December 1996

From the aspect of propaganda research, the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina is particularly interesting. First, in addition to the three ethnic groups (Bosnian Croats, Bosnian Serbs, and Bosnian Muslims) being direct participants in the war, other subjects were also involved, some of whom would not admitted to the fact and who masked their involvement through propaganda messages. Second, the war, which began with Serbian aggression against Bosnia-Herzegovina, gradually developed into an ethnic and a civil war where everybody was fighting everybody else ("bellum omnia contra omnes"), where allies and enemies would change places in a relatively short time span - not only at the level of the three ethnic communities, but also at local levels. Such frequent shifts in coalitions and anti-coalitions demanded a superbly well-oiled, multi-directional propaganda machinery, where from time to time everything was reduced to the question: "How can one most effectively transform an ally into an enemy, and vice versa, in the eyes of the general public?" Third, the three adversarial sides in the Bosnian war are characterized by their vast differences: civilizational (with one part of Bosnia-Herzegovina having experienced Austro-Hungarian rule, and another part having lived under Ottoman rule), religious (Catholicism among the Croats, Orthodox Christianity among the Serbs, and Islam among the Bosnian Muslims), and cultural (language, script, customs). Such fundamental differences provided an eminently sound basis for the broadcasting of propaganda messages, for apostrophizing differences and, on that basis, for presenting a justification for national homogeneity, or, put another way, for attempting to prove that a future life together is no longer possible.

This, in brief, is the context within which we carried out our study of media-based propaganda. We included in our analysis both the Croatian and Serbian printed media (dailies and weeklies) for the period January-May 1993, and main TV-news of channel One of the State Television for the period February-April 1993.

The subject of this article is the relationship between propaganda and nationalism as an ideology in the Serbian massmedia.

I. Model for a Study of Propaganda ²

As researchers, we have been fully aware of the fact that the safest guarantee for establishing an appropriate methodological concept for research into this subject would be the study of available literature on psychological/political warfare and, within the same context, a study of propaganda. ³

Serious analysis of contemporary propaganda is a complex discipline, primarily because of the use of the mass media. The issue is further complicated by the fact that the introduction of ever new technologies results in new channels of public media, which demand specific and new methods of utilization - a factor

2 In 1622 Pope Gregory XV formed a special Collegium whose task was the propagation of the Catholic faith. The name of this Collegium was *Sacra Congregatio Christiano Nomini Propaganda*, or, *Sacra Congregatio de Propaganda Fide*. The word "propaganda" stems from the Latin verb *propagare*, meaning, to spread, expand, multiply, circulate (Splichal, 1975, p.12).

3 The research team based its theoretical concept of propaganda on previous studies and analyses of the subject, first and foremost on works by Daugherty and Janowitz (1960), *A Psychological Warfare Casebook*; Splichal (1975), *Dimensions of Political Propaganda*; Curtis, (1984), *Ireland. The Propaganda War. The British Media and the Battle for Hearts and Minds*; and Jowett and O'Donnell (1986), *Propaganda and Persuasion*.

which has always been of great significance for propaganda. In the study of propaganda in Serbian media as it affects the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the following elements are of particular interest: propaganda and ideology (propaganda and nationalism, propaganda and religion, propaganda and reinterpretation of history); the use of language for propaganda purposes; the context of propaganda; propaganda organization and propagandists; the public; the level of source criticism; iconography. As a general rule the foregoing elements should not be split one from another, although to a certain degree such a separation is essential for the sake of analysis. Instead, they should all be viewed in the context of their interlinked and mutually complementary character. In this article we will explore one element of propaganda - nationalism as an ideology - in Serbian mass-media.

II. Propaganda and Ideology

Jowett and O'Donnell (1986, p. 154) quote Kecskemeti, who claims that any ideology promoted by propaganda presents the general public with a comprehensive, conceptual framework for dealing with, or obtaining an understanding of, both social and political realities. In adhering to the procedure for placing an ideology within a given context the analyst observes the situation from various angles, sets of persuasions and values, behaviour and attitudes. He also observes the modes of those perceptions and reflections on the basis of which a consensus had been achieved up to the degree where norms are created which dictate what is desirable and what is not. The main aim of a propagandist is that the people accept the ideology he presents them with.

Splichal (1975, p. 7) believes that the bourgeois revolution and the industrial revolution were crucially important to the emergence of propaganda, and especially for its vigorous development. Linked with the first of these is the appearance of mass ideologies, while the second heralded the advent of mass communication. The initial and obvious link between ideology and propaganda occurred during the French Revolution (1789)⁴ and from that point onwards this link has remained the very foundation of propaganda. Splichal points to Ellul and Domenach (1975, pp. 13) as being two Western researchers who believe the existence of social (national) myths and ideologies to be preconditions for the development of propaganda, or rather, that in order to develop, propaganda demands an ideologically saturated environment, which Serbia, as the subject of research has found in nationalism. Great myths serve to knit a people together through a commonly perceived vision of the future.

Within such a context it is important not to overlook the role of religion and the reinterpretation of history, both of which appear to play the key roles in the formulation of propagandist communications for the Serbian general public with regard to the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In addition to religion itself --and in this particular case we are speaking about Roman Catholicism, the Orthodox Church, and Islam - the role of an individual's awareness of belonging to a particular civilization is also highly significant, although this awareness is frequently the result of a specific religious attitude.⁵

⁴ For the Jacobins, propaganda was used primarily as a means of waging war against their political opponents (Noelle-Neumann and Schulz, 1971, p. 304).

⁵ For more on this subject, see S. Huntington, 1993.

In the formulation of propagandist communications the role of the interpretation of history, myths and nationalism⁶ is equally important. On the same lines, Eyal (1992, p. 82) arrived at the conclusion that the Balkans are characterized by a highly dangerous combination of conflicts determined by exclusive territorial demands and historical claims, lately clad in newly composed nationalistic ideologies. On a territory whose borders often shift and where the historical justification for such moves depends on the starting point of the main actors concerned, every nationalistic demand is, by definition, to the detriment of another people. This situation is exacerbated by the tendency displayed by some peoples in the Balkans to alter historical and national arguments in accordance with obtaining circumstances.

III. Methodology of Research

The content analysis of TV 'News of the Day' programmes was accomplished in the following way: having produced a theoretical propaganda model with a directional role, researchers viewed 33 programmes in order to formulate a general impression of the nature of such news programmes produced by Serbian Television. This was followed by a more intensive viewing of those parts of the programme which related to the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, recording impressions in keeping with the elements of the theoretical model of propaganda (as, for instance, the relationship between propaganda and nationalism, the use of language for propaganda purposes, the degree of source criticisms...). Concurrently, we identified those items in the programme which presented themselves as the most characteristic examples of propaganda; later, those items were transcribed. This was followed by an additional analysis of the content through which we subsequently obtained the most characteristic quotes from TV 'News of the Day' programmes which fitted into our theoretical model, and which at the same time expanded and complemented it.

In the continuation of the report we present those quotes in chronological order, each one being accompanied by a note in parentheses, indicating to which particular elements of the propaganda model a given quote belongs. This technique allows us, ultimately, to conclude, firstly, to what level and in what way does the 'propaganda reality' of Serbian Television respectively, correspond to our theoretical propaganda model; secondly, what are the elements on which propaganda messages are based and, thirdly, which of the propaganda elements are present in 'propaganda reality' but have not been taken into account by our model.

Sample of the Serbian printed media included one weekly: *NIN*, one bi-monthly: *Duga*, and two daily newspapers: *Večernje Novosti* and *Politika*. In total 146 articles from the Serbian press (*Nin* - 53, *Duga* - 37, *Politika* - 27, *Večernje Novosti* - 29) were covered by the analysis. All print categories were included: commentaries, interviews, statements, reportages, and reports.

The content analysis of the printed media was carried out in the following way: our start point was the same theoretical model used for analysis of television. A review of articles relating to the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina appearing in both weekly and daily newspapers during the period under analysis is followed by a selection of articles relevant to the study of propaganda. This was followed by an identical content analysis of selected articles which, in addition to allowing us to

6 For more on this subject, see P. Schlesinger, 1991 and A. Giddens, 1991.

obtain a general impression with regard to propaganda in the printed media, also enabled us to verify our theoretical propaganda model. This is followed by a selection of relevant quotes accompanied by, in our empirical presentation, by corresponding connotations relating to our model, and wider, and given in parentheses. Thus, we ascertained the degree to which the model is compatible with 'propaganda reality', and we have obtained a list of elements within the model most frequently deployed in the propaganda practice of the printed media in the country covered by the study.

IV. Serbian Massmedia and the Ideology of Nationalism

In the former Yugoslavia the all-embracing memory of nationalities, and national identification, were subjected to a rigid identification with a national State and a national history. For decades the experiences and events of the second World War were kept alive through story telling, popular songs and films which perpetuated memories of Great Events from the Revolution for the coming generations, of all the suffering and martyrdom, and of boundless love for the Leader (Father) and the Homeland (Mother).⁷

Following the total disintegration of the previous political system, the new national governments began with (re)organizing the collective memory of their respective peoples: first, they established new iconographies of their authority (markedly different flags, national anthems, uniforms, street and place names).⁸ The next phase involved the much more complex process of reinterpreting history. It is through this ever resurgent experience of the most important events defining their national history that the various States are endeavouring to establish a linearity of the national memory for future generations. Whereas the previous regime had formulated a collective memory based on rituals linked with the communist party, the new States reached far back into history to found their own res-

7 At the linguistic level there are differences between the understanding of "patrimony" or "ancestral heritage" and, in relation to that, of the concept of "Homeland." The first concept is based on the principle of a patrimonial community, of male ownership inherited through the generations (Fatherland), whereas the second concept is related to the sphere of intimacy, birth, family: hearthside, domestic circle, home, Homeland. Within a given propaganda model the first concept relates to the right to defend one's country, one's property, and the right to inheritance. It was on that basis that Dobrica Ćosić (then President of (the rump) Yugoslavia), when addressing the Belgian media stressed that "The Serbs are living on their own territory; they did not conquer it, it is their ethnic territory where they have lived for centuries. According to all the land registers 64 % of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina is in their private ownership." (Serbian television, 31 March 1993). The second concept, that of Home and Homeland, is used when reporting about refugees and displaced persons who were forced to flee their centuries-old hearth-sides due to the fighting (or who had been simply thrown out of their homes).

8 In one of the April 1993 issues of *Večernje Novosti* (a Serbian daily) an article was published which spoke of the intention of the Republika Srpska authorities to change a large number of toponyms throughout the "liberated territories." In the process, any word with any suggestion of things Bosnian, either in the name of the State or in place names, would be altered: Bosanska Krupa to Krupa na Uni, Bosanski Novi to Novi Grad, Bosanska Dubica to Kozarska Dubica, while Bosanska Gradiška, Bosansko Grahovo, Bosanski Petrovac, Bosanski Šamac, and Bosanska Kostajnica, would all lose their prefixes. Also, Donji Vakuf would become Srbobran, and Skender Vakuf would become Knežev. Additionally, Mount Jahorina would be known as Mount Javorina, Zvornik would become Zvonik, Rogatica would be altered to Jelengrad, and Han Pijesak to Pijesak. (Čolović, 1994, p. 54).

pective collective memories: Serbia, to the fourteenth century and the Battle of Kosovo.

In the new nations established on the territory of the former Yugoslavia the predominant feature in the (re)construction of national memory is that of "one nation, one State, one religion", as well as the populist perception of an ethnic community springing from "common roots" and the concept of "blood and soul." Regarded from that standpoint, those ethno-nationalistic projects which demand that "all members of a national community must live together within the borders of a single State" are quite understandable. Serbia, for example, founded its political project of a Great Serbia on the demand that all Serbs "must (and indeed, want to) live in a common State", a principle very close to *Nationalitätsprinzip* ("Every nation one State. The entire nation in one State") that was prevalent in the political thinking of nineteenth-century Germany. This demand is usually followed by a statement such as "Serbia is where there are Serbian graves" which transfers the whole process of national identification to the level of symbols.⁹ The most pronounced method of reproducing national memory is through the discourse of daily life (a living nation). In the nationally homogenized community, media language translates the symbolic structure of national feelings into the rituals of everyday life. In the post-socialist countries which are constituting themselves as national States, national identity becomes the most substantial reference point of personal identification. In other words, national identity becomes an open symbolic space which replaces the now destroyed network of social identification.

Consequently, the main task of the media is to transfer, and to create, two different sets of images of one's own nation: one intended for internal use (the "we - image") shared by all members of the same national community, exclusive of all others; and the other group of images from outside, i.e., the outsider's perception of one's own nation. In our analysis we differentiate between two groups of memories which together constitute an integral part of a wider group of memories on the basis of which individuals formulate their own identity: national memory is constructed linearly, upon the events of Great History, i.e., the events which go to make up the geography of a Nation. Public memory, on the other hand, is a part of political indoctrination conducted by the ruling ideology. With special reference to Serbia we can speak of a collapse of both the groups of memories, of a national community unable to reproduce itself without the constant creation of enemies. Attention must be drawn to the fact that this matrix may be employed both for political opponents (it is sufficient merely to accuse them of working against the interests of the nation for them to become "They"), and for all manner of things different (the populist comprehension of a nation exclu-

9 This was the very reason why the Serbian government decided to move the mortal remains of Prince Lazar (who died 600 years ago) from Belgrade to the region of Kosovo in symbolic confirmation (with far-reaching and devastating consequences) that Kosovo has always been and will continue to be the cradle of the Serbian nation. A further example of this attitude was a statement made in the main news programme of Serbian television on 11 April 1993: "It is well known where the land of Serbia is. Serbian land is where Serbian people live, where Serbian churches are, where Serbs have died..." These were the words of a Serbian Army general stationed somewhere in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The statement was made in response to news that the UN Security Council intended to tighten sanctions against Yugoslavia.

des from the national community all those who do not have the "correct" sexual leaning, who do not wish to have many children, who are not religious...).

V. Propaganda and Nationalism - List of Cases

In a commentary given on 10 March 1993, Serbian TV criticized Serbian opposition politicians and peace activists: "In their analyses they neither wish, nor are they willing, nor indeed are they able to see, through their charge of negative emotions, what any simple and comprehensive analysis would show. And that is that Serbia is not at war; that nobody in or from Serbia is instigating the war." (Routine lie). "On the contrary, the war is being instigated in Serbia only by those whose behaviour and political activities pander to the centres of power that are actually orchestrating the war; in other words, those who constantly engage in anti-war rhetoric. What *is* true is that it is Serbia's official policy not to become involved in the war, but to assist in defending the Serbian people. It is true that the Serbian government is not prepared to see that section of the Serbian people to go barefoot, hungry and without medical supplies. It is also true that Serbia is providing its moral and political support for the just struggle and aspirations of the Serbian people. For instance, like the right not to have to form part of foreign national States, in which that part of the people would be made to simply disappear, by any means possible. Is it really so shameful, is it impermissible, to assist one's own people in this way?" (Conspiracy theory, discrediting of and accusations against anti-war opposition politicians and peace activists, nationalism).

"It is not, nor can attacking only the authorities be the only political consequence of actions by peace activists. The outcome includes allegations that Serbia and the Serbs are responsible for the war. It also includes visits to the very centres of world power which are leading a genocidal policy against the Serbian people. And flirting with those same centres. It also means being a passive on-looker while the Serbian people are fighting for their very survival, with not a single voice being raised against unjust sanctions." (Discrediting of those opposed to the war, nationalism).

The following day's programme included the reading of a letter from Dobrica Ćosić, President of so-called SR Yugoslavia, to the European Parliament: "The truth about the Yugoslav tragedy, the internal and external factors involved in the break-up of Yugoslavia, the direct consequence of which is the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia; the truth about the Serbian problem; about the consequences of current events for the Balkans and for Europe; the truth about Kosovo; about the suffering of the people of Serbia and Montenegro which has resulted from the sanctions; about isolation from Europe and the world community these truths have not yet become the guidelines which should be observed by the European Community and the United Nations in their behaviour towards events presently occurring on the territory of former Yugoslavia. You are displeased, even angry, with we Serbs, Yugoslavs; in adopting Manichaeian ideology, and even stereotypes of racial hatred, your media are presenting Serbs as barbarians and criminals. And in you we are deeply disappointed, because through injustice and lies we have been humiliated and deprived of hope in a way we have never been throughout our history." (Dramatization, emotionally-charged anti-propaganda), "Protagonists of the Vance-Owen plan have designed maps for the provinces that are in no way acceptable to the Serbs, since they are unjust and they threaten the existential interests of the Serbs, while affording preferential treatment to Croatian interests and giving consideration to Muslim interests." (Conspiracy

theory and national aspect). "We expected that... they would demonstrate more readiness to consider the vital needs of the Serbs and to show some understanding of the Serbian fear of collective extermination, which stems from memories of genocide at the hands of the Ustashas." (National and historical aspects). Referring to the threats being made in New York and Brussels of further punitive measures and for his country's total isolation, Čosić asked: "By which principles and rights, and in whose interests and aims is a whole people to be threatened with destruction?"

In the second news of the 'News of the Day' programme on the same day (11 March 1993), a commentator claimed that the Vance-Owen plan would open the door to the ethnic cleansing of every Serb from "former" Bosnia-Herzegovina... "By signing those maps, Serbs living outside Serbia would be committing national suicide. Cut off from their mother country Serbs would be left with the bitter choice of either adopting Catholicism or Islam, or of emigrating." (Nationalism, with religious overtones). "... If the UN could see fit to recognize the right of Slovenes, Croats, and even Muslims, the right to their own State and they did recognize it the right to choose how and with whom they lived, it is essential that the same rights be granted to the Serbs, in order to bring this war to an end." (Selective memory loss, in that this right should not be realized through force of arms, and certainly not invoked at the moment, when the Serbs have conquered far more territory than they are actually entitled to hold).

In 'News of the Day' on 3 April 1993 a commentator spoke disparagingly of a group of peace activists that had organized a protest meeting in front of the Federal Parliament building in Belgrade: "The fanaticism of the quasi-peacemakers of Belgrade is contemptible, for they have never uttered a single word which referred to any of the Serbian people's rights, nor have they ever mentioned the innocent Serbian victims." (National perspective).

The same news programme devoted considerable air time to a report on the Bosnian Serb Assembly held in the eastern Herzegovian town of Bileća, where the Vance-Owen plan was discussed. The newscaster read the Declaration issued by the Assembly in which it was stated that the Serbs rejected the map for the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina, although they were in favour of concluding a peace agreement and of direct talks with the Muslims and Bosnian Croats. The next item was an interview with Radovan Karadžić, and included a statement from Nikola Krajišnik. Karadžić said: "The world can take it as read that we have rejected the plan. We have not rejected it; we refuse to accept the maps, and our Declaration clearly states that... the leadership of the Bosnian Serbs is not extreme out of caprice, it is merely interpreting the will of the people... Our position is strong, thanks primarily to the army of Republika Srpska and to a people that has managed to defend itself." (Constant presentation of the people as an almost metaphysical entity). In his statement, Krajišnik said: "There were some, so to say, emotional charges. There were plain, vociferous and possibly harsh words spoken." (Here, it is possible to detect, albeit indirectly, the influence of propaganda, since it was propaganda that was responsible for the supercharged atmosphere of the Assembly). "But we have to understand those representatives who feel they have a great responsibility for their people, and who feel the pressure from those same people, who want to announce loudly and clearly: 'Such a division of Bosnia-Herzegovina is unjust and we the people will just not accept it.'" (Reference to the people). "We refuse to accept any solution that would have catastrophic consequences for the Serbian people in those areas for the next one hundred years."

On 1 January 1993 *NIN* published the text of a statement by Biljana Plavšić, Vice-president of the government of the self-styled Republika Srpska (RS) in Bosnia, made by her at a session of the RS Assembly in Pale, near Sarajevo: "We do not trust Europe; for the next ultimatum regarding territorial principles we have the answers ready, the answers of the new Obiličs," [she is referring to Miloš Obilič who, so legend has it, killed the Turkish Sultan Murat during the Battle of Kosovo in 1389, but losing his own life in the process] "of Major Gavrilović and of others like them." [Gavrilović: an officer who, in World War 1 during the defence of Belgrade, when addressing his troops before they went 'over the top', told them: 'Don't be concerned about whether or not you will survive this action, because our high command has already listed you all as having been killed in action!'], (The character of the Serbs in the interpretation of history). Biljana Plavšić came to fame with her impassioned rallying cry: "Even if six million Serbs should perish in this war, six million will survive to live in freedom!" (*NIN*, 3 April 1993).

In the same issue, Dragoslav Djordjević (a Serb who had emigrated to the USA) was quoted as saying: "Josip Broz [Tito], that supreme Serb hater, invented and legalized the Montenegrin, Muslim and Macedonian 'nations'... We do not recognize the artificial Muslim nationality, which is bent on destroying Serbs in the name of sacred Islam... Even today there exists a considerable number of Serbs of the Muslim faith. If that is untrue, then why are there several thousand Muslim refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina living in Serbia? They have been received in Serbia as our own and have found refuge there." (Nationalism with religious overtones; the implication is that the Muslim people are in fact Serbs who have adopted Islam).

Biljana Plavšić, in an interview published by *Duga* in its issue of 12 - 26 February 1993, entitled 'We shall yet live in a Greater Serbia', said: "We, the leadership, have been mandated by our people to achieve just one aim... Pale ['capital' of Republika Srpska] is in fact a personification of Republika Srpska and of the people living on its territory. Naturally, we have all followed with great interest, even with a degree of trepidation, events evolving in Geneva. Meanwhile, however, our troops and people on the ground are getting on with their appointed tasks. And they are doing so in complete accord with the aims of the Serbian people. You see, to us - and especially to our men in the trenches - all these negotiations over there in Geneva in certain of their phases look like a game of 'pass the parcel' and as though the discussions are taking place on another planet, as though they have nothing whatever to do with the people our soldiers are defending in their trenches." (Nationalism).

Referring to the Vance-Owen plan, which at that time [first quarter of 1993] the self-styled Serbian Assembly in Bosnia were in agreement with, she said: "The Serbs are an emotional people. Dignity and pride have a tremendous influence on the morale of Serbian fighters. Had we rejected the plan I feel sure that we would have gained more territory on the battle field. In doing what we did, however, we have forsaken a part of our traditional Serbian dignity; and yet, the war goes on and our people are still dying." (Serbian national character).

In the same issue there is an interview with a Serb, Nikodin Čavić, one-time priest and lawyer, now a soldier, who said: "I am everywhere where Serbs and Serbianism are threatened!" He describes himself as being first and foremost a Serbian Orthodox priest, as a shepherd who serves God and the Serbian people faithfully, and as one who has been involved in every crucial battle for the salvation of his endangered and beleaguered people. (Nationalism).

Nikodin Čavić underlined his unswerving commitment to Serbs and the Serbian cause by taking his two sons with him to war, one of whom is thirty years old, and the other thirty-five. He relates how, when his wife pleaded with him to leave one of them at home he answered without hesitation: "Our sons have not been fed by us alone, but by the entire Serbian people as well, and it is their duty to repay that debt by defending the Serbian people!" (Nationalism, the Serbian national character. Those who know something of the Serbian 'soul' and the Serbian character will also know that this endless self-extolling of the Serbian people and of Serbianism, of needing always to defend themselves, all play an extremely important role in the construction of that same Serbian 'soul' and character: a Serb would never think of conquest or of unprovoked attack; whatever such action he takes would be in the name of defending himself against the hostile actions of others; in the present situation he is not waging a war in order to gain territory or to pursue similar aims, and the subject deserving such a 'defence' must be something to be exalted).

With regard to the matter of the Vance-Owen peace plan being rejected by the Assembly of the Bosnian Serbs at its session in Bileća on 5 April, *Politika* comments on how the whole world is agog at news of the rejection, while nobody is questioning the reaction of the people of Republika Srpska, a reaction which *Politika* says is clearly discernible in Bileća: "... today, when a ten-member delegation comprising soldiers fresh from the front line arrived to congratulate the representatives. They were able to meet only a few of them, but they successfully discharged the responsibility entrusted to them by their comrades." The article is mainly composed of references to Serbian historical events, to the brave deeds of the Serbian people and of the town in which the Assembly had just held its session. Only the opening line of the article made reference to the peace plan, mentioning that it was rejected by 69 votes against, with one abstention.

On 4 March *Večernje Novosti* reacted to a statement made by the British author Salman Rushdie, who regards Bosnian Muslims as being completely secular and wholly European, but who are being treated as though they were little Khmeinis. 'Europe,' Rushdie said, 'has no interest in coming to their defence... and since Europe refuses to defend them... religious fanatics flock to their aid and... an integralist State will be born on Europe's threshold.' A *Večernje Novosti* expert voiced his opinion that Rushdie was not fully informed about the events under discussion, claiming that '... everything that has occurred on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina since the country's independence was recognized has favoured the Muslims... much more so than is to the liking of the Serbs, and even of the Croats.' (Religious and national aspects).

In its issue of 10 March 1993 *Večernje Novosti* carried an interview with Radovan Karadžić who had the following to say on the matter of the impartiality of negotiations conducted by Lord David Owen and Cyrus Vance: "As time went by the two of them demonstrated quite clearly that they approached the situation as our opponents. They were unable to conceal that they were acting in accordance with a prescribed agenda, that their allotted task was to divide, weaken and break up the Serbian people." (Discrediting of international negotiations; conspiracy theory; national aspect). Karadžić went on to give his own views of future Serbian activities: "We Serbs have to do something similar to what the Jews did. We have to achieve a state of mind whereby every anti-Serb action and threat to our interests, even the most insignificant, prompts us all to rise as one, with all our hearts and with the utmost energy. Bearing in mind this repetition of genocide against us and the constant campaign of anti-Serbian politics being conducted by

the West, we can no longer afford to be naive or passive." (Nationalism; conspiracy theory).

Conclusion

The theoretical model of propaganda helped us to research the propaganda reality in Serbia. Let us now present the model of propaganda which exists in the reality (the elements of the model are listed according to their importance in propaganda activity of respective media), and let us place our subject - the ideology of nationalism - into this propaganda model.

Serbian television:

1. The connection between ideology and propaganda is more than obvious, and in this context in the first place the connection between propaganda and nationalism, then propaganda and religion, and finally propaganda and reinterpretation of history;

2. conspiracy theory;
3. accusing and discrediting the opponents;
4. anti-propaganda;
5. disseminating routine lies;
6. classic (hard) propaganda;
7. collective (selective) memory loss.

As we can see from the conclusion, the theoretical model of propaganda is expanded in the reality by two important elements: conspiracy theory and accusing and discrediting the opponents.

Serbian printed media:

1. As in the case of Serbian television the connection between ideology and propaganda is obvious, and in this context in the first place the connection between propaganda and nationalism, then propaganda and religion, and finally propaganda and reinterpretation of history;

2. accusing and discrediting the opponents;
3. conspiracy theory;
4. anti-propaganda;
5. classic (hard) propaganda;
6. routine lies.

The propaganda reality of Serbian printed media was similar to the case of Serbian television.

The analysis of Serbian television news programmes and its role in the formulation of national and collective memory is limited by the fact that television broadcasting organisation utilises the "closed" worlds of symbolism, decipherable only by those who share a common national "background knowledge." As a State-controlled institution, one that is under the direct influence of a ruling political

party, television has an exclusive monopoly of public communication and in defining the dominant linguistic styles. In other words, the basic role of television in defining a new collective memory lies in the process of defining the nation, a nation that would be recognisable to everybody. There are several ways in which television is able to construct such a national memory:

1. Through constant reminders of events connected with the "Defensive War";
2. the screening of various kinds of reports which introduce new social values, usually related to refugees and displaced persons, i.e., those who have lost everything except their collective memory;
3. production of programmes devoted to reawakening national awareness (dealing with such topics as history, art, culture, traditions, roots of the language, customs, beliefs...); and
4. linguistic purism as a form of differentiation plays an important role in the formation of national identity. If we speak the same language it means that we share the same national memories. Hence, if we want to divide national communities we must make distinctions in the language they speak.

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Summary: Massmedia, Propaganda and Nationalism

This article assesses the relationship between propaganda and nationalism as an ideology in the Serbian massmedia. Serious analysis of contemporary propaganda is a complex discipline, primarily because of the use of the mass media. The issue is further complicated by the fact that the introduction of ever new technologies results in new channels of public media, which demand specific and new methods of propaganda and manipulation.

In the study of propaganda in Serbian media as it affects the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the following elements were found to be of particular interest: propaganda and ideology (propaganda and nationalism, propaganda and religion, propaganda and reinterpretation of history); the use of language for propaganda purposes; the context of propaganda; propaganda organization and propagandists; the public; the level of source criticism; and the iconography.