

Switzerland and the Jura : ethnic diversity and elite accommodation

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Introduction.

Although ethnically quite diverse, post war Switzerland has been rather free of ethnically-related conflict. This harmony contrasts with the experiences of many other heterogeneous political systems such as Canada, Northern Ireland, Belgium, Spain, and France. Some authors have stressed the importance of the Swiss cross-cutting cleavage pattern in understanding post-war Swiss ethnic harmony (1). Others have mentioned the declining importance of ethnic divisions in contemporary Switzerland, even if such divisions remain important (2). A number of other relevant factors have been mentioned at one time or another, but in recent years the importance of Switzerland's highly institutionalized pattern of elite accommodation in explaining the Swiss experience has been emphasized (3). According to Hans Daalder, minority ethnic group influence has been strongly emphasized by political decision-makers in all spheres of the policy-making process since the nineteenth century. Partly as a result of this elite sensitivity to minority interests, no group has ever come to feel permanently politically deprived. Swiss leaders addressed themselves to the problems of ethnics diversity before these

(1) Karl MEYER, *Die Mehrsprachige Schweiz* (Zurich : Fretz and Wasmuth, 1939) and more recently Juerg STEINER, *Amicable Agreement Versus Majority Rule : Conflict Resolution in Switzerland* (Chapel Hill, N.C. : University of North Carolina Press, 1974).

(2) For example, see Henry H. KERR, jr, *Switzerland : Social Cleavages and Partisan Conflict* (Beverly Hills, Calif. : Sage Publications, 1974).

(3) Arend LIJPHART, *The Politics of Accommodation* (Berkeley and Los Angeles : University of California Press, 1970) ; Gerhard LEHMBRUCH, *Proporzdemokratie* [Tuebingen : J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1967] ; Juerg STEINER, *Amicable Agreement Versus Majority Rule* ; Erich GRUNER, *Die Parteien in der Schweiz* (Bern : Franke-Verlag, 1969), p. 22.

divisions ever became grounds for intense conflict. Elite accommodation was a prior reason why ethnic divisions, although pronounced, never became bases for political turmoil (4).

Switzerland, however, has not been totally free of conflict involving ethnic groups. In one ethnically divided canton, Bern, political differences between the French speaking northwest portion of the canton, the Jura, and the predominantly German speaking majority have resulted in conflict (5). The Jura issue has given rise to intense emotions, by Swiss standards, and even outbursts of violence. Making use of survey data, this article addresses the seemingly anomalous Jura case. The article stresses the importance of political leadership in understanding the Jura conflict, and argues that this conflict illustrates two important points: ethnic diversity as a precondition rather than determinant of conflict; and the central role of political elites in ethnically divided political systems. As the Jura experience demonstrates, ethnic diversity, rather than a determinant of conflict, is better understood as related to other variables more directly associated with conflict. One such variable is a sense of deprivation, especially when this is linked to ethnic identity. As the specific example of the Jura testifies, political elites can be instrumental in either preventing or fostering a sense of deprivation among ethnic groups.

National sensitivity to minorities has been accompanied at the national level by ethnic harmony; Bernese cantonal insensitivity to the Jurassien minority has led to the growth of political frustration among the Jurassien and cantonal disharmony. But the actual conflict cannot be reduced to ethnic diversity alone. Instead, many Jurassien have never felt themselves integral parts of the canton; many Jurassien have been made keenly aware of minority status through the historical cantonal treatment of the Jura. As William R. Keech asserts, conflict has arisen in the Jura because of « a lack of felt tradition of belonging to the canton », and because of a poor cantonal record of attending to Jurassien grievances (6). Jurassien identity gives definition to a minority which perceives itself politically deprived by cantonal authorities.

(4) Hans DAALDER, « On Building Consociational Nations: The Cases of the Netherlands and Switzerland », *International Social Science Journal* 23 (1971), p. 368.

(5) Karl MEYER, *Die Mehrsprachige Schweiz*, p. 3; Leo SCHÜRMAN, « Rechtliche Grundlegung: die verfassungsrechtliche Struktur der Schweiz » in J. STEINER (ed.), *Das Politische System der Schweiz* (Munich: Piper-Verlag, 1971), pp. 55-59; Kenneth McRAE, « Consociationalism and the Canadian Political System », in Kenneth McRAE (ed.), *Consociational Democracy: Political Accommodation in Segmented Societies* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, Ltd., 1974), p. 253.

(6) William R. KEECH, « Linguistic Diversity and Political Conflict: Some Observations Based on Four Swiss Cantons », *Comparative Politics* 4 (1972), p. 402.

The Jura.

Demographic composition.

Unlike most Swiss cantons Bern is linguistically heterogeneous. Most of the canton's fifteen percent French speakers are located in the Jura. Although nearly all of the canton's 12 % Catholics are found in the Jura, the region itself is divided into 63 % Catholic with the remainder Protestant. The rest of the Bern canton is, in contrast, overwhelmingly Protestant and German speaking. The Jura itself is actually composed of seven administrative districts, six of which are French speaking. But the term Jura shall be reserved for the French speaking portions only.

Cantonal treatment of the Jura until 1959.

The Jura was an independent entity for many years before its transfer to Bern in 1815. A number of Jurassien continue to emphasize this historical distinctiveness (7). The Jura was a part of the old bishopric of Basel between 999 and 1797, but the French Revolution brought the annexation of the Jura to France after nearly two and a half centuries of membership in the Holy Roman Empire. In 1815 the Congress of Vienna awarded the Jura to Bern in compensation for the canton's loss of several other areas. The initial transfer took place with little difficulty, but the new liberal Bernese government of 1830 soon started a campaign of intervention in Jurassien affairs, a practice which greatly differed from national and other cantonal approaches to minorities (8). This situation worsened toward the end of the century as many Protestant Bernese, inspired by Bismarck's *Kulturkampf* in Germany, initiated an anti-Catholic effort in the canton. Coupled with this was the Jura's continued economic stagnation. Nevertheless, cantonal officials continued to treat the Jura as a « step child », paying inadequate attention to the region's ethnic, political, and economic interests (9).

Jurassien separatist movements appeared as early as the late nineteenth century, but little of real significance occurred until 1947 and the *affair Moekli*. Various party leaders had agreed to give a key cantonal ministry to the Jurassien Moekli, but the cantonal parliament twice

(7) See the discussion in Hans Peter HENECKA, *Die jurassischen Separatisten* (Meisenheim am Glan : Verlag Anton Hain, 1972), chapters 2 and 3.

(8) Erich GRUNER, *Das bernische Patriziat und die Regeration* (Bern: Buchdruckerei Feuz, 1943), p. 20.

(9) William R. KEECH, « Linguistic Diversity and Political Conflict », p. 397.

overturned the agreement. The Jura had traditionally had members in the cantonal executive, but Moekli was rejected because many German speakers felt the particular ministry in question was too important for a French speaker to hold (10). An uproar swept the Jura (11). Separatists and anti-separatists alike forced an initially reluctant Bernese government to institute a series of limited reforms. The major separatist group, the *Rassemblement jurassien* (RJ), became convinced only complete separation from the Bern canton could adequately further Jurassien interests. To the RJ, and many others, the *affair Moekli* had only dramatically illustrated the traditional attitude of Bern toward the Jura.

TABLE I
Voting results in the Jura on the 1959 and 1974 referenda

| | Percent favoring separation | | Percent catholic 1970 | Percent french speaking 1969 |
|---------------------------------|-----------------------------|------|--------------------------|------------------------------------|
| | 1959 | 1974 | | |
| <i>North Jura districts</i> | | | | |
| Delemont | 72 | 76 | 82 | 77 |
| Franches-Montagnes | 76 | 76 | 85 | 86 |
| Porrentruy | 66 | 66 | 85 | 86 |
| <i>South Jura districts</i> | | | | |
| Courtelary | 24 | 23 | 31 | 69 |
| La Neuveville | 34 | 35 | 23 | 65 |
| Moutier | 34 | 42 | 46 | 73 |
| <i>German speaking district</i> | | | | |
| Laufon | 26 | 27 | 83 | 2 |

In 1959, due largely to the RJ's efforts, a cantonal consultative referendum took place on the Jura's future. The results were in no way binding, yet the cantonal government led a vigorous campaign against the referendum, insuring its defeat. The German speaking portion of the canton overwhelmingly rejected the prospect of Jurassien separation, as did a small majority of the French speakers. Nevertheless, several areas of the Jura, predominantly Catholic in composition, overwhelmingly supported separation. The figures in table I are instructive. The three Catholic French speaking districts, the ones most identified with the old bishopric of Basel, voted solidly for separation. At the same time

(10) See the record of the cantonal debate in *Tagblatt des Grossen Rates des Kantons Bern*, especially years 1947, 1948, 1949, and *Kommission der 24, Bericht zur Jurafrage* (Biel: Graphische Anstalt Schüler AG, 1968).

(11) François-L. REYMOND, « La Question Jurassienne et l'évolution du Mouvement Séparatiste, 1959-1964 », *Annuaire Suisse de Science Politique* 5 (1965), 29-84.

the three Protestant districts to the south just as clearly rejected the idea of separation (12).

Post-1959 Jura.

Separatist sentiments were concentrated in the north. Years of perceived and real cantonal neglect gave few of these Jurassien hopes for an improved situation. As a regional and ethnic majority, many Jurassien, both north and south, saw themselves permanently disadvantaged by membership in the Bern canton. Two considerations, in particular, served to underscore this feeling: continued cantonal attitudes toward the Jura, and Jurassien economic weaknesses.

Cantonal authorities in the post war period simply refused to address the question of Jurassien separation (13). Despite the fact that nearly one half of the French speaking Jura had indicated support for possible separation, cantonal officials remained obdurate. In particular, German speakers within the canton's largest political party, then labelled the BGB, forced the acceptance of several vocal anti-separatists in various government positions.

An important example of concerted anti-separatist BGB effort was their 1961 nomination of a candidate to the cantonal executive who had been one of the most outspoken opponents of Moekli's ill-fated 1947 nomination. At the cantonal election which followed the nomination, the BGB candidate faced opposition from a RJ sponsored candidate. Although these elections were usually uncontested, a heated campaign developed around this one. The BGB candidate easily defeated his French speaking opponent in the entire canton receiving 58 % of the vote to his opponent's 21 %. However, within the Jura the RJ candidate overwhelmed the BGB candidate 74 % to 14 %. Not all those who voted for the RJ candidate necessarily favored separation, but many used their vote to express disapproval of cantonal political practices toward the Jura. The vectorious BGB responded by merely emphasizing its desire to avoid contact with anyone sympathetic to the separatist cause (14).

(12) Figures for the 1959 and 1974 referenda were obtained from official records at the Staatskanzlei of the Bern canton.

(13) See: Han Peter HENECKA, *Die jurassischen Separatisten*; Peter FOSTER et al., *Schwierige Selbstbestimmung im Jura* (Zurich: Buchverlag Neue Zuercher Zeitung, 1974); and Roland BÉGUELIN, *Un faux témoin, la Suisse* (Lausanne: Ed. du Monde, 1973).

(14) François-L. REYMOND, « La Question Jurassienne », p. 39.

Cantonal leaders consistently refused to deal with RJ-sponsored referenda over a wide range of issues, and instead led concerted campaigns against them. As well, cantonal authorities forced the further selection of anti-separatists in government. As one observer not especially sympathetic to the separatists wrote. « ... the attitude of the government contributed to a radicalization of the situation » (15). Many Jurassien believed only federal intervention could rectify the situation, but cantonal authorities steadfastly refused such intervention. At the same time the cantonal government refused to meet with the separatists, calling the movement's increasingly extreme statements and methods outside Swiss political practice. To the separatists, on the other hand, Bernese officials had deviated from the national practice of minority respect.

Economic considerations also caused concern among many Jurassien. The Jura had experienced a strong pattern of economic growth since the second world war, especially in the southern Protestant areas. Nevertheless, this prosperity was relatively less than that enjoyed by many other areas of Switzerland, most noticeably the large urban areas. The average income in the Jura, especially in the north, remained below that of the entire canton, despite the fact that the canton spent more in these areas than it collected in taxes (16). For many Jurassien, though, the Bernese had not really ever made systematic efforts to foster Jurassien economic interests.

The implications of the slower Jurassien growth rates did not go unnoticed by the separatists. There are no large urban areas within the Jura itself. The northern Catholic portion, in particular, has remained isolated in many ways from the remainder of the canton. Large cities bordering on the Jura continue to attract significant numbers of Jurassien away from the region. Moreover, national planners projected that two neighboring large cities, Basle and Bienne, would expand into the Jura in the coming years. As a result Jurassien regional and cultural identity would be severely threatened. « In short », concludes M. Bassand, « if the Jura does not protect itself, it will be literally torn apart and dismembered » (17). Many Jurassien saw little reason to believe Bern would expend the necessary resources to change these projections.

(15) *Ibid.*, p. 4.

(16) Peter FOSTER *et al.*, *Schwierige*, pp. 65-71.

(17) Michel BASSAND, « The Jura Problem » unpublished paper, Department of Sociology, University of Geneva, 1974.

Deprivation and political dissatisfaction.

T.R. Gurr emphasizes that the potential for conflict increases when one group sees itself deprived of benefits enjoyed by others. One such benefit according to Gurr is what he terms power values. These are those that determine the extent to which men can influence the actions of others and avoid unwanted interference by others in their own actions (18). Gurr goes on to point out that power values especially salient to political violence include self-determination and participation in collective decision-making. This observation is certainly important for the Jura, which has experienced conflict in recent years. The Jura consistently lagged behind most of the canton in economic and political benefits. Cantonal authorities have hardly been sensitive to Jurassien claims to participation in collective decision-making, let alone self-determination.

Walter Korpi further accents the importance of not only aspirations, but capabilities. « The process of acquiring control over power resources is seen as a necessary condition for the capacity to contend for privileges » (19). When individuals within a group identify with that group, and begin to link their sense of dissatisfaction to their group membership, conflict can be both a release of bottled frustrations and a more conscious response to the political situation. The national Swiss norm of minority accommodation can only have strengthened Jurassien aspirations, while perceived and real Bernese neglect of Jurassien interests can only have increased the potential for conflict. If Gurr and Korpi are instructive, Jurassien, when compared to German speaking Bernese, should be especially dissatisfied with cantonal practices. Survey data do, in fact, demonstrate this. Moreover, this dissatisfaction seems to have carried over into other areas as well. On a wide range of questions Jurassien are particularly negative in their responses. Jurassien attitudes not only contrast with German speaking Bernese, but also differ from the rest of the Swiss francophone community. In a comparative perspective many Jurassien feel deprived of benefits enjoyed by both other Bernese and by the national Swiss francophones. Yet simple ethnic differences are not the direct basis of such Jurassien discontent. Rather, a sense of deprivation brought about by years of perceived and real cantonal neglect and abuse is the real root of the problem.

(18) Ted Robert GURR, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 25-26.

(19) Walter KORPI, « Conflict, Power, and Relative Deprivation », *American Political Science Review* 68 (1974), p. 1571.

Jurassien political dissatisfaction.*The data.*

The data were chiefly drawn from two national opinion surveys. The first, or national survey as I shall refer to it, is a random sample of Switzerland as a whole. The second, or youth survey, is a random sample of male youths between eighteen and twenty-five. All male youths in Switzerland are required to perform yearly military duty. The youth survey is drawn from one year's recruits. A final special survey consists of Jurassien male youths alone (20).

Political dissatisfaction in a comparative perspective.

National survey respondents were asked the extent to which they felt cantonal authorities addressed themselves to people like the respondent. Item [1] in table II shows an interesting pattern. We

TABLE II
Political dissatisfaction among german and french speakers
(National and youth surveys)

| | [I] Cantonal authorities | [II] Swiss manner of governing | [III] Swiss political system | [IV]* Swiss manner of governing |
|-------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------------|------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| Bern | .35 | .33 | .29 | .28 |
| N = | (299) | (301) | (299) | (253) |
| Rest of Switzerland | .07 | -.17 | -.11 | -.02 |
| N = | (1186) | (1355) | (1065) | (1265) |

* Youth survey item.

obtain a positive Gamma score for the Bern canton, but a much weaker Gamma for Switzerland as a whole. The positive score indicates French speakers are more prone than German speakers to feel neglected by cantonal authorities. Although practically no relationship exists at the national level, a stronger one does exist within the Bern canton. The pattern carries over to items [2] and [3]. In item [2] respondents were asked the extent to which they were satisfied with the manner in which Switzerland was governed, while in item [3] a similar question referred to a general evaluation of the Swiss political system. The positive Gamma scores for these two items are very similar to those in

(20) I would like to thank Professors D. Sidjanski and D. Frei of the Universities of Geneva and Zurich, respectively, for allowing me access to the survey data.

item [1]. It appears Jurassien discontent has spilled over into other areas. Perhaps many Jurassien are dissatisfied with federal political practices since federal authorities would not intervene in the Jura conflict, despite repeated calls for federal involvement by the separatists. Youth survey respondents were also asked a question about their evaluation of the manner in which Switzerland was governed, item [4]. The positive Gamma score is again surprisingly similar to those in the national survey items.

The response pattern for Swiss outside the Bern canton consistently differs from the Bernese patterns. As the Gamma scores in table II indicate, the national francophone community is, if anything, *less* dissatisfied than the national German speaking community. Except for item [1], all the scores are negative. One could argue that the minority francophones feel secure about their place in a national political system which has historically devoted great attention to minority accommodation.

TABLE III

Political dissatisfaction among french speakers. Percentage indicating dissatisfaction (National and youth surveys)

| | [I] Cantonal authorities | [II] Swiss manner of governing | [III] Swiss political system | [IV]* Swiss manner of governing |
|------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------------|------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| Jurassien | 60 % | 44 % | 47 % | 33 % |
| N = | (32) | (23) | (26) | (11) |
| Swiss French | 48 % | 20 % | 26 % | 27 % |
| N = | (139) | (59) | (78) | (66) |

* Youth survey item.

Not only do the overall response patterns between Bernese and non-Bernese differ, but in absolute percentages Jurassien are more dissatisfied than are other francophone Swiss. The percentages in table III show the total number of Jurassien and francophone Swiss who gave negative responses to the four items. On every item Jurassien are more negative. On two items, [2] and [3], the differences are over twenty percentages points. Ethnic differences exist at the national level between French and German speakers, just as they do within the Bern canton. Yet at the national level, in contrast to Bern, these differences have not been translated into political divisions.

As the data from tables II and III indicate, conflict in the Jura has been accompanied by marked Jurassien dissatisfaction, just as the lack of national conflict is hardly surprising in light of francophone satisfaction. Ethnic divisions are not in themselves automatic determinants

of conflict, but are instead a precondition for factors which do prompt such conflict (21). One such precondition is a sense of minority deprivation, as the national Swiss and Bernese cases illustrate. And it is possible to argue that elite behavior has been instrumental in creating or preventing such minority deprivation.

The ethnic dimensions of the Jura conflict.

The purely ethnic dimensions of the Jura conflict have at times been overemphasized. James A. Dunn asserts the Jura problem is primarily linguistic with strong religious roots. Others have stressed the religious dimension alone (22). Kurt B. Mayer traces Swiss ethnic coexistence to the country's, «...peculiar equilibrium of crosscutting cleavages...» In contrast, he asserts the Jura, «... furnishes proof that its divisions between linguistic and religious groups do not overlap but coincide the result is conflict instead of harmony» (23). Using the 122 voting districts of the French speaking Jura, Mayer analysed the 1959 referendum results. His analysis revealed product moment correlations of .56 between percentage of separatist votes and percentage of French speakers in each voting district, and .82 between separatist vote and percent Roman Catholic. Regression analysis of the same data prompted Mayer to conclude that within the Jura the importance of religion had been overlooked since the main separatist movement had emphasized the linguistic dimension of their movement. He concluded that both religious and linguistic factors, «are necessary conditions, but by themselves are insignificant; only where they appear in combination does the separatist cause triumph» (24).

Mayer, like some others, has overemphasized the direct impact of ethnicity in the Jura and neglected the importance of cantonal politics. Certainly Mayer's overlapping theory argument is open to question as other survey data indicate. The Jura youth data show, for example, that religion and language are not directly at issue, although the previous survey evidence certainly indicates Jurassien are particularly negative in their evaluations of cantonal and national politics.

(21) William R. KEECH, «Linguistic Diversity and Political Conflict», p. 388.

(22) James A. DUNN, jr., «Consociational Democracy and Language Conflict: A Comparison of the Belgium and Swiss Experiences», *Comparative Political Studies* 5 (1972), 3-40.

(23) Kurt B. MAYER, «The Jura Problem: Ethnic Conflict in Switzerland», *Social Research* 35 (1968), p. 733.

(24) *Ibid.*, p. 735.

Multivariate analysis of the Jura youth data.

The small number of French speaking Bernese in the two national surveys does not allow a satisfactory breakdown by religion, and certainly not by salience of religion and language. However, the Jura youth survey does. Not only can we explore the direct impact on dissatisfaction of religion within the Jura, we can also explore the response patterns of those for whom religion and language are important. Particularly helpful for this multivariate analysis is the Goodman log linear technique for the analysis of categorical data. With this technique we need not assume interval levels of measurement. Nor need we accept homoscedasticity or a normal distribution.

Briefly stated, with the Goodman technique we attempt to assess the statistically significant contributions made by various parameters in a saturated model, i.e., all possible main and interaction effects, on the dependent variable (25). We do this by determining which model, i.e., set of parameters, best fits the data. For each theoretically meaningful and statistically promising model we estimate the frequencies for each cell we would expect if that model accurately described the data. We then compare the expected frequencies with the actual, or observed, frequencies to see how closely the two frequencies correspond to one another. Using the likelihood ratio chi square we eliminate those parameters from the saturated model which do not help improve our understanding of the dependent variable. The various parameters refer to log-odds or logits. Although the saturated model for raw frequencies is multiplicative, since the product of logarithms is the sum between logarithms, the model will be additive. A saturated model for three independent variables and one dependent variable, i.e., like the one we will examine, appears as follows :

MODEL 1

Saturated model with three independent variables

$$U_{ijk} = B^{\overline{D}} + B_i^{\overline{AD}} + B_j^{\overline{BD}} + B_k^{\overline{CD}} + B_{ij}^{\overline{ABD}} + B_{ik}^{\overline{ACD}} + B_{jk}^{\overline{BCD}} + B_{ijk}^{\overline{ABCD}}$$

\overline{D} = political dissatisfaction.
A = religion.

B = importance of religion.
C = intensity of language group identification.

(25) Leo A. GOODMAN, « A Modified Multiple Regression Approach to the Analysis of Dichotomous Variables », *American Sociological Review* 37 (1972), 28-46.

The B is roughly equivalent to a regression coefficient while the $\bar{B}\bar{D}$ parameter is a constant somewhat analogous to the main effect of the general mean in the usual analysis of variance model. The bar atop the \bar{D} indicates this is the dependent variable.

The dependent variable is political dissatisfaction, taken to mean all those respondents who are either dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the manner in which Switzerland is governed. The three independent variables all emphasize the possible importance of ethnicity in understanding political dissatisfaction within the Jura : religion ; importance of religion ; and intensity of language group identification. Religion is either Protestant or Catholic. Importance of religion is operationalized as either important or not important. Those who felt differences between political parties should include religion were considered to hold religion important in politics. All others were labelled not important. Respondents who agreed with the statement, what really matters to them was language irrespective of a person's country, were considered to be intense in their language group identification. All others were considered not to be intense in their identification. Although all the variables were dichotomized, the Goodman technique does not require they be. It was done here because it maximized cell frequency, but more importantly, the variables lent themselves theoretically to such a dichotomization.

MODEL 2

Final model of political dissatisfaction among Jurassien youth

$$U_{ijk} = .93 \bar{D} + .45 \bar{A}\bar{D}_i + .27 \bar{B}\bar{D}_j$$

\bar{D} = political dissatisfaction. B = importance of religion.
A = religion.

Examining model 2, the final model for political dissatisfaction, we see only two terms are present. Both are main effects. No interaction effects were statistically significant. The $\bar{A}\bar{D}$ parameter, religious affiliation, is significant, and is the larger in magnitude. A higher percentage of Catholics, 42 %, than Protestants, 27 %, are politically dissatisfied. This is consistent with research indicating separatist strength to be strongest in Catholic areas. But if religious differences were a root cause of the problem, one would expect those for whom religion is important, especially Catholics, should be more dissatisfied than those for whom religion is not important. The $\bar{B}\bar{D}$ parameter, religious importance, is indeed present. But the positive sign indicates those

strongest in their religion are the *more* satisfied. Table IV demonstrates this is true for *both* Protestants and Catholics.

Since the late nineteenth century, religiously based differences have declined in importance within the Bern canton. The canton has taken a number of administrative and legal steps to insure religious freedom, and the Jura youth data do not indicate religion is really directly at issue. Instead, when we recall that Jurassien regional identity has always been strongest in Catholic areas, which most closely correspond to the old Bishopric of Basel, it would seem religious differences serve to distinguish Jurassien from non-Jurassien, but these differences have only taken on political significance because of the region's treatment by cantonal authorities.

TABLE IV

Political dissatisfaction among Jurassien youth by religion and importance of religion.
Percentage indicating dissatisfaction or strong dissatisfaction

| | Religion Important | Religion not Important |
|----------------------|--------------------|------------------------|
| Catholic | 36 % | 45 % |
| N = | (39) | (62) |
| Protestant | 12 % | 27 % |
| N = | (5) | (30) |

Equally important as the presence of the two main effects in the final model is the absence of the CD parameter, intensity of linguistic identification. We have already seen that Jurassien are more dissatisfied than German speaking Bernese. But within the Jura, intensity of linguistic group identification is not related to political dissatisfaction. This, of course, suggests language in itself is not a direct cause of the political unrest in the Jura.

Although no interaction terms are present in the final model, if Mayer's observation about overlapping cleavages is accurate we would expect a high level of dissatisfaction among those Catholics for whom both religion and language are important. But the data do not indicate this to be the case. To be sure there were only nineteen respondents in this cell, but only five, or 26 %, indicated political dissatisfaction. Again religion and language differences seem to be only possible *pre-conditions* of conflict.

Certainly no ethnic group among the Jura youth is especially willing to view the Jura issue as a rejection of the national Swiss norm of cultural coexistence. They were asked whether they agree Switzerland showed the world how different subcultures lived together in harmony. The same independent variables as in Model Two were used with the

Goodman technique to determine the acceptance of Swiss ethnic harmony. No parameters were significant in the final model. It would seem various key Jurassien groups do not reject Swiss ethnic coexistence, but merely wish to enjoy the advantages traditionally held by national minorities. This would certainly be consistent with repeated calls by separatists, in the 1960's, for federal intervention into the conflict.

Comparative cantonal experiences.

That ethnic differences need not necessarily translate themselves into conflict can further be seen in table 5. Switzerland has two other mixed German and French speaking cantons, Fribourg and Valais. Unlike Bern, though, Fribourg is approximately two-thirds French-speaking with the other third German-speaking. Valais is roughly evenly divided between linguistic groups. In addition to the differences in

TABLE V
Political dissatisfaction with cantonal government
in three linguistically mixed cantons. Gamma scores (National survey)

| | Does the cantonal government care? | | |
|-----|------------------------------------|-------------|--------------|
| | Bern | Frelburg | Wallis |
| (N) | .35 (299) | .06 (43) | -.07 (56) |

relative linguistic composition, these two cantons have differed from Bern in one other important respect. Elites in these two cantons have in recent years followed a pattern of minority accommodation far closer to the national pattern than to the Bernese experience (26). The small Gamma scores for these two other cantons indicate no significant differences between ethnic groups in the extent to which they feel cantonal authorities address themselves to the respondents' problems. The larger, positive Gamma score for the Bern canton though demonstrates, as we recall, greater French-speaking dissatisfaction with cantonal authorities.

(26) Karl DEUTSCH and H. WEILENMANN, « The Valais : A Case Study in the Development of a Bilingual People », *Orbis* 10 (1972), 1269-1297, and E. GRICHTING, « Die Deutsche Minderheit im Wallis », as well as Bruno FASEL, « Die Deutsche Minderheit im Kanton Freiburg », in *Die Kraft der Schwachen in der Eidgenossenschaft: 30 Jahrbuch der neuen helvetischen Gesellschaft* (Bern, 1969).

Ethnic differences exist in all three cantons, but major political differences exist in only one, Bern.

The future of the Jura.

After increased tensions and markedly strident separatist behavior in the 1960's, the Bernese cantonal government finally began a series of steps which in 1974 resulted in a second Jura referendum. The canton had eventually accepted indirect federal assistance in formulating and guaranteeing the various steps necessary to bring about another vote. This time the results were to be legally binding and the voting restricted to Jurassien only. A small majority, 52 %, voted for separation, although the voting pattern was remarkably similar to the 1959 results with Catholic areas supporting separation and Protestant areas opposing it, as table I demonstrates. A series of referenda about the future of antiseparatist areas in the Jura, plus the prospect of another regional referendum to create two half-cantons, promises to keep the issue alive for several more years.

Conclusion.

The Jura question should alert us to the important role of political elites in ethnically divided polities. The Bernese approach to the Jura has traditionally differed from the national pattern of minority accommodation, just as the survey data indicated Bernese respondents differed from other Swiss in their expression of political dissatisfaction. The appearance or absence of such dissatisfaction or deprivation becomes important when we recognize that ethnic differences need not necessarily lead to conflict. Ethnic differences may increase the possibility of conflict. To be sure then, ethnic diversity represents a potentially fertile ground for conflict, but only when ethnic differences become grounds for political differences does this potential possibly translate into actuality. A sense of deprivation can be an important variable giving political dimensions to ethnic differences. And as the national Swiss and Bernese cases illustrate, elite behavior can be an important factor in minimizing or exacerbating the political importance of ethnic diversity by helping to create or avoid a sense of deprivation within the ethnic groups involved.

