The multi-national state

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Political scientists have paid a great deal of attention in recent years to the subject of integration. The theories of integration, like those of world federation, all seem to take it for granted that integration is a desirable process. The question is never posed whether complete integration leading to the creation of new supra-national multi-national entities is really a desirable result which will improve relations between the component nations.

In theory it may be argued that the ideal situation would call for the integration process between states to continue in the direction of melting down national differences. However, experience in recent centuries has shown that only when various nationalities immigrate to a new country is there any hope of their shedding off their old nationality in favour of a new common identity in the new land, and even then the process is not without problems (the United States and Israel are two such examples). The integration between existing nation-states can therefore at best hope to achieve successful multi-national states.

The purpose of this paper is to introduce some basic theoretical notions, a review of some unsuccessful attempts to create multi-national states, and a brief comparison between the four existing European multi-national states from which we might reach certain conclusions concerning the prospect of Western European union.

What is a multi-national state?

Before we define a multi-national state we must explain the term « nation ». A nation is usually said to be a people with certain factors in common including language, culture, tradition and history. Occassionally a nation may lack one of the above mentioned factors or may include others such as religion. I believe, however, that the most

important factor determining whether a people constitutes a separate nation is whether it feels itself to be one. By this definition the Palestinian Arabs are a separate nation whereas the Maronites and Moslems in the Lebanon may belong to separate communities but not separate nations.

In a multi-national state there live several nations, but this fact in itself does not necessarily make it a multi-national state. For this to be true the constitutional arrangement must ensure that the component nations are state-forming elements of the state. In practice this means that the component nations, irrespective of their relative size, are not dependent on the good will or tolerance of any other national group. None of the stateforming nations are considered foreign minorities. This does not mean that all the nations in a multi-national state are state forming nations. In Yugoslavia, for example, only the Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians and Montenegrans are state forming nations. The Albanians, even though more numerous than the Montenegrans, are a minority with minority rights.

The second characteristic of the multi-national state is that despite the fact that a common patriotism must exist if the state is not to deteriorate into a state of civil war, each national group maintains its own separate national identity, the use of its language and its own cultural heritage.

The abstract theory of the multi-national state.

As is true of many theories in political thought those written on the multi-national state have described ideals. The multi-national state as an ideal clashes with that of the nation-state. It was born as a result of the disappointment with the actual manifestation of the nation-state with its narrow chauvenism and its illiberal tendencies. It is therefore no wonder that the few theories of multi-nationalism which were not developed in connection with specific states have been those of liberal idealists.

Lord Acton, in his essay on Nationality (written in 1862) expressed his belief in the multi-national state as a higher human achievement than the nation-state:

The small states of homogeneous population are impediments to the progress of society, which depends on the mixture of races under the same government...

If we take the establishment of liberty for the realisation of moral duties to be the end of civil society, we must conclude that those states

are substantially the most perfect which, like the British and Austrian Empires, include various distinct nationalities without oppressing them. Those in which no mixture of races has occurred are imperfect; and those in which its effects have disappeared are decrepit. A state which is incompetent to satisfy different races condemns itself; a state which labours to neutralise, to absorb, or expel them, destroys its own vitality; a state which does not include them is destitute of the chief basis of self government (1).

According to our definition of a multi-national state neither the Habsburg Empire nor the British Empire could be classified as such, but this makes no difference to Acton's basic belief in the desirability of multi-national states.

A later author, professor Alfred Cobban, also argued the case for multi-national states:

The prime object of the establishment of a sovereign authority is the preservation of law and order, and the maintenance of the social fabric.

Except in the rarest circumstances cultural differences present no such threat [to the social fabric]. It can therefore be maintained that nationality as a fact of the cultural life of society should normally be outside the sphere of political sovereignty... it is only since the rise of the theory of national sovereignty that any one could have thought of asking (whether national liberty, without complete political independence, is possible or not)...

During the Middle Ages the inclusion of diverse peoples in allegiance to the same monarch was accepted as a matter of course... The nation state only became a condition of the free development of national cultures when the state began to assert totalitarian claims over the cultural as well as the political allegiance of its citizens.

It is not too late to put the clock back, in this respect, with profit... the economic and military conditions of the present day seem to dictate the creation of larger political groupings, if the influence of cultural nationalism tends in the direction of smaller ones (2).

Like Lord Acton so professor Cobban wrote about what he believed to be desirable without reference to any of the difficulties involved. He seems to believe that political nationalism can simply be wished away.

⁽¹⁾ Lord ACTON, Nationality, in Essays on Freedom and Power, selected by Gertrude Himmelfarb, the Free Press, Glencoe (Illinois), 1949, pp. 191-193.

⁽²⁾ Alfred COBBAN, The Nation State and National Self-Determination, Collins, the Fontana Library, London, 1969, pp. 141-147.

Theories of multi-nationalism developed in pre-World War I Empires.

The advocacy of multi-nationalism in connection with specific states is of greater interest in so far as the proponents of the idea could not avoid some of the practical problems. The first group of proposals which I shall discuss concerned the three pre-World War I Empires: the Austro-Hungarian, the Ottoman and the Russian ones. The multinational proposals were raised in these states as attempts to satisfy the demands of the various subject nationalities while preventing the disintegration of the large political units into many smaller ones, as was in fact to take place after the War in the cases of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires.

The Habsburg Empire.

In the Habsburg Empire during the 19th Century demands were raised by the various nationalities for the reform of the existing set up so as to give the non-German (and after 1867 the non-Magyar) nationalities autonomy and a share in the government. There were some, like the Poles, who wanted complete independence, but others, like the Czechs, felt that national autonomy within the Empire was preferable to independence.

The Czech historian Palacky realistically understood that his people were in permanent danger of being overrun by either the Germans or the Russians. His conclusion was:

If the bond which joins several nations to one political entity is to be strong and lasting, then none of them must have reason to fear that it would lose any one of its dearest possessions through the union. On the contrary, every one of them must hold the firm conviction that the Central Power will protect it against any encroachments by its neighbours. Should such an emergency arise, the Central Power should be provided immediately with adequate power to exercise this protection effectively. I am convinced that it is not yet too late for Austria to proclaim this principle of justice... (3).

Palacky's demands had been part of the general demand for reform in the year 1848 which resulted in the resignation of Metternich and the Emperor temporarily yielding to demands from all parts of the Empire. But finally reaction set in and the Empire remained more or less as it has been.

⁽³⁾ As quoted by Robert A. KANN, The Multinational Empire, vol. I, Columbia University Press, New York, 1950, p. 177.

The second source of plans for transforming the Empire into a multinational state were the Austrian Social-Democrats at the turn of the 20th Century. This time it was German nationals of the Empire who spoke of the reforms. At the 1899 Party Conference at Brünn (Brno) the Social Democrats adopted as their programme the transformation of the Empire into a multi-national state. Following this conference and until the collapse of the Empire in 1918 two of the theoreticians of the party, Karl Renner and Otto Bauer, developed theories on the actual shape of their proposed multi-national state. Their aim was to change the Empire in such a way that a socialist society might develop and at the same time offer an alternative to separate independence to all the nationalities of the Empire.

Karl Renner wrote:

We must put a double network on the map, an economic and an ethnic one. We must cut across the functions of the state. We must separate national and political affairs, we must organize the population twice once nationally and once according to administrative requirements (4).

Renner's theories put the idea of the democratic multi-national state before the achievement of the socialist revolution and the classless society. For Bauer national pacification primarily meant a means of realizing the Socialist State. However, both sought to base their multinational state on personal autonomy (or communal federalism) as opposed to territorial federalism which would strengthen the desire for local autonomy.

The main weakness of the Social Democrats' plan lay in the fact that it had come too late and was not supported by the non-German members of the party. Once the First World War broke out and the Empire collapsed, before it ended, the whole idea had no meaning, for the national minorities were now able to gain complete independence.

Had the Empire adopted the idea of the multi-national state earlier it might possibly have survived, but it was only in 1916 that the Emperor Charles, who succeeded the old Emperor Franz Joseph, finally proposed its creation and by then it was too late.

The Ottoman Empire.

In the Ottoman Empire there were a number of leaders of the Young Turk movement who wished to reform the Empire by turning it into a multi-national state. Prince Sabaheddin, one of the earlier leaders of the movement, thought out the following plan:

⁽⁴⁾ Ibid., vol. II, p. 156.

A constitutional monarchy, on British lines, would provide a minimum of central government; for the rest, the different peoples and communities of the Empire could satisfy their aspirations and safeguard their rights in regional and local government and in a public life emancipated from collective or governmental control... Prince Sabaheddin's ideas, despite some initial success, were in fact foredoomed to failure. The Armenians and other Christian nationalities, whom he tried so hard to conciliate, found little to attract them in an Ottoman federation, and prefered to seek the fulfillment of their political aspirations outside the Empire altogether. For the Turks, already irritated by the clashes and arguments with the Armenian committees, private initiative and decentralization seemed a much less satisfying slogan than union and progress (5).

As it were, when the Young Turks came to power in 1908 as the Union of Progress no attempt was made in the direction of turning the Ottoman Empire into a multi-national state. On the contrary, Turkish chauvinism grew and the chance that a transformed Ottoman Empire might survive the First World War was doomed.

The Russian Empire.

When the Bolsheviks gained power in Russia in 1917 they inheritted an Empire which included many nationalities. The Czars had not attempted to transform it into a multi-national state and the new rulers had formed certain ideas on the subject even before the Revolution. Though Marxist theory predicted the disappearance of national differences in the struggle of the working class against its exploiters, it was evident that this was not about to happen in practice, at least in the near future.

Even before 1917 the Communist Party of Russia considered the problem of nationalities. The party's programme, declared at its second Congress in 1903, dealt with the right of all the nationalities to use their language and with their right to self determination. Lenin explained what was meant by national self determination:

A struggle against any national oppression — unreservedly yes. A struggle on behalf of any national development, of « national culture » in general — unreservedly no (6).

As opposed to the Austrian Social Democrats the Communists declared that local autonomy was to be on a regional rather than on a

⁽⁵⁾ Bernard LEWIS, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, Oxford University Press, 1961, p. 200.

⁽⁶⁾ As quoted by Robert CONQUEST, Soviet Nationalities Policy in Practice, the Bodley Head Soviet Studies Series, London, 1967, p. 17.

nationality basis. The declaration of the rights of the peoples of Russia of November 15th, 1917:

Proclaimed the equality and sovereignty of the people of Russia; their right to self-determination, including secession and the formation of an independent State; the abolition of all and every kind of national and national-religious privilege and restrictions and the free development of national minorities and ethnic groups inhabiting the territories of Russia (7).

Theoretically this policy was extremely liberal, but Stalin's qualifications made it meaningless for the right of self-determination was subordinate to the right of the working class to consolidate its power.

In the first Constitution of the USSR of July 6th 1923, a second Chamber was introduced — the Council of Nationalities. Attempts were also made to « nationalize » the governmental apparatus of the various republics (i.e. to employ, as far as possible, local manpower for the administration) and to curb « Great Russian Chauvenism ». However, this was no substitute for genuine self rule.

In 1929 Stalin introduced the term « Socialist Nation »:

I affirmed (and continue to affirm) that the period of the victory of socialism in one country does not create the conditions for the amalgamation of nations and national languages, that, on the contrary, the period creates favourable conditions for the renaissance and efflorescence of the nations that were formerly oppressed by tsarist imperialism and have now been liberated from national oppression by the Soviet revolution...

It is a mistake to think that after the defeat of world imperialism national differences will be abolished and national languages will die away, directly, at one stroke, by decree from above... it would spell disaster to the cause of the liberation of nations, and be fatal to the cause of organizing cooperation and fraternity among nations...

This means that the Party supports, and will continue to support the development and progress of the national cultures of the peoples of our country, that it will encourage the strengthening of our new socialist nations, that it takes this matter under its protection and guardianship against anti-Leninist elements of every description (8).

Once again this theorizing had little practical effect and the most that the nationalities of the USSR have managed to enjoy have been periods of relative cultural tolerance.

⁽⁷⁾ Ibid., p. 20.

⁽⁸⁾ Joseph STALIN, The National Question and Leninism, Foreign Language Publishing House, Moscow, 1950, pp. 23-35.

Conclusion.

So we see that of the three multi-national Empires which existed in Europe and its periphery none in practice managed to transform into a multi-national state as defined at the beginning of this paper. Two of these Empires, the Habsburg and Ottoman, collapsed during the First World War and their territories were divided into many separate states. The Russian Empire has survived under a Communist regime but in practice has not succeeded in eliminating the superiority of the Russians over the other nationalities.

Experience has demonstrated that an empire in which one or two nationalities dominate the others, will not find the way to becoming a multi-national state in which all nationalities are equal.

One of the prerequisites for the establishment of a true multi-national state, and for its successful functioning is that there should be no tradition of domination by one of the state forming nationalities over the rest, for such a tradition leaves behind prejudices, distrust and resentment. It also takes time for a nation which had previously dominated to accept a role of equality with those over which it had ruled, and nations which were previously dominated usually prefer complete independence if they can obtain it.

Some idealists were sorry to see the large political units split into many states instead of transforming themselves, and others have been disillusioned by the developments in the one which did not split. The experience of these Empires was, however, inevitable. The multi-national state can only develop, if at all, from the voluntary union of nations who are free from each other. Whether the voluntary union results from a tradition of common administration or from a political decision based on emotional or realistic grounds is of secondary importance.

Bi-national plans of the present Century.

In the present Century bi- or multi-nationalism was proposed to solve the national problems in several countries, amongst them in pre- 1948 Palestine and in Cyprus. Neither became a bi-national state as we defined it, and in both the national problem has not been solved.

Palestine was partitioned following the proposal of a UN Commission but following the 1967 Middle Eastern War the whole of mandatory Palestine and several additional territories have come under Israeli administration with a future settlement still in question.

Cyprus, on the other hand, was given a bi-national constitution upon gaining independence in 1960, but bi-nationalism has so far not worked out in practice.

Palestine.

The boundaries of Palestine were determined after the First World War by agreements between the two ruling European powers in the area (Britain and France) taking certain geographical and strategic factors into account. In the Ottoman Empire Palestine as such had not been an administrative unit, and the Arabs considered it part of Syria. By 1921 the territory east of the Jordan river was cut off for political reasons and referred to as Transjordan, under the Amir Abdullah.

In 1922 the indigenous Moslem population numbered 486,177, the Christian population 71,464 and the Jews — partly orthodox Jews who had come back to Palestine for religious reasons and partly Zionist pioneers who began to immigrate into the country after 1880 — numbered 83,790 (9).

Though a Jewish state had not existed in Palestine for almost 2000 years there were always some Jews who lived in the country, and in the Jewish religion it remained the promised land to which the Jews would return, some day. The Zionist idea that the Jews should not await an act of God before returning to Palestine to construct there a modern « national home » combined with the persecution of Jews in Europe, brought hundreds of thousands of Jewish immigrants to the country. By 1947 the Jewish community numbered 589,341 (10).

During this period the Arab population also grew considerably, mostly through natural growth but also by the immigration of Arab labourers from neighbouring countries. In 1947 the Moslems numbered 1,157,423 and the Christians 146,162 (10).

The rulers in Palestine during the period 1917-1948 were the British but Palestine was not part of the British Empire — it was a Mandate under the League of Nations and Britain had undertaken to lead it, like most of the other Mandates, to independence. Throughout the period various proposals were made of possible constitutions for the future. Some of these proposals advocated bi-nationalism. However, the idea never gained the support of either the Zionists, the Arabs or the British. The Arabs, who refused to admit that the Jews had any

⁽⁹⁾ Statistical Abstract of Palestine 1944-1945, Department of Statistics, Government Printer, Jerusalem, 1946. p. 16.

⁽¹⁰⁾ Central Monthly Bulletin of Current Statistics, January-February 1948, Department of Statistics, Government Printer, Jerusalem, 1948, p. 5.

« rights » in Palestine, wished to see Palestine develop into an Arab state in which the Jews would have minority rights and little possibility to increase through immigration.

Though bi-nationalism was usually advocated by Jews less than 10 % of the Jewish population supported the idea — most of them envisaged the immigration of millions of Jews into the country and the eventual creation of a Jewish state in all or part of Palestine. Officially the Zionist movement declared its intention not to dominate the Arabs, but on the other hand Arab opposition and obstruction to Jewish immigration and development could not convince the Zionists to abandon their ideals. Though the Colonial Office considered some bi-national plans they preferred the development of a Palestinian state in which there would be as little emphasis as possible on national differences.

There were several different bi-national plans which were developed. Some envisaged the division of the country into a number of cantons — several Jewish, other Arab and the remainder mixed. Other plans proposed the division of the country into a Jewish and an Arab state with the holy places remaining international and all joined together in a federation. A third group of plans returned to the Austrian Social Democrat idea of Communal Federalism thus avoiding the need to delimit boundaries, and dividing the country between the Arabs and the Jews.

Though these plans never materialized, and did not have any real chance because of their general lack of appeal to the nations concerned, there are people who still argue that bi-nationalism, as defined at the beginning of this paper, was, and is, the only just solution for the Jewish-Arab problem in the Middle East (11).

Cyprus.

The experience of Cyprus has been slightly different despite several similarities in the problems faced by the two Eastern Mediterranean countries.

In 1968 the population of Cyprus numbered about 627,500 of whom 493,000 were Greek and 110,000 Turkish. Cyprus has been populated with Greeks for thousands of years and the Turkish population came to the island with the Turkish conquest in 1571. The British became the *de facto* rulers of Cyprus in 1878 and annexed it to their Empire in 1914 when Turkey entered the War on Germany's side. Cyprus

⁽¹¹⁾ For further details on the bi-national idea in Palestina see my book: Susan Lee HATTIS, The Bi-National Idea in Palestine During Mandatory Times, Haifa, Shikmona, 1970.

was granted independence in 1960 following an uprising by the Greek population against British rule, it was only then that the serious clash between the two nations on the island came to the open.

The Greeks and Turks found themselves living in one state intermingled with each other but without feeling any common patriotism. The Turks, in fact, had not been opposed to continued British rule, but once Cyprus gained independence under a bi-national constitution, and when this Constitution led to deadlock because of Greek opposition, the Turks began to advocate partition of the island.

The Constitution which came into force in Cyprus on August 16th, 1960 had been prepared by a committee of Greeks, Turks, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. Despite the fact that the Turks form less than 20% of the population, they were given greater representation than their numbers would warrant. The Greek President and Turkish vice-President both were given a veto power over all decisions concerning foreign affairs, defence and security. The Cabinet, Parliament, the Administration and the police force were to be 70% Greek and 30% Turkish. In the army the Turks were to constitute 40% of the total force. In the cities where there is a large Turkish minority they were to have separate municipal administration, and there were to be separate courts for matters not concerning cases in which both Turks and Greeks were involved. Since the Greeks and Turks do not live in separate parts of the island the state could not be divided on territorial federal lines.

In fact, this Constitution did not succeed in solving the intercommunal strife, and very soon ended in dead-lock. The main problem with the Cypriot bi-national Constitution has been that the Greek majority does not want it. It was more or less imposed from the outside and a semblance of peace is kept up with a good deal of outside intervention.

The Greeks feel superior to the Turks and if left on their own would be willing to grant them no more than minority rights. They would probably also eventually opt for union with Greece despite the fact that the island is geographically much closer to Turkey.

The Turks, who were less eager for independence would probably now opt for partition and association with Turkey, unless bi-nationalism could, by some miracle, be made to work.

It is only because of the delicate balance held by the Greek and Turkish Governments who are both members of NATO, as well as the presence of British bases and UN peace keeping forces that Cyprus is being kept in a state of relative calm.

Conclusions.

What we can learn from the cases of both Palestine and Cyprus is that bi- or multi-nationalism is not a solution which can be imposed and, as we shall see in the following sections, it must be based on a good deal of common interest. Even then many great problems arise which can be solved only through good will. It must also be pointed out that the *de facto* situation or two nations living together need not result in any desire to go on doing so, as 400 years of Cypriot history demonstrates.

It should be noted that in both pre-1948 Palestine and in present day Cyprus territorial federalism was not easily to be arranged without moving whole communities. It was often pointed out in the case of Palestine that the boundaries of a Jewish state or canton could not be delimited without placing a very large Arab minority in it. One might say that this particular problem was « solved » by the flight of hundreds of thousands of Arab refugees from Israel after 1948 (some fled before), however, the refugee camps and Arab Palestinian frustrations today demonstrate to what extent this « solution » was not satisfactory.

Existing bi- or multi-national states in Europe.

From the preceding section one might reach the conclusion that multi-nationalism is nothing more than the dream of idealists. However, there are quite a few bi- and multi-national states in the world which function with varying degrees of success.

I have chosen to deal with the four European examples by way of comparison, Switzerland is the most successful case of a multi-national state and has often been brought as an example for less fortunate states with nationality problems. Belgium, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia have had a less smooth experience, but all three have in recent years introduced constitutional amendments which should assist them in overcoming some of the difficulties of the past.

Statistical Data.

Switzerland — population figures (1970 census) divided by language spoken (12):

⁽¹²⁾ Annuaire Statistique de la Suisse, Le Bureau fédéral de statistique, Bern, 1972.

German speaking						3,	864,684	
French speaking						1,045,091 207,557		
Italian speaking								
Romansch speaking							49,455	
Others speaking							22,920	
Belgium — population en (13):	figur	es	(1970)	di	vided	by	language	e spo-
Flemish speaking						5,4	432,790	
French speaking						3,	124,891	
German speaking							62,116	
Brussels Area (mixe	d)				٠	1,0	071,194	
Czechoslovakia — population figures (estimates for 1968) divided ecording to nationality (14):								
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Czechs				9,285,000
Slovaks				4,197,000
Others				851,176

Yugoslavia - population figures (1961) divided according to nationality (15):

Serbs					7,806,000
Croats					4,294,000
Slovenes					1,589,000
Macedonia	ans				1,046,000
Monteneg	rans				514,000
Others					3,300,000

(of whom 973,000 are Muslims, 915,000 Albanians, 504,000 Hungarians, 183,000 Turks)

Comment.

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A multi-national state can work even if the various nations are far from equal in numbers as long as the largest nation does not try to dominate and impose its will. On the contrary, it might even be desirable that one of the national groups should be considerably larger than the rest so as to prevent a feeling of rivalry between the largest nations.

⁽¹³⁾ Annuaire Statistique de la Belgique, tome 91, année 1970. Royaume de Belgique, Ministère des Affaires Economiques, Bruxelles, Institut National de Statistique.

⁽¹⁴⁾ Statistická recenka CSSR, Federální Statisticky URAD, Cesky Statisticky Urad (Praha), Slovensky Statisticky Urad (Bratislava), 1969.

⁽¹⁵⁾ Petit Manuel Statistique de la Yougoslavie, Institut Fédéral de la Statistique, Beograd, avril 1971.

How did these states Come into Being?

The history of each of our four states is complicated but it is important to note a few of the land-marks in their development so as to try and understand why they developed as multi-national states and did not split into several nation states.

Switzerland.

The original Confederation of the three German speaking cantons of Uri, Schwytz and Unterwalden, founded in 1291 as a defence pact against the Habsburgs gradually expanded by accepting new cantons into its fold. Some cantons became allies of the Confederation, while others were simply occupied by one or several of the cantons for economic or strategic reasons.

In 1792, under the influence of the French Revolution the non-German speaking cantons gained equality of rights, and in 1815 Switzerland gained its present boundaries. Until 1848 there was no central government and administration and it was only in that year that German, French and Italian were all recognized as official languages.

Switzerland became a truely multi-national state by a gradual process, turning from a loose confederation into a federal state.

Belgium.

In 1477 the provinces of the low-lands (present day Belgium and Holland) passed into the hands of the Habsburgs. In 1555, when the Habsburg lands were divided in two, they came under the rule of Spain. Following a revolt by some of the provinces of the Low-Lands, by the treaty of Westphalia of 1648, the boundary between Belgium and the Netherlands was formed, cutting across the Dutch speaking population. This boundary was formed simply by the fortunes of war. The Treaty of Utrecht of 1713 set the border between Belgium and France, once again cutting across the population speaking a certain dialect of French. In 1792 Belgium was conquered by France and from 1815 to 1830 was united with Holland.

Only in 1830 did Belgium gain independence. The problem of the bilingual character of the country did not rise until after independence. Almost 350 years of living under the same administration proved, however, to be too strong a bond for linguistic difficulties to destroy.

Czechoslovakia.

The Czechs and Slovaks had both been ruled by the Habsburg Empire until 1918. But whereas the Czechs had come under Austrian rule the Slovaks were governed by the Hungarians. It was only upon gaining

independence in 1918 that the two nationalities, speaking similar languages, finally came under one administration.

The idea that the Czechs and Slovaks should form one state had roots in romantic nationalist ideas which developed during the 19th Century, though only amongst the Czechs was this affinity taken for granted. The First World War which brought about the collapse of the Habsburg Empire called for improvisation and to a large extent it was the work of Thomas Masaryk, himself partly Czech and partly Slovak, that the Czechoslovak state was born. Geopolitical considerations were not absent in its creation, and the feeling of affinity between Czech and Slovak immigrants to the United States, amongst whom Masaryk had gained substantial backing, was a further element in bringing the two peoples together in Central Europe.

An interesting point is that during the Second World War the idea developed amongst certain Czechoslovak and Polish personalities that their two states should unite and form a tri-national state. However, nothing came of this idea.

Yugoslavia.

The territory of Yugoslavia fell under numerous administrations before the creation of the Southern Slav state in 1918. The Serbs were conquered by the Turks in 1389 but some had crossed the frontier into the Habsburg Empire and settled there in four different crownlands. In 1878 Serbian independence was recognized by the powers. The Croats were governed by the Hungarians with few interruptions from 1089. Amongst the nationalities governed by the Magyars they were the most favoured. The Slovenes, who had never been politically independent (like the Slovaks in Czechoslovakia), were governed by the Austrians in the Empire. The Montenegrans were conquered by the Turks in 1514 and gained independence in 1799. The non-Slav Macedonians were conquered by the Turks in the 14th Century and were joined to Serbia in 1912.

It was only in 1918 that all these nations came under one administration for the first time in history, though during the Napoleonic era the Slovenes, Croats and some of the Serbs were united in the Illyrian Kingdom which existed from 1809 to 1812 (this Kingdom had been one of Napoleon's creations).

The notion that the Southern Slavs (the Yugo-Slavs) were one « nation » was born during the 19th Century. Like in Czechoslovakia so in the case of Yugoslavia it was the First World War and the collapse of the Habsburg Empire which gave a decisive push to the movement. Unlike Czechoslovakia there was no *one* predominant figure

to head the movement and there was a clash between the Serbian Government and the Yugoslav Committee. Though the two groups agreed on a joint programme in 1917 they continued to work at cross purposes, and because of these clashes Yugoslavia was less willingly recognized by the Allies than Czechoslovakia.

Conclusion.

There is no general rule about the manner in which a multi-national state should be born. It has not been proven in practice that long experience of common administration and habits of cooperation are necessary prerequisites. Though this was the case in the examples of Switzerland and Belgium it was not so in Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia which had emerged as new creations in 1918. Possibly what was lacking in these two states in the way of common historical experience was more than compensated for by common race and similarity of language — both states are predominantly Slav states and their languages are Slavonic languages.

What qualifies these states as bi- or multi-national States?

As I stated at the beginning of this paper when I defined what a multi-national state actually is, it is not enough that many nations should live in one state to qualify it as multi-national from a constitutional point of view.

Switzerland.

By the 1848 Constitution as amended in 1874 the multi-national character of the state is brought out on the question of language. German, French, Italian and Romansch are the national languages of Switzerland, though only the first three are official languages of the state.

Since the autonomy of the cantons is guarded in so far as this is not limited by the Federal Constitution, and since in *most* of the cantons only one language is officially spoken, the various language groups have a good deal of independence within their own cantons. This manifests itself in particular in the spheres of education and culture.

The Federal Assembly consists of a National Council based on proportional representation (only in 1971 were the women in Switzerland given the vote!) and Council of States in which the cantons are equally represented.

Belgium.

Unlike Switzerland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, Belgium does not have a federal constitution, despite the fact that with the exception of the Brussels area the Walloons and Flemish live in separate regions of the country.

The process by which Belgium transformed into what might be called a bi-national state was slow. Only in 1898 did Flemish become an official language on the side of French, and Belgium was divided into linguistic regions as late as 1932.

In 1965 efforts were made to amend the Constitution so as to define with greater clarity the bi-national, or bi-lingual character of the country, but the episode ended with the defeat of the Government. The amendment was achieved, however, in December 1970. Belgium was declared to consist of three cultural communities: Dutch (i.e. Flemish), French (i.e. Walloon) and German, each with appropriate constitutional rights. For administrative purposes there are four linguistic regions — one Flemish, one French, one German, and Brussels with its environs as a bi-lingual region.

The National Assembly is based on proportional representation, but by the 1970 amendment members of parliament must declare their adhesion to either the Flemish or the French speaking community. On the other hand, the Cabinet must now consist (in addition to the Prime Minister) of equal numbers of Flemish and French speaking members.

Czechoslovakia.

Until the Czechoslovak Constitution was amended on October 27th, 1968, Czechoslovakia had been a unitary state. During the First Republic (1918-1939) the existence of a « Czechoslovak » nation was emphasized. This was due, to a large extent, to the fact that otherwise the Czechs would have been a minority in the State, and the Slovaks would have constituted a smaller minority than the Germans.

The 1948 Constitution emphasized the equal rights of the Czech and Slovak nations and assured the less numerous and weaker Slovaks special national organs. In 1960 Slovak autonomy was limited due to Novotny's centralistic policies. By the 1968 amendments Czechoslovakia became a Federal state.

The National Assembly now consists of a Chamber of Peoples in which the population is proportionally represented, and a Chamber of Nations in which the Czechs and Slovaks are equally represented. Each nation has its own National Council which deals with those matters not reserved for the Central Government. The Constitution enumerates a list of important questions, such as election of the President, amendment of the Constitution and declaration of war, on which deci-

sion cannot be taken without a 60 % majority in the Chamber of People and a 60 % majority in each half of the Chamber of Nations.

Yugoslavia.

The far from happy experience of a strongly centralistic government during the inter-war period resulted in the post-war Yugoslav Constitution emphasizing her federal structure. Yugoslavia consists of six republics (Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro) and two autonomous provinces (Kosovo, with a predominantly Albanian population, and Vojvodina, which, though predominantly Serb, has a large Hungarian minority) whose status was enhanced by a constitutional amendment of December 26th, 1968.

Citizens are guaranteed by the Constitution the freedom to express their nationality and culture, and the freedom to use their own language. The languages (Serbo-Croat, Slovene and Macedonian) and scripts (Latin and Cyrillic) of the peoples of Yugoslavia are declared by the Constitution as equal and each nation has the right of school instruction in its own language.

The Federal Assembly consists of several Chambers of which the Socio-Political Chamber, which is elected by proportional representation and the Chamber of Nationalities (representing the Republics and Autonomous Provinces) are the most important and, by the constitutional amendment of April 1967 have been placed on equal footing in dealing with most matters until 1967 the Chamber of Nationalities had only a secondary role. The Chamber of Nationalities also discusses matters relating to the equality of the Republics, peoples and national minorities (Albanians, Magyars, Turks, Bulgarians, Italians, Rumanians and Vlachs), and to the constitutional rights of the Republics and Autonomous Provinces.

Conclusions.

In all the cases of bi-and multi-national states which we have studied there has been a tendency to adopt federal constitutions. Even Belgium has accepted a limited form of federalism in the principle of linguistic regions. The recent constitutional amendments in Belgium, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia have all been in the direction of giving the various nations more clearly defined rights and establishing greater equality between them. The developments in these states have therefore not been in the direction of erasing the cultural and linguistic differences between the nations, but on the contrary, these differences are better defined.

The problems Encountered by these states in the past and today.

Although all our four European multi-national states are considered relatively successful they have all had their difficulties.

Switzerland.

Though the various language groups were not equal under the law before the French Revolution, and only in 1848 were they granted equal status by the Constitution, there were never any serious disturbances on the basis of nationality. The only serious challenge to the Confederation did not result from the desire of any of the nationalities to secede, but from the resistance of some of the predominantly Catholic cantons to give up most of their sovereignty in favour of the Confederation. In 1845 they had organized in the Sonderbund but were beaten by the other cantons.

At the outbreak of the First World War there was some tension resulting from the sympathy of the various language groups with the neighbouring states speaking the same languages, but the policy of neutrality and the benefits it brought to Switzerland soon calmed the tension. During the Second World War the problem did not reappear, and the Swiss were proud of their democratic tradition which did not succumb to the examples of Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy or Vichy France. Geography was certainly an important factor which permitted Switzerland to remain independent during the War years.

The only persistant problem in Switzerland concerning the nationalities is the economically and linguistically inferior position of the Italian speaking cantons and their fear of being economically overrun by the non-Italian speaking Swiss or by foreigners. Though Italian is one of the official languages it does not have the prestige of German or the social acceptability of French. There is also greater social mobility between the German and French speaking Swiss which the Italian Swiss do not share. However, these problems are minor and have never caused the tensions which similar problems have caused in other multinational states.

Belgium.

The gradual transformation of Belgium has been much more painful than that of Switzerland. The major cause of tension has been the fact that though the Flemish are more numerous than the Walloons, the Walloons are wealthier and better educated. The long struggle which the Flemish had to wage to gain equal status resulted in the development of ill feelings between the two peoples. It is probably still

true that the Walloons feel superior, a fact which is naturally resented by the Flemish.

During the First World War the activist section of the Flamingant movement was trying to obtain autonomy from the German occupiers. However, it was only a minority and the Germans showed no eagerness to grant the Flemings independence. On the whole the Flemings have not wanted political independence but have sought to improve their lot and erase any inequalities which may persist.

The Walloons, on the other hand, have been striving to federalizing Belgium and ensure that their own status will not be undermined by the Flemish majority.

The greatest centre of difficulties has been the mixed Brussels area where the Flemings feel that there is a tendency for French to become the prevalent language — a tendency enhanced by Brussels' having become, in recent years, an international centre.

Czechoslovakia.

At the time of the establishment of the Czechoslovak state the Slovak population was less educated and economically much behind the Czech majority. It was largely for this reason that the Slovaks had been less enthusiastic about the union which they felt would cause their own disappearance as a separate nation.

After Czechoslovakia was created the Slovaks constantly complained that not enough was being done by the state to quicken the development of Slovakia. The depression during the early 1930's hit Slovakia hardest.

In March 1939 the Germans, who had begun taking over Czechoslovakia by the Munich agreement of 1938, made Slovakia autonomous, and set up a Protectorate over Bohemia and Moravia while Ruthenia was given to the Hungarians. After the War, with the exception of her eastern tip which was ceded to the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia was put together again. Many Czechs resented the fact that the Slovaks had accepted autonomy from the Nazis, while some Slovak Communists had desired Slovakia to be united with the Soviet Union. However, the predominat feeling both amongst the Communists and the non-Communists was that Czechoslovak unity should be maintained.

The project of changing Czechoslovakia into a federal state, initiated by the Dubcek Government during the short lived period of liberalization (Dubcek himself is a Slovak) and carried out after the invasion of the country by Warsaw Pact troops in August 1968, resulted from Slovak dissatisfaction with measures taken in 1960 to centralize the government machinery to a greater extent than had been the case before.

It is obvious, however, that the unpopularity of the present Communist regime amongst both nations has made the problem of Czech-Slovak relations less acute than might otherwise have been the case.

Yugoslavia.

It is obvious that in a country in which several languages are spoken, and in which there are three religions (Roman Catholic, Orthodox and Moslem) and two scripts, there are bound to be difficulties in upholding the unity of the population.

When the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was established in 1918 (its name was changed to Yugoslavia only in 1929) immediately there appeared a tendency for the Serb element to dominate — the fact that the King was a Serb strengthened this trend. As a result, the Croats soon began to demand autonomy, a demand which contributed to the establishment of a dictatorship in 1929 by the King.

During the Second World War the Croats had hoped to extend their autonomy with German help, whereas the Serbs and Montenegrans were suspicious of Axis intentions. Yugoslavia was attacked by Hitler when she refused to concur to a treaty with him. Following Germany's attack Slovenia was divided between Germany and Italy, Croatia gained independence under Italian protection, Serbia was put under German military rule and Macedonia was handed over to Bulgaria.

Guerilla fighting developed in the mountanous parts of Serbia, Bosnia and Montenegro. There were two groups, one led by the Serb Mikelovic and the other by the half-Croat and half-Slovene Communist « Tito ». It was the latter who finally gained official recognition by the Allies and took over the whole country at the end of the War. Since the War Tito has followed a persistent policy of trying to satisfy the demands of the various nationalities (not always with success) and of decentralizing as much as might be consistent with the interests of a Socialist Yugoslavia.

Nevertheless, there are still difficulties resulting from Croat separatists, as recent events in Yugoslavia demonstrate. Also, the fact that the northern part of the country is more developed than the rest has resulted in national jealousies and, in certain parts of the country, in prestige investment which is not warranted by economic considerations.

Conclusions and comments.

All the bi- or multi-national states have had problems of jealousy by the less developed nations towards their more prosperous brethren. Whereas in a unitary state it is not even questioned that special efforts must be made for less developed regions within the state, and when this is not achieved there is a movement of population, in the case

of the multi-national state the richer nations resent their having to pay the bill for developing the regions of the less developed ones, and mobility is not always simple because of the language barriers.

Despite the obvious economic advantages of larger political units it is not at all certain that as far as internal cohesion is concerned there are equal advantages. On the contrary, in addition to the various stresses which exist in all states on social, economic, political and ideological grounds, stresses resulting from differences of nationality only aggravate the other internal problems.

What has contributed to keeping the various nationalities together?

An important question is why these particular states have succeeded, despite the problems, to remain functioning multi-national states. This is especially interesting when we compare these « success stories » with other states which have failed with multi-nationalism.

Switzerland.

It is often pointed out that the fact that religious divisions in Switzerland do not run along cantonal boundaries, and often counteract problems arising between cantons, has been an important factor in the success of the Swiss state. Nevertheless, the most important factor has probably been the success of the Swiss policy of neutrality which kept the country uninvolved in European Wars since 1815. Swiss neutrality contributed to her prosperity by attracting enormous funds to her banks as well as to her becoming a centre for intergovernmental and transnational organizations and companies.

The various language groups have retained control over education and cultural matters and the cantons have maintained a fair amount of independence in running their own affairs. It is only in theory that one might imagine circumstances, such as a total collapse of Swiss prosperity, in which there would be great attractions for the three main language groups to join the neighbouring countries in which the same languages are spoken, i.e. West Germany, France and Italy.

Belgium.

Habit has probably been an important factor in keeping the Flemings and Walloons together. An interesting fact is that the Walloons showed no desire to remain attached to France after the collapse of Napoleon (probably due at the time to the lack of attraction to be connected with a defeated state), and that the Flemings were just as eager as the Walloons to break the union with Holland (1815-1830) — cen-

turies of trade war by the Dutch against Belgium, and the attitude of superiority with which they regarded the Flemings were probably the main causes for Flemish displeasure with Holland.

The obvious economic loss to both regions if partition were to take place and the option for a policy of economic and possibly also political integration with other Western European states have left the possibility of dividing Belgium into two states a purely theoretical proposition.

Czechoslovakia.

The affinity of Czechs and Slovaks racially, linguistically and culturally has certainly been an advantage in communication between the two and their being welded together after the political union took place in 1918.

The external danger, first from Germany and later from the Soviet Union (as had been foreseen during the 19th Century by the historian Palacky) has been an important factor in uniting the peoples emotionally.

The absence of economic freedom (amongst other freedoms) has prevented the prosperity which would certainly have come the way of Czechoslovakia had she had a different regime, but the union was certainly advantagious to the two nations before the War, tying Slovakia to the more industrialized Bohemia and Moravia and granting the Czechs access to the Danube which was of commercial importance to her because of the fact of her being land-locked.

Though the Czechs did not gain by their union with the Slovaks the security which they had hoped to have against the Germans and Russians they would have nothing to gain from separation from them. As an independent state Slovakia would be much weaker, in all respects, than she is today. Her alternatives might be to become part of Hungary, under whose administration she had been before 1918, or part of the USSR on which she had bordered since 1945. Neither possibility was ever seriously considered and it is doubtful whether these alternative unions would solve more problems that they would create.

Yugoslavia.

In the case of Yugoslavia the fact that the state has managed to keep together is probably more surprising than in any of the other multi-national states. A real Southern-Slav identity has actually emerged to which the irredentist claims of many of Yugoslavia's neighbours in the past has probably contributed.

Since the Second World War the Government's nationalities policy and Tito's success in leading his country on an independent road to socialism, despite Soviet interests, have been important contributors to the success of Yugoslavia as a multi-national state.

Only Macedonia and the autonomous province of Kosovo might have any interest in joining other existing states (Bulgaria and Albania respectively) while the splitting of Yugoslavia into several states would weaken all of them while making them more vulnerable to outside pressures.

Conclusions and Comments.

It is obvious that a multi-national state will function only if all the nations are satisfied with their lot and can imagine no better arrangement for themselves such as secession to form a separate state or joining another existing one. If dissatisfaction does however arise, as it is not unlikely to do, then the only practical way to deal with it without endangering the actual continuation of the multi-national state, is through concessions, though these must be consistent with multi-nationalism.

The use of brute force in order to keep a dissatisfied nation within the fold of a multi-national state will either fail, as in the case of Pakistan and Bangladesh, or make the existence of true bi- or multinationalism unlikely, as in the case of Nigeria and Biafra.

The foreign policy orientations of the multi-national states.

The question may be posed whether the bi- or multi-national states share a common outlook on international affairs because of their internal diversity. Strangely enough our five states represent five very different policy orientations.

Switzerland.

Switzerland, as we have already stated, has chosen a policy of neutrality and has interpreted it to the extreme of not even joining the United Nations after the Second World War.

Belgium.

Belgium is one of the enthusiastic supporters of the European Communities and it was in fact one of her statesmen, Paul-Henri Spaak who had initiated the discussion for setting up the EEC. Belgium is also a devoted member of NATO and has housed SHAPE since the French decided to withdraw from active participation in the organization.

Czechoslovakia.

During the inter-war period Czechoslovakia had managed to carry out an independent policy, and was a devoted supporter of the League of Nations. However, after the Second World War, largely for reasons not dependent on herself, Czechoslovakia has found herself within the Soviet orbit. Efforts to draw away from it in 1968 ended in the invasion of her territory by her own allies.

Yugoslavia.

Despite her communist regime Yugoslavia managed to escape the clutches of the Soviet Union, and while accepting Marshall aid from the United States after the War has been one of the leaders, and the only European member, of the so called non-aligned camp.

Conclusions.

The foreign policies of the four countries have been dictated to a large extent by their geographical position. Belgium's neutrality was twice flouted by the Germans during the present Century while Switzerland's geographical position has so far made it worth while for all other states to respect her neutrality. Despite Czechoslovakia's desire to be neutral first the Germans and later the Soviet Union did not permit her to follow such a policy, and the Communist party, which had always enjoyed a fair amount of popularity, was assisted by the latter to catch the reigns of power. Yugoslavia's geographical position and topography enabled her to escape becoming a Soviet Satellite and has enabled her to carry out a neutralist policy. The mere fact that these states are multi-national has not dictated their policy orientations nor made them any more internationally minded than any other state.

Conclusions concerning the prospect of Western European Union.

It is not absolutely clear what conclusions can legitimately be drawn from the experience of the four successful multi-national states discussed with regards to a hypothetical Western European Union. In the first place it is unclear how such a state would come into being. De Gaulle proved the theories of the neo-functionalists, who believed the road to full integration to be a relatively direct one, to be quite shakey. Western Europe missed the period of great peril and dangers which followed the Second World War to transform itself dramatically and a new shock of equivalent magnitude is unlikely to reccur in the near future. Western Europe's three major powers, France, Britain and the Federal Republic are still too jealous of each other to create the neces-

sary core of the new state and the lesser powers have no reason for dissatisfaction with their lot or motivation to wish to become the minor nationalities of a multi-national state in return for possible political, economic or security benefits.

But assuming that by some unforeseeable event the states of Western Europe will be convinced to give up their sovereignty how would the new multi-national state have to develop in order to succeed? In the first place it would have to be federal and extremely decentralized so that the smaller nationalities would have enough local power to compensate for their inevitable minor role in the central government.

The French, British and Germans would have to learn to view each other as non-rival equals, and control the traditional tendency of two of them appearing to gang up on the third one, or one of them feeling able or qualified to dominate the rest. It should be noted, however, that in none of the existing multi-national states have there been three major nationalities of similar size and power forming the central core of the state. This factor could create great difficulties in the Western European Union.

The wealthier parts of the union would have to make an extraordinary effort to industrialize the less developed section of the state to prevent certain nationalities from becoming the proletarian. The equasion of social class with nationality has been one of the explosive issues of all multi-national, or potential multi-national states.

The new state would have to achieve major successes in foreign and defense policies which are the two main spheres which would justify its raison d'être in the first place, since regional economic integration is achievable without the creation of a new multi-national state and gradual social and cultural integration is taking place under the present multi-state system. It is difficult to forecast what sort of foreign policy orientation a Western European Union would follow as its appearance on the world scene would change the whole system and the possible choices to be made therein. Unlike any of the four European states which we have discussed the new creation would be a potential Superpower which could hardly be satisfied with a minor role such as those assumed by Switzerland, Belgium, Czechoslovakia or Yugoslavia. If one is to go by the foreign policy ideals of the existing Western European states and their inability to reach a joint policy on any major international issue, then the foreign policy of the new state would be the product of forces which we are unable to foresee.

If one believes the security of Europe today to be based on the delicate balance achieved between the United States and the Soviet Union then the major change which Western European Union would